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Abstract        
Following the introduction of the microprocessor into the power system protection 
field, modern microprocessor based numeric relays have developed very rapidly in the 
last 20 years, and modern power system protection schemes are virtually all based on 
microcomputers technology. 
  
The International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) recently launched the standard 
IEC61850, “Communication Networks and System in Substation”, which is having a 
major impact on the structure of new protection systems and schemes. In itself it 
describes the concepts for sub-station communications covering protection, control 
and metering functions. However, although it is going to have a major impact on the 
power systems communications, it will also influence the design of future protection 
systems.  
 
There will also be a host of other opportunities and advantages that can be realised. 
These include easier upgrading, refurbishment and replacement of sub-station 
protection. They also provide for greater use of general purpose Intelligent Electronics 
Devices (IEDs), self-healing systems, and plug and play type facilities. 
 
The Ethernet based communication network for data transfer between process level 
switchyard equipment and bay level IEDs, the process bus, is defined in IEC61850 
Section 9-2. This process bus facilitates the communication of two types of real-time, 
peer-to-peer communication messages. Generic object-oriented substation event 
messages, the GOOSE messages and the data sample values, SVs which include the 
measured currents and voltages. Although this standard describes the message 
structures and the timing requirements, it does not describe the process bus topology. 
 
This work describes different LAN topologies that can be used in the design of 
process bus for protection systems. It considers the implications of the different 
structures on the operation of the protection scheme and how these relate to the 
operational strategy of different operators. 
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It provides an assessment of the data handling capabilities of the system and how the 
demands of the protection system can be met. Several potential problem areas are 
identified and analyzed. The probabilistic nature of these systems is discussed and the 
implications explained.  
 
It also provides an insight into the implementation of the alternative topologies and 
their performance when applied to a transmission line feeder protection and 
transformer protection. 
 
The digital substation and the implementation of IEC61850 are fundamental to the 
future of protection ‘relays’. There are many pointers to the potential directions that 
these systems will develop and the skills required for the protection engineers of the 
future. 
 
This project is seeking to overcome some of the ownership challenges presented by 
modern protection and control (P&C) devices, which have an inherent short life due 
to their dependence on modern electronics and software.  
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T HIS chapter briefly describes the background, motivation, objectives, and contribution of this work. It also provides an overview of the thesis. 
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1.1 Introduction 
IEC61850 is the new approved international standard for communication in 
substations. It enables integration of all protection, control, measurement and 
monitoring functions within a substation, and additionally provides the means for 
high-speed substation protection applications, interlocking and intertripping. It 
combines the convenience of Ethernet with the performance and security which is 
essential in substations, and also offers new possibilities for maximising economic 
and effective utilisation of the transmission asset and network. 
 
IEC61850 has already made a significant impact on the development of different 
devices or systems used in the substation. All major substation protection and control 
equipment manufacturers have products the implement different forms of IEC61850 
communication to simplify integration in substation automation systems and improve 
the functionality of the system, and reduce the overall system cost at the same time. 
New protection solutions are also being developed in order to take full advantage of 
the functionality supported in the new standard.  
 
To take full advantages of this new technology, National Grid Electricity 
Transmission launched the Architecture of Substation Secondary System (AS3) [1]. 
This project is seeking to overcome some of the ownership challenges presented by 
modern protection and control (P&C) devices, which have an inherent short life due 
to their dependence on modern electronics and software. This will be achieved by 
implementation of a process bus. 
 
Compared with the substation primary plants and instrument transformers which 
generally remain in-service for long life-cycles, renewed only when physically or 
mechanically life-expired, the secondary systems (P&C equipments) are often 
changed more frequently. The short life of P&C equipment means that during the 
typical 40 year asset life of primary switchgear the secondary equipment needs to be 
replaced at least once and probably twice. Based on the statistics from UK 
construction, currently achievable replacement rate for protection and control systems 
is about 5% per annual. It would take around 20 years to complete a whole cycle of a 
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replacement. However, the modern P&C equipments asset life is 15 years, and in 
many cases, they only last 10 years due to the availability of technical support and 
technology change. In addition, the replacement and maintenance of substation 
secondary equipment may also lead to downtime, which negatively influences the 
overall availability of the substation. One factor which contributes to this problem is 
the complex wiring required for the installation of a relay. Another possible 
contributing factor is relay obsolescence. If a new relay has to be installed, it may 
require a new configuration in order to communicate with the existing substation 
equipment, and this may not be possible without the use of expensive protocol 
converters. Normally, outages for replacement of P&C devices are eight weeks in 
duration and National Grid would like to reduce these to typically one to two weeks. 
 
One way to overcome the problem is to develop a new architecture for substation 
secondary systems by deploying some new technologies such as standard interface 
modules, process bus and IEC61850 communication protocol. The deployment of 
IEC61850 process bus technology will allow ongoing substation secondary equipment 
retrofitting (refurbishment) projects to proceed whilst limiting the duration and 
frequency of circuit outages, required to facilitate the work. Once the new technology 
is installed, secondary equipment renewals occurring mid-life in the primary plant 
lifecycle can be undertaken in a safer, quicker and easier way with much reduced 
outages of primary systems.  
 
This will also enable vendor interoperability and easier modification and extension of 
the secondary schemes, particularly allowing reconfiguration and feature 
enhancement by software means, rather than the modification of wiring as would have 
been the case in the past. As the new secondary systems transmit data of CT and VT 
analogue signals via the process bus, this poses no safety risks of opening CT circuits, 
and hence improving the safety when the protection replacement is carried out with 
primary circuit in service. 
 
To improve installation and commission of protection systems and to aid lifetime 
management issues, the following design features are required which can be provided 
by the AS3 project:  
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a) Standard Interface or “switching boxes” must be provided as the secondary 
interface to primary switchgear. 
 
b) An architecture must be provided which satisfies some Standard Rules. 
 
c) Installation practices need to be simplified. 
 
d) Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) need to be the main form of commissioning 
and on site testing and commissioning needs to be simplified. 
 
e) A means of upgrade and maintenance of the systems including a means of 
physical isolation needs to be inherent in the design. 
 
To achieve all the requirements, AS3 project in divided into 13 working groups which 
are listed below: 
 
 WG1: Current Policy & Practice Review 
 
 WG2: Strategy Analysis (Risk assessment, Business case) 
 
 WG3: Implementation Strategy 
 
 WG4: Architecture & Reliability 
 
 WG5: Protection Performance Study 
 
 WG6: I/O Standardisation 
 
 WG7: IEC61850 Configuration/Merging Unit (MU) Specifications 
 
 WG8: Test & Commissioning Philosophy 
 
 WG9: Safety & Operation 
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 4 WGs with National Grid main suppliers/alliances (ABB, ALSTOM, 
Mitsubishi & Siemens) 
 
This project is part of WG5 and is concerned with the implementation of the digital 
sub-station for power system local protection and control. In particular it explores the 
implementation of IEC61850 9-2 which proposes an Ethernet based communication 
network between switchyard equipments and bay level protection and control, P&C. 
This process bus connects transducers and actuators to Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs), which are responsible for the decision making. The process bus, an Ethernet 
LAN, facilitates the communication of time-critical messages, including SV and 
GOOSE messages. 
 
1.2 Standard Interfaces 
Standard interface “switching boxes” with a 40 year asset life need to be specified 
across the supplier base. The switching box is designed to fit between the high voltage 
(HV) equipment hardwired secondary interface and the AS3 system merging units and 
circuit breaker controllers. The merging unit is the direct interface to the process bus. 
The switching box simplifies safety isolation for work on both HV and/or secondary 
equipment and allows for short outage durations during asset replacement of the 
shorter life MUs, CBCs, process buses and IEDs. In the substation, the process bus 
will use fibre optic equipment. 
 
The switching box will be a combination of separate types of switching units; Current 
Transformer (CT), Voltage Transformer (VT) and General Input/Output 
Disconnection. The number and types used will depend on the bay configuration. 
 
With reference to Figure 1-1, the HV equipment side external wiring is directly 
connected to switching units, which then connect to a bay standard marshalling field 
using plugs and sockets. The protection and control side external wiring interface with 
the process bus (the merging unit and circuit breaker controller) is connected by plugs 
and sockets to the other side of the marshalling field. The marshalling field should be 
made standard for a particular bay type and can be used both on site and for factory 
acceptance testing [1]. 
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Figure 1-1 Switching unit connection 
 
The means of physical isolation shall be suitable for use as a “point of isolation” in 
the National Grid Electricity Safety Rules. 
 
1.3 Process Bus Architecture 
To aid lifetime management issues the system architecture on the process bus must be 
designed to allow simple disconnection – switch box or merging unit isolation 
particular to an IED.  
 
For example, first and second main protection systems should have separate merging 
units and process buses. Physical isolation of hardwired interfaces and the ability to 
disconnect LAN switches whilst keeping most of the protection systems in service is a 
necessity to minimise the risks of incidents to the utility. These are part of the 
National Grid Company’s “Golden Rules” [2]. 
 
Primary aims of AS3 process bus architecture are: 
 
A. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements. 
 
B. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement. 
 
Page 
Chapter 1                                                                                    Overview of AS3 Project
                                                                         
   
                                                                                                                                                                          7
C. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems. 
 
D. Reduce risks of mal-operation. 
 
Each protection bay type should be based on a standard architecture. Primary 
equipment associated with a bay will contain circuit breakers, isolators, voltage 
transformers (VTs), Current Transformers (CTs), Interposing Transformers, and Earth 
Switches. 
 
The number and layout of the primary equipment will vary with the type of bay, for 
example a double busbar (DBB) or a mesh corner (MC). 
 
The inputs and outputs of the primary equipment shall be routed through switching 
boxes, this provides isolation of the primary equipment from the protection equipment 
and vice versa. 
 
There are seven golden rules which must be followed in the design of the process bus 
Architecture [2]:  
 
1. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types – 
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC 
Transformer, MC Feeder. 
 
The number of process buses, the means of collating information, the means of 
isolation, and the means of tripping shall be identical in philosophy across bay 
types. 
 
2. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary 
equipment 
 
Analogue and digital signals are to be converted to SVs on to the bay process 
buses by merging units. These shall be installed as close as possible to the primary 
equipment to provide the greatest saving in copper cabling. CT merging units 
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shall be normal resolution for protection and control CTs, and high resolution for 
measurement CTs. 
 
3. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system. 
 
4. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay. 
 
5. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection & 
Control). 
 
Switching boxes, test/normal switches and gateway LAN switches shall be 
provided. 
 
6. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally 
identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid 
suppliers. 
 
There shall be 3 IEDs on a standard bay – MAIN 1, MAIN 2, and bay controller. 
 
The IEDs shall trip their own bay circuit breakers directly via the process bus and 
CBCs.   
 
The IEDs shall trip other busbar bay circuit breakers via the process bus, gateway 
switch and busbar process bus. 
 
7. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding 
intertrip send).  
 
The gateway switches shall provide isolation for the protection bay as well as a 
connection to the busbar process bus for passing on tripping to keep the transfer 
trip time across bays to a minimum. 
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1.4 Installation 
For current feeder protection asset replacement schemes, outages of six weeks are 
the norm with 3-4 weeks spent on installation. The time is generally taken up by 
interfacing with existing systems using hardwiring, and engineering of one off 
issues such as Emergency Return to Service (ERTS). An additional constraint 
applies when the new protection cannot be installed in situ pre-outage. 
 
To improve installation times significantly, it is suggested the following 
requirements. 
 
A. Pre-Outage works should be maximised. Previous asset replacement over the 
last 10 years should have freed significant room in relay rooms allowing pre-
outage installation of panels and other works. Where this is not possible this 
will likely increase installation times by up to 1 week. 
 
B. Standard interface “switching boxes” need to be specified across the supplier 
base. This should minimise hardwired interfaces. ERTS can be easily achieved 
by the use of standard plugs and sockets (or similar) to connect the merging 
units to the “switching boxes”. 
 
C. Merging units/CBCs and switching boxes should be placed as close to the 
plant interface as possible. The use of suitable weatherproof marshalling 
kiosks or small dispersed relay rooms may need to be considered for sites 
without existing dispersed relay rooms or Local Control Cubicles (LCCs). 
There may be such sites where wiring to the common relay room can be 
retained - dependant on the suitability of the existing marshalling of cross site 
cables. New bays added to such sites would likely require a dispersed relay 
room. 
 
D. Connections from the merging unit to the IED’s should be either fibre optic or 
Ethernet cable to minimise hardwiring. 
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Initial installation of a switching box and AS3 bay solution with 1-4 above 
implemented should be possible in two weeks outage. Note that two – three weeks 
pre-outage work may be required to fit relay panels, cabling, Site Acceptance Testing 
and Stage 1 commissioning. Subsequent installation of a bay solution to an existing 
switching box should be possible in circa one week outage. 
 
1.5 Test and Commission 
For feeder protection asset replacement schemes within National Grid, outages of six 
weeks are the norm with 2-3 weeks spent on commissioning. The time is generally 
taken up by testing of hardwire interfaces and hardwiring in cubicles, witnessing 
supplier SCT sheets, fault finding, trip and alarm tests, settings loading verification 
[3], and stage 2 commissioning; all as per National Grid Procedure TP106 [4]. 
 
To improve testing and commissioning times significantly it is suggested the 
following is required in addition to the points in 1.4 above:  
 
A. FAT testing needs to be the major part of the commissioning process with the 
full involvement of National Grid commissioning engineers. Testing of fibre 
interfaces on site should be minimal to ensure correct connections. The FAT 
should be carried out on the contract specific hardware using a fully connected 
system. This shall comprise functional testing and include all interfaces. 
 
B. All hardwiring installed or interfered with should be fully tested on site in line 
with current National Grid procedures. It is thus advantageous to reduce this as 
much as possible. 
 
C. IEC61850 “emulators” should be engineered across the supplier base to 
simplify FAT testing. 
 
D. Suppliers should have ‘test platforms’ available within their FAT facilities that 
emulate exactly the switching box interface. This ensures a standard approach 
for connections during the FAT. 
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E. Supplier Site Commissioning Test (SCT) sheets should be part of the FAT test. 
 
F. The supplier should ensure a general Site Acceptance Test (SAT) is carried 
out on site for all delivered hardware and interface connections prior to 
installation to the “switching boxes”. This should simply ensure the hardware 
is not damaged and include minimal overlap tests. 
 
G. To ensure correct operation of the protection functions it is suggested that 
generic functional SCT sheets are provided by National Grid to formalise the 
trip and alarm tests. These tests should be carried out by National Grid and 
should take up to two days. 
 
Settings Load Verification and Stage 2 Commissioning would complete the testing 
and commissioning prior to return to service.  
 
Initial testing and commissioning of a switching box and AS3 bay solution with the 
above implemented should be possible in two weeks circuit outage. 
 
Subsequent testing and commissioning of a bay solution to an existing switching box 
should be possible in circa one week. 
 
1.6 System Upgrade 
Upgrades or replacements to IEDs and or merging units/CBCs under a Post Delivery 
Support Agreement (PDSA) should be relatively straightforward provided the 
following is applied or adhered to: 
 
A. FAT testing of the IED is carried out with sufficient overlap. 
 
B. The system is designed to allow simple disconnection – switch box or merging 
unit isolation particular to an IED. For example first and second main systems 
should have separate merging units and LANs. 
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C. Testing on site for fibre interfaces is minimal to provide correct connection 
and transfer of a signal over the network between associated IEDs. 
 
D. The use of outages should be minimised by the design. 
 
E. Prior to returning to service the normal Transmission Procedure TP107 [5] 
procedures must be followed on site to ensure the correct settings and 
configurations are loaded i.e. file comparisons. 
 
F. Following upgrade or replacement sufficient on load testing is carried out to 
ensure that, as a minimum, the device is correctly reading both power systems 
values and plant status , is stable and is in full communication both local and 
any remote ends. 
 
1.7 Maintenance 
Maintenance shall comprise the following: 
 
A. Secondary injection of each switching box to prove AC quantities both at the 
merging units and the IEDs. 
 
B. Testing of hardwired I/O from the switching box to the merging units and 
IEDs. 
 
C. Trip testing of all Main Protection IED’s. 
 
A Suitable means of interrogation of the IEDs and process bus using an IEC61850 
emulator is to be provided. 
 
Test/Normal switches to assist general maintenance and fault investigation are to be 
provided on all IEDs and Merging Units. 
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1.8 Overview of WG5 – Protection Performance 
Study 
1.8.1 Introduction 
The project of protection performance study is undertaken by the University of Bath 
and the University of Manchester, which is sponsored by National Grid, ALSTOM 
Grid, Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power.  
 
The aim of the project is to investigate, quantify and optimise the level of security, 
dependability and operating speed in secondary schemes with an appropriate 
IEC61850 process bus topology on a National Grid’s mesh substation as shown in 
Figure 1-2.  
 
 
Figure 1-2 National Grid mesh substation 
 
1.8.2 Protection Schemes Applied in the Mesh Substation 
A mesh station is a type of primary substation configuration that is economical in its 
use of circuit breakers. Although there are many variants, the typical configurations 
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are single switch and four switch meshes, the names inferring the number of circuit 
breakers used to accomplish the layout.  
A mesh corner is where busbars connect circuit breakers, transformers and feeders. A 
four switch mesh has four mesh corners as shown in Figure 1-3. Feeders or 
transformers connect to mesh corners via motorized disconnectors to provide 
individual isolation and it is possible to have more than one transformer connected to 
the mesh corner. A mesh corner would typically have a feeder and up to two 
transformers connected which means with four circuit breakers. A station could be 
built with 4 feeder and 8 transformer circuits. If a circuit breaker requires maintenance, 
it may be taken out of the mesh without any loss of supply. 
 
 
Figure 1-3 The four switch mesh substation 
 
The main differences between the protection arrangements at a mesh substation 
compared to those at a double-busbar substation concern the protection provided for 
the busbar. At a mesh substation, the number of circuit breaker required to be tripped 
in the event of a busbar fault is much smaller than at a double-busbar substation and 
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the operational consequences of an inadvertent operation of the busbar protection are 
very much less severe, hence there is no need for a “two out of two” logic in the 
tripping sequence. The busbar protection at a mesh substation is normally of the high 
impedance differential type and is arranged in a “one out of two” logic. 
 
The National Grid mesh station has one mesh corner which is connected to a feeder 
and a transformer similar as the mesh corner 1 in Figure 1-3. In the project, the mesh 
corner will be protected by an IEC61850 based mesh corner protection relay. The 
transformer will be protected by an IEC61850 based transformer protection relay. The 
feeder will be protected by the current differential and distance protection schemes. In 
these schemes, the local end of the feeder is equipped with the IEC61850 based 
protection relays, and the remote end of the feeder is equipped with the conventional 
protection relays. 
 
The study assesses the security, dependability and operating speed of the process bus 
based protection schemes, and compares them with the traditional hardwired schemes.  
The lab tests are also be carried out to verify the performance. As a precursor to wide 
deployment of the philosophy in AS3 project, it must be ensured that the performance 
of the protection and control schemes using IEC61850 meets or exceeds that of its 
hardwired Substation Information, Control & Protection (SICAP) predecessors. 
 
1.8.3 Implementation Plan 
The project is managed under the steering group consisting of representatives from all 
parties, University of Bath, University of Manchester, National Grid, ALSTOM Grid, 
Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power, delivering agreed deliverables 
annually in line with agreed project plan-detail in development with steering group: 
 
 Two full-time PhD students, Mr. Xin Sun supervised by Dr. Miles Redfern at 
University of Bath and Ms. Li Yang supervised by Professor Peter Crossley at 
University of Manchester, work on this project, with specialist support from 
ALSTOM Grid and NG for applications of the new protection and control 
system. 
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 ALSTOM Grid has free issued the new protection relays and built the panels. 
The Panels are listed in Table 1-1 below.  
 
Table 1-1 Panels and protection relays issued by ALSTOM Grid 
Name of Panel Components Quantity 
Feeder Local Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P545 Distance 
Protection Relay, 
1 
IEC61850 based MiCOM P545 Current 
Differential Protection Relay 
1 
MiCOM P594 GPS Synchronization Unit 1 
Remote Local Panel Conventional MiCOM P545 Distance 
Protection Relay, 
1 
Conventional MiCOM P545 Current 
Differential Protection Relay 
1 
MiCOM P594 GPS Synchronization Unit 1 
HV Transformer Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P643 Transformer 
Protection Relay, 
1 
IEC61850 based MiCOM P841 Multifunction 
Line Terminal IED 
1 
LV Transformer Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P643 Transformer 
Protection Relay 
1 
MiCOM P594 GPS synchronization unit 1 
Mesh Corner Panel IEC61850 based MiCOM P645 Mesh Corner 
Protection Relay 
1 
IEC61850 based MiCOM P841 Multifunction 
Line Terminal IED 
1 
MiCOM P594 GPS Synchronization Unit 1 
 
 Both universities develop their abilities for detailed system testing and 
demonstration.  
 
The task of the University of Bath is testing and analyzing the protection 
performance of feeder bay and transformer bay.  
Page 
Chapter 1                                                                                    Overview of AS3 Project
                                                                         
   
                                                                                                                                                                          17
 Detailed Scope-Responsibility matrix and project plan have been developed 
and are managed by the project steering group and progress meetings are held 
quarterly. 
 
 Interaction with AS3 project and team via planned workshops, conferences and 
seminars to all participants. 
 
 NG’s site engineers and the development engineers from key manufactures are 
invited to comment on the new secondary systems during lab tests. 
 
1.9 Design of the Process Bus Architecture  
1.9.1 Introduction 
A standard process bus architecture which can achieve the four primary aims and 
obey the seven golden rules of AS3 project must be established, before the protection 
performance study take place.  
 
1. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements. 
 
2. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement. 
 
3. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems. 
 
4. Reduce risks of mal-operation. 
 
5. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types – 
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC 
Transformer, MC Feeder. 
 
6. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary 
equipment. 
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7. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system. 
 
8. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay. 
 
9. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection & 
Control). 
 
10. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally 
identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid 
suppliers. 
 
11. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding 
intertrip send).  
 
Therefore, each party of the working group puts forward their own standard process 
bus architecture design. In the process bus architecture design of the University of 
Bath, each protection IED (main protection, backup protection and bay control unit) 
and its associated MUs and CBCs are connected to one dedicated process bus, which 
makes the different protection schemes are totally separated and independent. 
 
After working with WG4 – Architecture & Reliability (PhD student Miss Uzoamaka 
Anombem supervised by Doctor Haiyu Li at the University of Manchester working on 
this project), a process bus architecture has been finally proposed and have already 
been agreed by National Grid. 
 
Figure 1-4 illustrated the substation communication system within feeder bay which 
adopts the standard process bus architecture. 
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Figure 1-4 Communication system within feeder bay using the proposed standard 
process bus architecture 
 
Where: 
 
MP: Main Protection; 
BP: Backup Protection; 
BCU: Bay Control Unit; 
M: Metering; 
PMU: Phase Measurement Unit; 
PB: Process Bus; 
GPS: Global Position System; 
MU: Merging Unit; 
CBC: Circuit Breaker Controller; 
SB: Switch Box; 
CTMP: Measurement Class CT; 
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VT: Voltage Transformer; 
CB: Circuit Breaker. 
 
The blocks on PB1 and PB2 are Ethernet switches, and the blocks on Station Bus 
and Measurement Bus are gateway switches.  
 
The gateway switches shall provide isolation for the protection bay as well as a 
connection to the busbar process bus for passing on tripping instruction and to 
keep the transfer trip time across bays to a minimum. 
 
In this process bus architecture, each CT and VT is connected to a MU, while each 
CB is connected to a CBC. The MU1 and CBC1 are connected to the bay process bus 
1, while the MU2 and CBC2 are connected to the bay process bus 2. There is a switch 
box between each CT/VT and MU and also between each CB and CBC, which is used 
for isolation purposes. The protection IEDs, MP1, MP2 and BP, are connected to the 
process bus and station bus. The dashed arrow shows the bay level IED process bus 
connections are not dedicated, which can be switch to the other process bus when 
necessary. Therefore, the MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 are totally separated and independent.  
The BCU, M and PMU devices are connected to the measurement process bus. The 
measurement CT MU and CBC are connected via a gateway switch to the 
measurement process bus. 
 
Figure 1-5 illustrated the substation communication system for the feeder bay and the 
transformer bay. 
 
Page 
Chapter 1                                                                                    Overview of AS3 Project
                                                                         
   
                                                                                                                                                                          21
 
Figure 1-5 Communication system of feeder bay and transformer bay using the 
proposed standard process bus architecture 
 
In the transformer bay, the MP and the BP are connected to PB1 and PB2 respectively, 
which are independent. There is one inter bay process bus which is the measurement 
bus in this substation communication system.  
 
Therefore, the complete communication system of the mesh corner substation is 
derived as shown in Figure 1-6. 
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Figure 1-6 Communication system of mesh corner substation using the proposed standard process bus architecture
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In the feeder bay, the MP1, BP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB1, 
the MP2 and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB2, which makes the 
feeder MAIN1 and MAIN2 protections totally separated and independent. 
 
In the transformer bay, the MP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB1, 
the BP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB2, which makes the 
transformer main and back up protections totally separated and independent. 
 
In the mesh corner bay, the MP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB1, 
the BP and associated MUs and CBCs are connected to PB2, which makes the mesh 
corner main and back up protections totally separated and independent. 
 
Three phases switch box is used to isolate CT/VT and MU. One phase switch box is 
used to isolate CB and CBC. 
 
All the BCUs used for control and monitoring of switchgear, transformers and other 
equipments in the substation, metering devices, PMU and associated MUs and CBCs 
are connected to the inter bay measurement PB. A station bus is used to provide 
primary communications between the IEDs, which provide the various station 
protection, control, monitoring, and logging functions. All the process buses and the 
station bus are synchronized by GPS. 
 
1.9.2 Advantages of the Standard Process Bus Architecture 
The main advantages of this process bus architecture are described below in terms of 
the four primary aims and seven golden rules of AS3 project. 
 
1. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements. 
 
With the application of switching box, two independent bay process buses and 
gateway switches, the, any single faulty IED can be replaced without an outage or 
impacting any other IEDs. 
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2. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement. 
 
The secondary system of a bay can be refurbished without an outage. 
 
3. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems. 
 
The primary system of a bay can be refurbished in an isolated way. 
 
4. Reduce risks of mal-operation. 
 
By using the independent MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protection systems, each 
protection IED is capable of tripping the circuit breaker. Therefore, the risk of 
mal-operation is reduced. 
 
5. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types – 
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC 
Transformer, MC Feeder. 
 
The process bus architecture is proposed as a standard for all bay types. 
 
6. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary 
equipment. 
 
The switching box is capable of being located next to the Primary equipment 
 
7. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system. 
 
The MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 systems are totally separated and independent. 
 
8. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay. 
 
All the BCUs are connected to the inter-bay  process bus and station bus through 
gateway switches. Any single failure would influence one BCU at most. 
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9. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing. 
 
The application of switching box and gateway switches can fulfil this requirement. 
 
10. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally 
identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid 
suppliers. 
 
The new substation communication system will not influence the protection and 
control schemes that the substations are using at the moment. 
 
11. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding 
intertrip send).  
 
This rule will be tested and demonstrated in the following chapters 
 
1.10 Objectives and Contributions of This Study 
This research is focusing on the communications needs associated with the protection 
scheme for an EHV mesh-corner operated by a transmission network operator. The 
main objectives of this project are shown below: 
 
1. The design and implementation of the different process bus topologies as 
applied to the mesh-corner protection. 
 
As described in section 1.9 above, the double bay process bus architecture (PB1 
and PB2) is established. However, there are different Ethernet LAN topologies 
which can be applied on the design of PB1 and PB2.  
 
In this study, the mesh-corner substation model is built by using the Real Time 
Digital Simulator (RTDS) software. Different process bus communication systems 
are built for the University of Bath’s RTDS hardware and IEDs.  
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2. The reliability and availability analysis of the different process bus 
communication topologies.  
 
The reliability and availability of the different process bus topologies are 
calculated and analyzed before tested on the experiment platform.  
 
3. The performance of an Ethernet switched communication networks in terms of 
communications volume and latency.  
 
Different process bus topologies are modelled by using the OPNET 
communication network simulation tool. The latency of each process bus topology 
is estimated in terms of the communication volume. 
 
4. The effects on the protection scheme performance in respect to limitations in 
the communications volume and its latency. 
 
Adopting different process bus topologies, the performance of the protection 
relays with different protection schemes are evaluated in terms of the 
communication volume. 
 
The main contributions of this study can be summarized below: 
 
1. Configuration of various existing and new substation automation system, SAS, 
process bus structures. 
 
2. Modelling of these using commercially available simulation tools. These 
configurable IED models allow the engineers to easily build SAS network 
model with different topologies for all kinds of substations, so that the 
dynamic performance issues could be studied and rules could be developed to 
guide the SAS network planning and design. 
 
3. Investigation of the impact of the various process bus structures on the power 
system network operator’s primary operation aims and the golden rules.  
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1.11 Thesis Outline 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter two describes the development, concept, and major benefits of 
IEC61850. It also compares the conventional substation protection system with the 
IEC16850 based protection system. 
Chapter three evaluates the performance of IEC61850 based and conventional 
relays using a commercial Test Universe. Two feeder protection schemes, distance 
and current differential protection schemes, are involved in the tests. The trip times of 
both relays are recorded and mean trip times are calculated. 
Chapter four describes three different process bus topologies, their 
implementations and their relative advantages and disadvantages. It also puts forward 
mean time to failure and availability analysis of a transmission line protection scheme 
using different Ethernet based process bus topologis based on the reliability block 
diagram method, RBD.  
Chapter five evaluates the performance of SV messages over the three Ethernet 
switch based process bus topologies by using OPNET communication network 
simulation tool. In these tests, ETE delay of the SV messages under normal and 
process bus overload conditions are simulated. 
Chapter six evaluates the performance of different protection schemes, which 
include distance protection scheme, feeder current differential protection scheme and 
transformer current differential protection scheme, with cascaded, star and ring 
process bus architecture using RTDS Simulator. It also examines the performance of 
the IEC61850 relay when the data transfer traffic on the process bus exceeds its 
capability and data packets are therefore lost. 
Chapter seven summarizes the key findings from the research and the major 
contributions of the work and provides some potential research topics in IEC61850. 
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T HIS chapter introduces the development, concept, and key benefits of IEC61850.  
Introduction of IEC61850 
Chapter 2              
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2.1 IEC61850 – Communication Networks and 
Systems in Substation 
2.1.1 The Development of IEC61850 
Communication has always played a critical role in the real-time operation of the 
power system. In the beginning, the telephone was used to transmit the transmission 
line loads back to the control centre, and also to dispatch the instructions to be 
performed by the operators at substations. Telephone-switching based remote control 
units were carried out as early as the 1930’s and were able to provide status and 
control for a few points. As digital communications in substations became practical in 
the 1960’s, the data acquisition systems (DAS) were installed to automatically collect 
measurement data from the substations. Because bandwidth was limited, DAS 
communication protocols were only optimized to operate over low-bandwidth 
communication channels. Therefore, the time that it would take to configure, map and 
document the location of the various data bits received by the protocol was relatively 
long, which was the “cost” of this optimization. 
Since the mid 1970s, power system engineers have sought ways to use 
microprocessors to improve the control, protection, and monitoring of power system 
substations. This led to the rapid development of the modern microprocessor relays. 
The microprocessors combine the advantages of semiconductor technology with the 
flexibility of the digital computer. Software offers considerable flexibility in scheme 
logic and the possibility of switching selectable scheme logics and operating 
characteristics. Hardware provides for general purpose system and standardized 
protection platforms. It enables relays to be easily modified to meet new and varied 
requirement of particular customers, by changing the software without the need to 
redesign the relay’s hardware.  
Modern microprocessor relays integrate multiple functions, such as protection, 
control, automation, metering, digital fault recording and reporting, and are therefore 
able to efficiently accommodate various power system services. For this reason, they 
are also referred to as Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) which are widely used in 
today’s electrical protection systems.  
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The development of IEDs and network communication technologies led to the success 
of substation automation system (SAS), which could facilitate the effective substation 
monitoring, local & remote control, protection, primary equipment condition 
monitoring and many other functions that couldn’t be easily realized with 
conventional protection and control devices.  
Since stepping into a digital era, literally thousands of analogue and digital data points 
are available in a single IED and the communication bandwidth is not a limiting factor 
any more. At present, it is common that the communication data paths between 
substations and master can operate at 64,000 bits per second, and it is obvious that it 
will migrate to the data paths with much higher rates. With this migration in 
technology, the “cost” component of a data acquisition system has now become the 
configuration and documentation component. Therefore, a key component of a 
communication system is able to describe themselves from both a data and services 
(communications functions that an IED performs) perspective. Other key 
requirements include: 
 
 High-speed IED to IED communication 
 
 Network operation throughout the utility enterprise 
 
 High-availability 
 
 Guaranteed delivery times 
 
 Standards based 
 
 Multi-vendor interoperability 
 
 Support for Voltage and Current samples data 
 
 Support for File Transfer 
 
 Auto-configurable / configuration support 
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 Support for security 
The absence of a common communication protocol has already become a major 
deterrent for the use of communication in SAS. Until recently, manufacturers were 
using their own proprietary communication protocols. Therefore, a huge investment 
was needed to develop costly and complicated protocol converters [6]. It has been 
estimated that across that information technology industry around US$82 billion was 
spent on application integration in 1998, which amounted to 40% of the corporate IT 
budgets [7]. To address these SAS issues, an international communication standard is 
imperative. 
The work on the development of a next generation communication architecture began 
with the establishment of the Utility Communication Architecture (UCA) in 1988. 
The result of this work was a profile of recommended protocols for the various layers 
of the International Standards Organization (ISO) Open System Interconnection (OSI) 
communication system model. This architecture resulted in the definition of a profile 
of protocols, data models and abstract services definitions that became the UCA. The 
concepts and fundamental work done in UCA became the foundation for the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee Number 57 
(TC 57), this developed and maintained international standards for power system 
control, distribution automation, teleprotection, and associated information exchange 
for real-time and non-real-time information, used in the planning, operation and 
maintenance of power systems. Working Group 10 (WG10) of TC 57 launched the 
International Standard – IEC61850 – Communication Networks and Systems in 
Substations in 1995, and the first edition issued in 2002. The scope of each IEC61850 
related working group is described below. 
  
1. TC 57 Working Group 10: Power systems IED communication and associated data 
models [8] 
 
Scope: To develop communication standards for substations – Functional architecture 
and general requirements. 
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2. TC 57 Working Group 13: Energy management system application program 
interface (EMS – API) [8] 
 
Scope: To produce standard interface specification for “plug-in” application for an 
electric utility power control centre Energy management System (EMS) or other 
system performing the same or similar functions. A “plug-in” application is defined to 
be software that may be installed on a system with minimal effort and no modification 
of source code. This standard facilitates installation of the same application program 
on different platforms by reducing the efforts currently required. 
 
3. TC 57 Working Group 14: System interfaces for distribution management (SIDM) 
[8] 
 
Scope: Identify and establish requirements of standard interfaces of a Distribution 
Management System (DMS) based on an interface architecture. The standard is the 
first in a series of standards that, taken as a whole, define Distribution Management 
Systems. Subsequent standards will be developed in accordance with the interfaces 
defined in this task. 
 
4. TC 57 Working Group 15: Data and communication security [8] 
 
Scope: Undertake the development of standards for security of the communication 
protocols defined by the IEC TC 57. 
 
5. TC 57 Working Group 17: Communications Systems for Distribution Energy 
Resources (DER) [8] 
 
Scope: Undertake the development of IEC61850 information models to be used in the 
exchange of information with distributed energy resources (DER). 
 
6. TC 57 Working Group 18: Hydroelectric power plants – Communication for 
monitoring and control [8] 
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Scope: IEC61850-7-410 is part of the IEC61850 series. This part of IEC61850 
specifies the additional common data classes, logical nodes and data objects required 
for the use of IEC61850 in hydropower plant. 
 
7. TC 57 Working Group 19: Interoperability within TC 57 in the long term [8] 
 
Scope: Harmonization of IEC61850 and common information model  
 
The standard IEC61850 “Communication networks and systems in substation” has 
been published by IEC between 2003 and 2005. This global communication standard 
for the SAS, defines the communication protocol, data format, and the configuration 
language, thus provides the interoperability within power substation. In an IEC61850 
based substation automation system, the cables which carry binary or analogue 
information between different equipments will be replaced with a standardized 
communication. 
 
2.1.2 The Scope and Outline of IEC61850 
The stated scope of IEC61850 was communications within the substation. The 
document defines the various aspects of substation communication network in 10 
major sections as show in Table 2-1 [9]. 
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Table 2-1 Scope of IEC61850 
Part # Title 
1 Introduction and Overview 
2 Glossary of Terms 
3 General Requirements  
4 System and Project Management 
5 Communication Requirements for Functions and Device Models 
6 Configuration Description Language for Communication in Electrical 
Substations Related to Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) 
7 Basic Communication Structure for Substation and Feeder Equipment 
7.1 - Principles and Models 
7.2 - Abstract Communication Service Interface (ASCI) 
7.3 - Common Data Classes (CDC) 
7.4 - Compatible Logical Node Classes and Data Classes 
8 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) 
8.1 - Mapping to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506 – Part 1 and Part 2) and to ISO/IEC 
8802-3 
9 Specific communication Service Mapping (SCSM) 
9.1 - Sample Values over Serial Unidirectional Multidrop Point-to-Point Link 
9.2 - Sample Values over ISO/IEC 8802-3 
10 Conformance Testing  
 
 
Part 1 and 2: Provide an overview to the IEC61850 standard and contain the glossary 
of the terminology used in the different parts of the standard [10]. 
 
Parts 3, 4, and 5 of the standard identify the general and specific functional 
requirements for communications in a substation. These requirements are then used as 
forcing functions to aid in the identification of the services and data models needed, 
application protocol required, and the underlying transport, network, data link, and 
physical layers that will meet the overall requirements [11]. 
 
From a system perspective, a significant amount of configuration is required to put all 
the pieces together and make them work. In order to facilitate this process and 
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eliminate the human error, part 6 defines a Substation Configuration Language (SCL) 
which is based on the eXtensible Makeup Language (XML) to describe the 
configuration of IEC61850 based system. SCL specifies a hierarchy of configuration 
files that enable multiple levels of the system to be described in unambiguous and 
standardized XML files. The various SCL files include system specification 
description (SSD), IED capability description (ICD), substation configuration 
description (SCD), and configured IED description (CID) files. All these files are 
constructed in the same methods and format but have different scopes depending on 
the need. 
 
Part 7 provides the basic communication structure for substation and feeder 
equipment, including the principles and data models, the Common Data Classes 
(CDC), the Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) and the compatible 
logical node and data classes [12] [13] [14]. 
 
To ease understanding, the data model of the IEC61850 IED can be viewed as a 
hierarchy of information as shown in Figure 2-1. The categories and naming of this 
information is standardized in the IEC61850 specification. 
 
Figure 2-1 Data model layers in IEC61850 
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The levels of this hierarchy can be described as follows: 
 
1) Physical device: identifies the actual IED within a system. Typically the device’s 
name or IP address can be used (for example Feeder_1 or 10.0.0.1). 
 
2) Logical device: identifies groups of related Logical Nodes within the Physical 
Devices. 
 
3) Wrapper/logical node instance: identifies the major functional areas within the 
IEC61850 data model. Either 3 or 6 characters are used as a prefix to define the 
functional (wrapper) while the actual functionality is identified by a 4 character 
Logical Node name suffixed by an instance number. For example, XCBR1 
(circuit breaker), MMXU1 (measurements), FrqPTOF2 (overfrequency 
protection, stage 2) 
 
4) Data object: this next layer is used to identify the type of data you will be 
presented with. For example, Pos (position) of Logical Node type XCBR. 
 
5) Data attribute: this is the actual data (measurement value, status, description, 
etc.). For example, stVal (status value) indicating actual position of circuit 
breaker for Data Object type Pos of Logical Node type XCBR. 
 
“Abstracting” the definition of the data items and services which can create data 
items/objects and services that are independent of any underlying protocols is the 
major architectural construction that IEC61850 adopts. The abstract definitions allow 
“mapping” of the data objects and services to any other protocol which can meet the 
data and service requirement. The definition of the abstract services is found in 
IEC61850 part 7.2. The two relevant ACSI services are show below: 
 
1. Transmission of sampled values model 
 
MULTICAST-SAMPLE-VALUE-CONTROL-BLOCK: 
SendMSVMessage; GetMSVCBValues; SetMSVCBValues 
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UNICAST-SAMPLE-VALUE-CONTROL-BLOCK 
SendUSVMessage; GetUSVCBValues; SetUSVCBValues 
 
2. Generic substation event model (GSE) 
 
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE):  
SendGOOSEMessage; GetGoReference; GetGOOSEElementNumber; 
GetGoCBValues; SetGoCBValues 
 
Generic Substation State Event (GSSE):  
SendGSSEMessage; GetGsReference; GetGSSEDataOffset; GetGsCBValues; 
SetGsCBValues 
 
The abstraction of the data objects (referred to as Logical Nodes) is found in 
IEC61850 part 7.4. Because most data objects are made up of common pieces, such as 
Status, Control, Measurement and Substitution, etc. the concept of CDC is developed 
to define common building blocks for creating the larger data objects. The CDC 
elements are defined in part 7.3. In short, the part 7 achieves the naming of the 
massive data and forming of data objects and services. 
 
The abstract data and object models of IEC61850 define a standardized method of 
describing power system devices that enables all IEDs to present data using identical 
structures that are directly related to their power system function. The ACSI models 
of IEC61850 define a set of services and the responses to those services that enable all 
IEDs to behave in an identical manner from the network behaviour perspective. While 
the abstract model is critical to achieving this level of interoperability, these models 
need to be operated over a real set of protocols that are practical to implement and that 
can operate within the computing environments commonly found in the power 
industry. 
 
IEC61850 Part 8.1 defines the mapping of the abstract data object and services onto 
the Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS) of ISO9506 [9]. MMS is the only 
public (ISO standard) protocol that has proven implementation track record that can 
easily support the complex naming and service models of IEC61850. Although 
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IEC61850 can be theoretically mapped to any protocols, this mapping can get very 
complex and cumbersome when IEC61850 objects and services are tried to be 
mapped to a protocol that only provides read/write/report services for simple variables 
that are accessed by register numbers or index numbers. That was the reason why 
MMS was chosen for UCA in 1991 and kept for IEC61850.  
 
In addition to the mapping to the application layer, IEC61850 Part 8.1 defines profiles 
for the “other” layers of the communication stack that are dependent on the service 
provided which is shown in Figure 2-2. the Sampled Values and GOOSE applications 
map directly into the Ethernet data frame thereby eliminating processing of any 
middle layers; the MMS Connection Oriented layer can operate over TCP/IP or ISO; 
the Generic Substation Status Event (GSSE) is the identical implementation as the 
UCA GOOSE and operates over connectionless ISO services; all data maps onto an 
Ethernet data frame using either the data type “Ethertype” in the case of Sampled 
Values, GOOSE, TimeSync, and TCP/IP or “802.3” data type for the ISO and GSSE 
messages. IEC61850 Part 8.1 defines which is known as the station bus. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Overview of IEC61850 functionality and associated communication profiles 
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IEC61850 Parts 9.1 and 9.2 define the mapping of the Sample Measured Values 
(unidirectional point-to-point and bi-directional multipoint accordingly) onto an 
Ethernet data frame [16]. The IEC61850 part 9.2 defines what has become known as 
the process bus. 
 
The IEC61850 part 9.2 is only restricted to the mapping of the ASCI model for the 
transmission of sampled values. However, to get full benefit of the process bus, 
additional ASCI models need to be supported in accordance to the IEC61850 part 8.1. 
In short, IEC61850 parts 9.2 and 8.1 can be used onto the process bus simultaneously. 
 
Finally, the IEC61850 part 10 defines a testing methodology in order to determine 
“conformance” with the numerous protocol definitions and constraints defined in the 
document [9]. 
 
The standard defines and offers much more than just a protocol. It provides: 
 
 standardized models for IEDs and other equipment within the substation; 
 
 standardized communication services (the methods used to access and 
exchange data); 
 
 standardized formats for configuration files;  
 
 peer-to-peer (e.g. relay to relay) communication. 
 
The standard includes mapping of data onto Ethernet. The use of Ethernet in the 
substation offers many advantages, the most significant ones are shown below [17]. 
 
 high-speed data rates (currently 100Mbit/s, rather than 10’s of kbits/s or less 
used by most serial protocols); 
 
 multiple masters (called “clients”);  
 
 Ethernet is an open standard in every-day use. 
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2.1.3 The Application of the Process Bus 
Ethernet technology has evolved from the initial CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple 
Access with Collision Detection) mechanism to native switched-base Ethernet, which 
is almost collision free [18]. This advanced networking protocol can now be designed 
with deterministic transmission times, suitable for real-time and mission-critical tasks. 
Contemporary switched Ethernet Local Area Networks (LANs) is able to create a full-
duplex and collision-free communication environment, by means of twisted paired 
optical fibre cables and separate Ethernet switch. Therefore, the development of 
Ethernet technology provides an opportunity to design a new communication system 
for power system protection applications. 
 
The IEC61850 part 8.1 and part 9.2 defines two real-time peer-to-peer communication 
messaging protocol which are GOOSE messages and Sample Value (SV) messages. 
Both GOOSE and SV messages behave in a multicast mode which permits 
simultaneous delivery of the same event message to multiple recipient IEDs through 
the process bus which is an Ethernet LAN. 
 
Hardwired interface between the primary transducers and the secondary protection 
devices is the basis of the existing protection system. IEC61850 introduces a 
communication based interface between instrument transformers, circuit breakers and 
IEDs. According to the concept of IEC61850, a substation distribution protection 
system is separated into three distinct levels: substation level, bay/unit level and 
process level. The three levels of functional hierarchy of IEC61850 are shown in 
Figure 2-3. These include: 
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Figure 2-3 Functional hierarchy of IEC61850 based SAS 
 
- Process level: This level includes switchyard equipments such as CTs / VTs, 
Remote I/O, actuators, etc. 
 
- Bay level: Bay level includes protection and control IEDs of different bays. 
 
- Station level: The functions requiring data from more than one bay are 
implemented at this level. 
 
In the process layer, all the information such as instrument transformer output and 
status from breakers and switches are gathered. IEC61850 defines the collection of 
these data through two different protocols. Part 9.1 defines a Unidirectional Multidrop 
Point-to-Point fixed link carrying a fixed dataset. Part 9.2 defines a configurable 
dataset which can be transmitted on a multi-cast basis from one publisher to multiple 
subscribers.  
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Figure 2-4 Process bus concept [9] 
 
Figure 2-4 illustrates the basic concept of the process bus. The interface of the 
instrument transformers which include both conventional and non-conventional ones 
with different types of substation protection, control, monitoring and recording 
equipment is through a device which is called Merging Unit (MU). The Merging Unit 
is defined in IEC61850-9-1 as: “Merging unit: interface unit that accepts multiple 
analogue CT/VT and binary inputs and produces multiple time synchronized serial 
unidirectional multi-drop digital point to point outputs to provide data communication 
via the logical interfaces.” The Merging Units sample the signals at an agreed, 
synchronized rate. Therefore, any IED can input data from multiple MUs and 
automatically align and process the data. There is an implementation agreement that 
defines a base sample rate of 80 samples per power system cycle for basic protection 
and monitoring and a “high” rate of 256 samples per power system cycle for high-
frequency applications such as power quality and high-resolution oscillography. 
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Merging Units have the following functions: 
 
 signal processing of all sensors - conventional or non-conventional; 
 
 synchronization of all measurements - 3 currents and 3 voltages; 
 
 analogue interface – high and low level signals, IEC61850 9-2; 
 
 digital interface - IEC 60044-8 [9]. 
 
IEC61850 part 9.1 specifies a preconfigured or “universal” dataset as defined in 
IEC60044-8. This dataset includes 3-phase voltage, bus voltage, neutral voltage, 3-
phase currents for protection, 3-phase currents for measurement and two 16-bit status 
words. Note that the analogue data values are mapped into 16 bits register in this 
mapping. 
 
IEC61850 part 9.2 is a more generalized implementation of SV data transfer. In part 
9.2, the dataset or “payload” is user-defined by using the SCL. As a dataset, data 
values of various sizes and types can be integrated together.  
 
However, IEC61850-9-2 is restricted to the transmission of SVs. To get full benefit of 
the process bus, the transmission of GOOSE messages need to be supported in 
accordance to the IEC61850 8-1 [19] [20] [21]. In this manner, the Circuit Breaker 
Controllers (CBC) which receive the GOOSE messages from protection IEDs to 
control the circuit breakers are able to share the process bus Ethernet LAN with the 
MUs.  
 
In brief, the data from conventional or optical/electronic sensors as well as status 
information is collected and converted to digital representation, and formatted for 
subsequent transmission via the process bus LAN [22]. The collection points can be 
redundant Ethernet switches that support Ethernet priority and Ethernet Virtual LAN 
(VLAN) [23]. Process Level information is then communicated over the LAN to the 
protection and control devices which are located at the Bay/Unit Level. Protective 
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functions are performed at the Bay Level. By applying the new standard, an integrated 
protection system can be established. 
 
2.2 IEC61850 Based Substation Protection System 
2.2.1 Conventional Substation Systems 
The existing protection schemes are based on hardwired interface between the 
primary substation equipment, such as transformers, breakers, instrument 
transformers, etc. and the secondary protection and control devices [24] [25] [26]. A 
simplified diagram of the communication architecture of conventional strategy is 
shown in Figure 2-5. 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Communication architecture of a conventional substation protection system 
 
In the conventional strategy, the CTs and VTs will transfer the analogue values or 
digital values to the interface module which includes both the analogue and digital 
input module through hardwires. After processing of the protection module, the output 
module will send control commands to other electrical equipments, such as trip a 
circuit breaker, also through hardwires. The Human Machine Interface (HMI) is 
directly installed in the protection relay in this strategy. 
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Considering the requirements for redundancy in protection functions, in conventional 
protection systems numerous primary and backup protection devices need to be 
installed, wired to the substation equipments. 
 
The interface requirements of the relays are separate from these of the metering 
devices. As a result, they need their own instrument transformers which allow a wide 
dynamic range of fault currents. 
 
2.2.2 The Integrated Protection System 
The modern microprocessor relays (IEDs) are able to accomplish more protection 
functions within one protective device. There are functionalities in different units, 
such as protection, metering, automation, control, digital fault recording and 
reporting. This research of integrated function is focused on the protection of 
individual components, not multiple apparatuses. Recently, the dramatic development 
in signal processing ability of hardware platform, the availability of suitable 
communication schemes and the introduction of non conventional instrument 
transformers has enabled the establishment of new concepts of power system 
protection. Therefore, the research of the new integrated protection system is 
encouraged, which is considered unsuitable in the past. The results show that the 
information obtained from multiple power system components can be used for new 
protection principles and schemes, which could have significant benefits over the 
existing techniques [27] [28] [29]. 
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Figure 2-6 Communication architecture of a conventional substation protection system 
 
Figure 2-6 illustrates a new advanced protection scheme which integrates all the 
protection functions for a substation busbar into one relay to form a centralized 
protection system. In this system, all the essential measured information collected 
from multiple lines in the substation busbar are sent to a centralized integrated relay 
unit through a redundant communication network for the implementation of multi-
protection functions. In the fault situation, the relay would process the data and then 
send trip commands and control signals back to the circuit breakers to trip the faulty 
line. Therefore, real time and dependable transmission of the sampled values and trip 
signals through the network becomes an essential part of the integrated protection 
communication system. 
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2.2.3 IEC61850 Based Substation Systems  
By applying the IEC61850 based solutions, a significant improvement in functionality 
and reduction of the cost of integrated substation protection and control systems can 
be achieved. In these solutions, the interface of the instrument transformers which 
include both conventional and non-conventional ones with different types of 
substation protection, control, monitoring and recording equipment is through a 
Merging Unit. MUs could be physically located either in the field or in the control 
house. 
 
It is very important to be able to interface with both the conventional and non-
conventional sensors in order to allow the implementation of the system in both 
existing and new substations. 
 
A simplified diagram of the communication architecture of an IEC61850 based 
substation protection system is shown in Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7 Communication architecture of an IEC61850 based substation protection 
system 
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In this architecture, the MUs multicast sets of sampled values and status information 
of breakers and switches to multiple IEDs in the substation through the process bus. 
Ethernet switches deliver datasets to only those switch ports/IEDs that have 
subscribed to the data. 
 
After receiving the sampled values, the protection IEDs process the data and make 
decisions regarding the fault detection, faulted phase selection and protection 
operation, and then transmit the instructions as required. The typical actions include 
operating their relay output or sending a high-speed peer-to-peer GOOSE message to 
other IEDs in order to trip a breaker or initiate some other protection or control 
functions, such as breaker failure protection, autoreclosing, etc.  
 
At the substation level, the station bus provides primary communications between the 
various Logical Nodes, which provide the various station protection, control, 
monitoring, and logging functions.  
 
Finally, this architecture supports remote network access for all types of data. As all 
communication is network enabled, multiple remote “clients” will desire access the 
wide variety of available information. Typical clients would include local HMI, 
operations, maintenance, engineering, and planning. The remote access point is one 
logical location to implement security functions such as encryption and authentication. 
This implementation unburdens the individual IEDs from performing encryption on 
internal data transfers but still provide security on all external transactions. 
 
2.2.4 Future Developments in IEC61850 Based Protection Schemes 
IEC61850 has grown out of the world of computing and communications. Many of 
the future developments in protection relaying and the associated areas of sub-station 
control and metering will mirror developments in computing. The overriding driving 
forces will be financial, in terms of lower equipment prices, ease of manufacture, 
lower installation costs, ease of installation, ease of commissioning, maintenance, 
updating, and finally de-commissioning and replacement with future systems. 
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There are many challenges in the general management of protection and control 
schemes which will have to be re-examined in adopting the concepts included in 
IEC61850.  
 
Health and safety considerations are paramount in the management of protection 
systems. Electrical systems are inherently dangerous and several elements associated 
with protection are potentially a health and safety hazard. CTs are the obvious 
example. 
 
Any activity associated with the protection systems has a potential impact on the 
working of the primary plant. If a system outage can be avoided, there are great cost 
savings. Can maintenance and refurbishment work be undertaken with the primary 
plant remaining live? It is achieved in the world of computer networks, therefore how 
can it be done in power systems? 
 
Although the computing and communications world provides an existing roadmap, 
there will be situations where power system and protection considerations will 
demand different solutions. Also, different utilities will demand solutions which meet 
their particular considerations. The software solutions preferred by the computer 
worlds may not be acceptable to all power system and protection engineers. In some 
cases, hardware isolation may be demanded. 
 
Relay development is one area where there may well be many interesting 
developments. Will the ‘relay’ of the future be recognised as a relay as understood 
today?  
 
Modern relays, albeit invariably microprocessor based and fully equipped for high 
level communications, still resemble the relays of many generations ago. They have 
inputs from current and/or voltage transducers, they have output closing contacts, they 
have a decision making capability and they have a human-machine interface. 
 
In the ‘relay’ shown in Figure 2-8, the protection IED is interfaced to the current and 
voltage transducers via merging units and the process bus. The output closing contacts 
are also interfaced using the process bus, merging units and actuators. The IED is 
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reduced to the processing element and the human-machine interface, as shown in 
Figure 2-9.  
 
Figure 2-8 The substation communication system 
 
 
Figure 2-9 The IEC61850 application of IED relay 
 
The immediate opportunity is to relocate the physical human-machine interface. The 
human-machine interface need not be a dedicated piece of hardware, but simply one 
of many screens included in the management and control system. Whenever an 
engineer needs to examine settings, they could access the screen either in the control 
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centre or in the sub-station. This would include facilities to adjust settings and extract 
any stored data. 
 
The ‘relay’ or protection IED will consist of a suitable processing unit alone, a 
protection processor. It could be a dedicated protection system processor, or if 
developments follow the trends seen in the computer world, it is more likely that it 
will be a general purpose processor system, designed for the environment and more 
than capable of handling the variety of tasks that it could be called upon to undertake. 
 
This development would immediately provide a cost saving in terms of ‘relay’ 
hardware. A general purpose IED would be expected to satisfy a variety of protection, 
control and metering duties. Its specific role would be defined by the software it uses. 
This commonality of hardware would immediately offer further potential cost savings.   
 
This would also provide a cost saving in terms of housing the ‘relay’ systems since 
there would be no need to have general access to the equipment to examine the front 
panel for the human-machine interface. 
 
 
Figure 2-10 The use of multiple IEDs 
 
The system using a variety of IEDs providing the processing capability for protection, 
control and metering is illustrated in Figure 2-10. The specific role of each IED would 
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be defined by the specific system configuration as set by the system designer or 
operator.  All of these IEDs will be designed for the sub-station environment. 
Provided that they have the processing capability, they could perform protection, 
control or metering duties.  
 
Similar considerations could be adapted for merging units, transducers, actuators and 
status contacts. The concepts of ‘plug and play’ could be adopted by the sub-station 
designers. 
 
Accepting the fundamental requirement that the IEDs must have the ability to handle 
the processing required for the specific applications, the choice of processor or 
processors becomes irrelevant. This ensures that they are future proofed and earlier 
IEDs can be replaced by more modern equivalents.  
 
Similarly, IEDs from different manufacturers should be interchangeable, including 
devices from new entrants to the market. The over-riding considerations being are 
they designed for the sub-station environment and are they able to undertake their 
duties.  
 
In addition to the aims of IEC61850, such a system provides a platform for the 
realisation of automatic self-healing protection, control and metering systems. Built in 
testing facilities are virtually universal in microprocessor based equipment. Should an 
IED’s application detect that that device is suspect and could be faulty, this could be 
communicated to the management and control systems and that IED could be flagged 
for replacement. This could be done by system engineers or it could be done under a 
predefined automatic procedure. Again, such procedures are available in today’s 
computer systems. If accepted by the power system engineers, they could be readily 
adopted. 
 
A further opportunity is the provision of automatic adaptive protection. The sub-
station’s management and control systems will have direct communications with local 
protection and control as well as communications with other systems, hence there will 
be the opportunity of using this to automatically reassess protection settings and 
change them as appropriate.  
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2.3 Benefits of IEC61850 
Justifying substation automation investments is one of the significant challenges 
which the substation engineers face. The positive impacts of automation which 
includes operating costs, increased power quality, and reduce outage responses are 
well known. However, little attention is paid to how a communication standard could 
impact on the cost of building and operating the substation. Former communication 
protocols were typically developed with the dual objectives of providing the necessary 
functions required by electric power systems while minimizing the number of bytes 
used by the protocol. That was because when many of those protocols were initially 
developed, severe bandwidth limitations were typical for the serial link technology of 
10 to 15 years ago. Later, as the Ethernet and modern networking protocols like 
TCP/IP became widespread, these protocols were adapted. The approach provided the 
same basic electric power system capabilities as the serial link version while bringing 
the advantages of modern networking technologies to the substation. But this 
approach has fundamental flaw; the protocols being used were still designed to 
minimize the bytes on the wire and do not take advantage of the dramatic increase in 
bandwidth of modern networking technologies which provide a higher level of 
functionality that can significantly reduce the implementation and operational costs of 
substation automation. 
 
IEC61850 is not a former serial link protocol recast onto TCP/IP-Ethernet. IEC61850 
was designed from the ground up to operate over modern networking technologies 
and delivers an unprecedented amount of functionality which is not available from 
former communication protocols. The unique characteristics of IEC61850 have a 
direct and positive impact on the cost to design, build, install, commission, and 
operate power systems. To better understand the specific benefits, some of the key 
features and capabilities of IEC61850 will be examined and then how these result in 
significant benefits that cannot be achieved with the former approaches will be 
explained. 
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2.3.1 Key Features  
The features and characteristics of IEC61850 that enable numerous advantages to all 
involved in the power industry. Some of these characteristics are seemingly small but 
are able to make tremendous impacts on substation automation systems. For instance, 
the use of VLANs and priority flags for GOOSE and SV enable much more intelligent 
use of Ethernet switches which cannot be achieved with other approaches. Therefore, 
some of the key features that provide significant benefits to users are listed below [9]. 
 
 Use of a Virtualized Model. The virtualized model of logical devices, logical 
nodes, ACSI, and CDCs enables definition of the data, services, and behaviour 
of devices to be defined in addition to the protocols that are used to define how 
the data is transmitted over the network. 
 
 Use of Names for All Data. Every element of IEC61850 data is named using 
descriptive strings to describe the data. Legacy protocols, on the other hand, 
tend to identify data by storage location and use index numbers, register 
numbers and the like to describe data. 
 
 All Object Names are Standardized and Defined in a Power System 
Context. The names of the data in the IEC61850 device are not dictated by the 
device vendor or configured by the user. All names are defined in the standard 
and provided in a power system context that enables the engineer to 
immediately identify the meaning of data without having to define mappings 
that relate index numbers and register numbers to power system data like 
voltage and current. 
 
 Devices are Self-Describing. Client applications that communicate with 
IEC61850 devices are able to download the description of all the data 
supported by the device from the device without any manual configuration of 
data objects or names. 
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 High-Level Services. ACSI supports a wide variety of services that far 
exceeds what is available in the typical legacy protocol. GOOSE, GSSE, SV, 
and logs are just a few of the unique capabilities of IEC61850. 
 
 Standardized Configuration Language. SCL enables the configuration of a 
device and its role in the power system to be precisely defined using XML 
files. 
 
2.3.2 Major Benefits 
By understanding and taking full advantage of the key features of IEC61850 
described above, significant benefits of IEC61850 can be realized [9]. 
 
 Eliminate Procurement Ambiguity. Not only can SCL be used to configure 
devices and power systems, SCL can also be used to precisely define user 
requirement for substations and devices. Using SCL a user can specify exactly 
and unambiguously what is expected to be provided in each device that is not 
subject to misinterpretation by suppliers. 
 
 Lower Installation Cost. IEC61850 enables devices to quickly exchange data 
and status using GOOSE and GSSE over the station LAN without having to 
wire separate links for each relay. This significantly reduces wiring costs by 
more fully utilizing the station LAN bandwidth for these signals and 
construction costs by reducing the need for trenching, ducts, conduit, etc. 
 
 Lower Transducer Costs. Rather than requiring separate transducers for each 
device needing a particular signal, a single merging unit supporting SV can 
deliver these signals to many devices using a single transducer lowering 
transducer, wiring, calibration, and maintenance costs. 
 
 Lower Commissioning Costs. The cost to configure and commission devices 
is drastically reduced because IEC61850 devices do not require as much 
manual configuration as legacy devices. Client applications no longer need to 
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be manually configured for each point they need to access because they can 
retrieve the points list directly from the device or import it via an SCL file. 
Many applications require nothing more than setting up a network address in 
order to establish communications. Most manual configuration is eliminated 
drastically reducing errors and rework. 
 
 Lower Equipment Migration Costs. Because IEC61850 defines more of 
the externally visible aspects of the devices besides just the encoding of data 
on the wire, the cost for equipment migrations is minimized. Behavioural 
differences from one brand of device to another is minimized and, in some 
cases, completely eliminated. All devices share the same naming conventions 
minimizing the reconfiguration of client applications when those devices are 
changed. 
 
 Lower Extension Costs. Because IEC61850 devices do not have to be 
configured to expose data, new extensions are easily added into the substation 
without having to reconfigure devices to expose data that was previously not 
accessed. Adding devices and applications into an existing IEC61850 system 
can be done with only a minimal impact, if any, on any of the existing 
equipment. 
 
 Lower Integration Costs. By utilizing the same networking technology 
that is being widely used across the utility enterprise the cost to integrate 
substation data into the enterprise is substantially reduced. Rather than 
installing costly RTUs that have to be manually configured and maintained for 
each point of data needed in control centre and engineering office application, 
IEC61850 networks are capable of delivering data without separate 
communications front-ends or reconfiguring devices. 
 
 Implement New Capabilities. The advanced services and unique features 
of IEC61850 enable new capabilities that are simply not possible with most 
legacy protocols. Wide area protection schemes that would normally be cost 
prohibitive become much more feasible. Because devices are already 
connected to the substation LAN, the incremental cost for accessing or sharing 
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more device data becomes insignificant enabling new and innovative 
applications that would be too costly to produce otherwise. 
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Protection Performance Study 
with Standard Protection Test 
Equipment 
T HIS chapter evaluates the performance of conventional protection system and IEC61850 based protection system using standard protection test equipment. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The implementation of IEC61850 in the substation can be defined as partial, hybrid 
and complete. Partial implementation is defined as the case that the IED supports only 
station bus communications, while the analogue signals are based on conventional 
hard wiring. Hybrid implementation is the case that the IED has process and station 
bus interface, but the execution of the trip function is based on hard wires between the 
relay outputs and the breaker trip coil. Complete implementation means that the IED 
has communication based interface only. The difference between the complete 
implementation and the hybrid case is that tripping is achieved by a GOOSE message 
sent to the breaker control device that performs the actual breaker tripping [30], [31].  
 
Before the design and evaluation of different process bus topologies, the basic 
performance of the IEDs needs to be tested and demonstrated. The results of these 
tests could be used as a benchmark for the future investigation. 
 
In this chapter, the three different implementations of the IEC61850 based IEDs and 
the conventional hardwired protection relays are tested by using the commercial test 
set. For the relays with the IEC61850-9-2 SV interface, a simple star process bus 
topology is adopted as shown in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 ALSTOM proposed process bus architecture 
  
3.2 Commercial Test Set 
Test sets used in such applications are required to have the functionality to perform 
coordinated and precisely synchronised tasks as a part of a distributed, system wide 
test facility.  
 
The utilisation of system configuration information, the GOOSE mechanism, Sampled 
Values and Client/Server SCADA Communication introduce several new issues for 
testing the next generation of relays [32]. The most obvious change is the different 
way of wiring to obtain the signals. The availability of machine readable, system wide 
configuration information enables new, automated procedures for the configuration of 
tests.  
 
The system configuration language implemented by IEC61850 standard defines a file 
format that describes the components of the substation and the protection and 
automation system in a way that allows most of the engineering tasks to be performed 
automatically. 
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The commercial test universe hardware and software used the OMICRON CMC 256+ 
as shown in Figure 3-2, are very well adopted in protection relays testing. It utilise the 
NetSim (Network Simulator) Software [32], which provides predefined Test Cases 
and Network Configurations to perform the tests. Standard network configurations 
with a simple parameter setup allow instant “click and run” simulations with signal 
outputs via the test set. Figure 3-3 shows the utilisation of system configuration 
information for testing a “stand-alone” relay. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 OMICRON CMC 256+ test set 
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Figure 3-3 Usage of configuration information for testing 
 
By “wiring” protective relays and test sets through the substation network, the test 
configuration is transformed into the networked world. Figure 3-4 shows a simplified, 
“fully-networked” protection testing layout based on a complete implementation of 
IEC61850. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 “Fully Networked” protection testing 
 
The test equipment can be connected to the GOOSE massages and the feedback from 
and stimulus to the devices under test that was formerly exchanged via binary I/Os, 
can be established by wiring the test equipment to the substation network. This test 
equipment is able to simulate the merging units by generating Sampled Values and 
publishing them on the network to be subscribed by the devices under test.  
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This networked testing system is similar to the classical testing of protection 
functions. The protection functions of the relays still work in the same way. For 
example, testing a distance protection will be performed by using similar fault 
scenarios and assessment criteria as before. Many aspects of the test configuration can 
be efficiently supported by using the substation configuration information. 
 
It is important that a test system preserves the working environment from classical 
testing and allows the re-use of existing test procedures for use with IEC61850. 
 
In addition, the substation devices provide a lot of additional information to be used 
for SCADA purposes. With IEC61850, these data are all served in a standardised 
way. By using a generic tool that works with relays, additional status data (e.g. 
specific pick-up information) can be examined. This will provide extended depth of 
testing. 
 
System tests were and are already performed to a certain extent. Prominent examples 
are the End-to-End tests for sophisticated line protection schemes. With the 
availability of substation wide configuration data, the feasibility of tests involving 
more devices is very much facilitated. Test with multiple points of test signal injection 
and measurement of response will become easier to implement in IEC61850 
installations. 
 
This chapter will focus on the testing of feeder protection schemes, the Feeder Local 
Panel (LB) and the Feeder Remote Panel (RB) is shown in Figure 3-5. The 
OMICRON CMC256+ test set provides analogue signals to remote hardwired relays 
and IEC61850 SVs signals to the local IEC61850 relays, as shown in Figure 3-6. The 
upper Local (LT) and Remote (RT) relays in the panels are configured as a Feeder 
Main-1 current differential scheme whilst the lower Local (LB) and Remote (RB) 
relays are configured as Feeder Main-2 distance scheme. 
 
Page 
Chapter 3              Protection Performance Study with Standard Protection Test
 Equipment 
 64
 
Figure 3-5 Feeder Local Panel (IEC61850) and Feeder Remote Panel (hardwired) 
 
 
Figure 3-6 Test setup for feeder local and remote protection schemes 
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3.3 Distance Relay Test 
The protection performance of RB conventional relay and LB IEC61850 based 
distance relay is demonstrated using the OMICRON CMC 256+ test set fitted with 
both conventional, current and voltage amplifiers, and IEC61850, Ethernet, SV 
outputs. The operating performance and characteristics of the RB hardwired relay are 
verified by injection with CMC 256+ test set applying analogue signals to the IED. 
The LB IEC61850 relay is injected with SVs also applied by the test set. Both relays 
have the IEC61850-8-1 interface, hence can be configured to send GOOSE trip 
message to the test set. The connections to the LT relay are shown in Figure 3-7. 
 
 
Figure 3-7 LT IEC61850 based distance relay rear view 
 
Therefore, four different scenarios can be derived, which are: 
 
 Scenario 1: Analogue input and Digital output – conventional hardwired; 
 
 Scenario 2: SV input and Digital output - hybrid implementation of IEC61850; 
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 Scenario 3: Analogue input and GOOSE output – partial implementation of 
IEC61850; 
 
 Scenario 4: SV input and GOOSE output – complete implementation of 
IEC61850. 
 
In these scenarios, all the components (PC, OMICRON, RB and LB relay) are 
connected to central Ethernet switch with the standard 100/1000TX electrical cables 
with RJ45 connectors using a star process bus topology. The connection diagrams of 
the four scenarios are shown below. 
 
 
Figure 3-8 Connection diagram of scenario 1 
 
In scenario 1, the CMC 256+ test set provides analogue signals to the conventional 
relay using the current and voltage amplifiers. The relay is configured to send digital 
trip signal to the test set. The CMC 256+ IEC61850 9-2LE interface card and a 
supervisory PC are connected to a central Ethernet switch. 
 
 
Figure 3-9  Connection diagram of scenario 2 
 
In scenario 2, the CMC 256+ test set provides SVs to the IEC61850 relay using the 
IEC61850 9-2LE interface card. The relay is configured to send digital trip signal to 
the test set. The CMC 256+ IEC61850 9-2LE interface card and a supervisory PC are 
connected to a central Ethernet switch. 
Page 
Chapter 3              Protection Performance Study with Standard Protection Test
 Equipment 
 67
 
Figure 3-10 Connection diagram of scenario 3 
 
In scenario 3, the CMC 256+ test set provides analogue signals to the conventional 
relay. The relay is configured to send GOOSE trip message to the test set. The CMC 
256+ IEC61850 9-2LE interface card, the relay IEC61850-8-1 interface card and a 
supervisory PC are connected to a central Ethernet switch. 
 
 
Figure 3-11 Connection diagram of scenario 4 
 
In scenario 4, the CMC 256+ test set provides SVs to the IEC61850 relay. The relay is 
configured to send GOOSE trip message to the test set. The CMC 256+ IEC61850 9-
2LE interface card, the relay IEC61850-9-2LE interface card, the relay IEC61850-8-1 
interface card and a supervisory PC are connected to a central Ethernet switch. 
 
The main parameters of the relays and are shown in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 Parameters of the distance protection relays for OMICRON test 
Item Value 
f nom 50.00 Hz 
No. of phases 3 
V primary 275.0 kV 
V secondary 110.0 V 
I primary 1.000 kA 
I secondary 1.000 A 
Z1 Ph. Reach 80 km 
tZ1 Delay 0s 
Z2 Ph. Reach 150 km 
tZ2 Delay 200ms 
Z3 Ph. Reach 250 km 
tZ3 Delay 600ms 
Line length 100.0 km 
Line impedance 10 Ω 
Line angle 70° 
kZN residual comp 1 
kZN residual angle 0° 
 
Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-2 Outline of distance relay test with OMICRON 
Fault Type Phase A to ground 
Pre-fault Time 2s 
Test Point 40 km, 115 km, 200 km. 
 
“Shot, check and search” test is repeated 100 times on the each test point. The shot 
test locations are shown in Figure 3-12. Circle A, B, and C represents protection Zone 
1, Zone 2, and Zone 3 respectively. The crosses are the fault locations which are all on 
angle (70°). The trip times of the relays are recorded as shown in Table Appendix-1 
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Figure 3-12 Short test for three different zones 
 
The mean trip time (MTT) for each fault point is calculated as shown in the Table 3-3.  
 
Table 3-3 The MTT for each test point 
Fault Point Scenario 1 
MTT 
Scenario 2 
MTT 
Scenario 3 
MTT 
Scenario 4 
MTT 
40 km 18.635 ms 19.1 ms 16.163 ms 17.29 ms 
 115 km  217.171 ms 218.076 ms 214.317 ms 215.096 ms 
200 km  616.927 ms 617.829 ms 614.252 ms 615.059 ms 
 
It can be observed from Table 3-3 that scenario 3 (Analogue input and GOOSE output) 
provides the shortest MTT of 16.163 ms, 214.317 ms and 614.252 ms respectively. 
Scenario 2 (SV input and Digital output) provides the longest MTT of 19.1 ms, 
218.076 ms and 617.829 ms respectively.  
 
Comparing scenario 1 (Analogue input and Digital out) with scenario 3 and scenario 2 
with scenario 4 (SV input and Digital out), the GOOSE trip signal is about 2.685 ms 
faster than the digital trip signal on average, which indicates that the GOOSE message 
digitization process of the relay is faster than the digital trip signal processing. 
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Comparing scenario 1 with scenario 2 and scenario 3 with scenario 4, the analogue 
input is about 0.831 ms faster than the SV input on average. which will be further 
investigated in the next section.  
 
In conclusion, the results indicate that the conventional and IEC61850 based distance 
protection relay have a similar performance and respond with similar tripping times. 
 
3.4 Current Differential Relay Test  
3.4.1 Introduction 
The test set is configured to generate SV data stream for the LT IEC61850 based 
current different relay and an analogue signal for the RT conventional current 
differential relay.  Since the analogue signals and the SVs signals are synchronized, 
phase offsets are due to the latency of the communication LAN and the digitizing 
process of the receiving IED. 
 
Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connectors are used to connect the 
LT and RT relay to the Ethernet communication networks. A fibre optic link is used 
for the communication between the two relays.  
 
In the test, both relays are synchronized by the GPS synchronization unit. The 
synchronization technique will be described in the next section, and configured to 
send GOOSE trip signals and digital trip signals to the CMC 256+ test set interfaces. 
Therefore, the four scenarios can be tested in parallel. The connection diagram of the 
test system is illustrated in Figure 3-13.  
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Figure 3-13 Connection diagram of current differential scheme test system 
 
3.4.2 Time Alignment of Current Vector 
A. Time alignment of current vectors without GPS input (Traditional Technique) 
 
This section relates to the relay when the GPS synchronisation is not used. 
 
To calculate differential current between line ends it is necessary that the current 
samples from each end are taken at the same moment in time. This can be achieved by 
time synchronising the sampling, or alternatively, by the continuous calculation of the 
propagation delay between line ends. The relay has adopted this second technique. 
 
Consider a two-ended system as shown in Figure 3-14 
 
Two identical relays, A and B are placed at the two ends of the line. Relay A samples 
its current signals at time tA1, tA2 etc., and relay B at time tB1, tB2 etc. Note that the 
sampling instants at the two ends will not, in general, be coincidental or of a fixed 
relationship, due to slight drifts in sampling frequencies [33]. 
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Figure 3-14 Propagation delay measurement 
 
Assume that at time tA1, relay A sends a data message to relay B. The message 
contains a time tag, tA1, together with other timing and status information and the 
current vector values calculated at tA1. The message arrives at end B after a channel 
propagation delay time, tp1. Relay B registers the arrival time of the message as tB*.  
 
Since relays A and B are identical, relay B also sends out data messages to end A. 
Assume relay B sends out a data message at tB3. The message therefore contains the 
time tag tB3. It also returns the last received time tag from relay A (i.e. tA1) and the 
delay time, td, between the arrival time of the received message, tB*, and the 
sampling time, tB3, i.e. td = (tB3 - tB*). 
 
The message arrives at end A after a channel propagation delay time, tp2. Its arrival 
time is registered by relay A as tA*. From the returned time tag, tA1, relay A can 
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measure the total elapsed time as (tA* - tA1). This equals the sum of the propagation 
delay times tp1, tp2 and the delay time td at end B. 
 
Hence, 
 
 )21()1( * tptptdtAtA     (3-1) 
 
The relay assumes that the transmit and receive channels follow the same path and so 
have the same propagation delay time. This time can therefore be calculated as: 
 
 )1(2
121 * tdtAtAtptp     (3-2) 
 
Note that the propagation delay time is measured for each received sample and this 
can be used to monitor any change on the communication link. 
 
As the propagation delay time has now been deduced, the sampling instant of the 
received data from relay B (tB3*) can be calculated. As shown in Figure 2, the 
sampling time tB3* is measured by relay A as: 
 
 )2(3 ** tptAtB     (3-3) 
 
In Figure 2-13, tB3* is between tA3 and tA4. To calculate the differential and bias 
currents, the vector samples at each line end must correspond to the same point in 
time. It is necessary therefore to time align the received tB3* data to tA3 and tA4. 
This can be achieved by rotating the received current vector by an angle 
corresponding to the time difference between tB3* and tA3. For example a time 
difference of 1ms would require a vector rotation of 1/20 * 360° = 18° for a 50Hz 
system. 
 
As two data samples can be compared with each data message, the process needs to 
be done only once every two samples, thus reducing the communication bandwidth 
required. Note that the current vectors of the three phases need to be time aligned 
separately. 
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B. Time alignment of current vectors with GPS input 
 
The relay make use of the timing information available from the GPS system to 
overcome the limitation of the traditional technique, and thus allow application to 
communications that can provide a permanent or semi-permanent split path routing. 
 
A 1 pulse per second output from a GPS receiver is used to ensure that the re-
sampling of the currents at each relay occurs at the same instant in time. The 
technique is thus not dependant on equal transmit and receive propagation delay times; 
changes in one or both of the propagation delay times also do not cause problems. 
 
The GPS technique is taken further, however, to overcome concerns about the 
reliability of the GPS system. Consider a similar two ended system to that of Figure 3-
13 where the re-sampling instants (tAn, tBn) are synchronised using the GPS timing 
information. Note that Figure 3-15 demonstrates a case where the communications 
path propagation delay times are not the same. 
 
 
Figure 3-15 Data transmission 
 
Relay A can measure the total elapsed time = (tA* - tA1). This equals the sum of the 
propagation delay times tp1 and tp2, the delay in sending out the initial message ta, 
and the delay time tc+td at end B. 
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Hence 
 
 tdtctatAtAtptp  121 *    (3-4) 
 
However, because of the GPS synchronisation of the re-sampling instants, tA3 is at 
the same instant as tB3 (therefore tB3* = tA3). Using this knowledge, the receive path 
delay can be calculated. 
 
 tdtAtAtp  32 *    (3-5) 
 
Using the same process, the relay can also calculate tp1.  
 
In the event of the GPS synchronising signal becoming unavailable, the 
synchronisation of the re-sampling instants at the different ends will be lost and the 
sampling will become asynchronous. However, time alignment of the current data can 
still be performed, by measuring the total elapsed time (as per the traditional 
measurement technique) and using the memorised value of tp2 prior to the GPS 
outage. If the overall propagation delay sum of tp1 + tp2 has not changed significantly 
since the GPS synchronising signal became unavailable, then the communication path 
has not been switched and tp2 remains valid. This “fallback” strategy ensures 
protection continuity even in the event of antenna vandalism, maintenance error, 
extremely adverse atmospheric conditions etc – all of which could result in GPS 
outage. Note that tp1 and tp2 do not need to be equal for the fallback strategy to 
become operational [33].  
 
3.4.3 Results and Discussion 
If the manual adjustment of the delay compensation in the LT relay is disabled, then 
under the healthy system conditions, the observed results from the front LCD of the 
relays indicate that SV data stream is about 20° (1.11ms) lagging the hardwired 
analogue signal, which can result in a different current of 292A~338A. It proves the 
conclusion in the previous section that analogue input is faster than the SV input on 
average. 
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The OMICRON software SV scout is able to calculate the average time offset of the 
communication LAN. The transmission of the SVs from the CMC 256+ test set to the 
PC network card resulted in an average LAN latency of 80µs, which would mean a 
phase shift of less than 1.5°, as shown in figure 3-16. Subtracting the LAN latency, 
the time offset introduced by the IEC61850 9-2 digitization process of the protection 
IED is approximately 1ms, which results that the analogue input is faster than the SV 
input. As the operating time  of a distance relay should be ≤20ms [33], considering 
the worst case which is scenario 2 in section 3.3, the SV input delay is tolerable. 
 
 
The angle difference and differential current can be reduced significantly (2°, 20A) by 
applying manual compensation to LT relay. 
 
 
Figure 3-16 Time offset for direct connection to the network card 
 
The tripping characteristics of the current differential protection scheme are shown in 
Figure 3-17. 
 
The characteristic is determined by four protection settings: 
 
Is1: The basic differential current setting which determines the minimum pick-up 
level of the relay. 
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k1: The lower percentage bias setting used when the bias current is below Is2 .This 
provides stability for small CT mismatches, whilst ensuring good sensitivity to 
resistive faults under heavy load conditions. 
 
Is2: A bias current threshold setting, above which the higher percentage bias k2 is 
used. 
 
k2: The higher percentage bias setting used to improve relay stability under heavy 
through fault current conditions. 
 
The tripping criteria can be formulated as: 
 
For 2IsIbias   11 IsIbiaskIdiff     (3-6) 
 
For 2IsIbias   12)12(2 IsIskkIbiaskIdiff    (3-7) 
 
 
Figure 3-17 Current differential bias characteristic 
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The main parameters of the relay and are shown in Table 3-4. 
 
Table 3-4 Parameters of the relay 
Item Value 
f nom 50.00 Hz 
No. of phases 3 
V primary 275.0 kV 
V secondary 110.0 V 
I primary 1.000 kA 
I secondary 1.000 A 
Is1 200A 
K1 30% 
Is 2 2000A 
K2 150% 
Line length 100.0 km 
Line impedance 10Ω 
Line angle  70° 
kZN residual comp 1 
kZN residual angle  0° 
 
Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 3-5. 
 
Table 3-5 Outline of current differential relay test 
Fault Type Phase A to ground 
Pre-fault Time 2s 
Test Point I diff=1000A, I bias=1500A 
 
The test is repeated 100 times. The trip time of the relays is recorded as shown in 
Table Appendix-2.  
 
The MTT of the four scenarios is shown in Table 3-6 below. 
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Table 3-6 MTT of the four scenarios 
Scenario No. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
MTT 26.241 ms 25.921 ms 23.426 ms 23.587 ms 
 
Similar as the distance relay test, it can be observed from Table 3-6 that scenario 3 
(Analogue input and GOOSE output) provides the shortest MTT of 23.426 ms. 
Scenario 2 (SV input and Digital output) provides the longest MTT of 26.241 ms. 
signal.  
 
Comparing scenario 1 (Analogue input and Digital out) with scenario 3 and scenario 2 
with scenario 4 (SV input and Digital out), the GOOSE trip signal is about 2.575ms 
faster than the digital trip signal on the average. 
 
Comparing scenario 1 with scenario 2 and scenario 3 with scenario 4, the latency of 
the analogue input is almost the same as the SV input, because of the manual 
compensation of the relays. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The results of the protection performance tests with the commercial test set indicate: 
 
 The average latency of the communication LAN is 80µs. Star topology is 
adopted in the tests, hence the LAN latency may vary for different process bus 
topologies. 
 
 The time offset introduced by IEC61850 9-2 digitization process of the 
protection IED is approximately 1ms. It results that the analogue input is faster 
than the SV input on average. As the operating time  of a distance relay should 
be ≤20ms, considering the worst case which is scenario 2 in section 3.3, the 
SV input delay is tolerable. 
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 The GOOSE trip signal is about 2.6 ms faster than the digital trip signal on 
average, which indicates that the GOOSE message digitization process of the 
protection IED is faster than the digital trip signal processing. 
 
In conclusion, the conventional and IEC61850 based relay have a similar performance 
and respond with similar tripping times. The results may be different if protection 
IEDs from different manufacturers are adopted. 
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HIS chapter describes three Ethernet switch based process bus 
topologies and compares the different process bus topologies in the 
light of the reliability and availability analysis. 
 T 
Reliability and Availability 
Analysis of Process Bus 
Topologies 
 
Chapter 4  
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4.1 Process Bus Configurations for IEC61850 
Based Substation 
In this chapter, three basic Ethernet LAN topologies are introduced, which will be 
applied in the following bay process bus design.  
 
4.1.1 Cascaded Topology 
A typical cascaded topology is illustrated in Figure 4-1. In this architecture, each 
Ethernet switch is connected to the previous switch and/or next switch in cascade via 
one of its ports. The maximum number of switches, which can be cascaded, depends 
on the worst case delay (latency) which can be tolerated by the system. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Cascaded topology 
 
This architecture is simple and less expensive than others, however, the latency is 
generally higher.  
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4.1.2 Star Topology 
In the star topology as shown in Figure 4-2, each component is directly connected to a 
common central node, a multiport Ethernet switch. The message transmission latency 
for Ethernet switch based star topology has capability to comply with the requirement 
of IEC61850. However, all IEDs in this architecture are connected to the single 
central Ethernet switch which produces an inherent weak point in the scheme. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Star topology 
 
4.1.3 Ring Topology 
As show in Figure 4-3, the ring topology is very similar to cascaded topology except 
that the chain of switches is closed from the last switch to the first switch to form the 
ring. Standard Ethernet switches do not support “loops”, since messages could 
circulate indefinitely in a loop and use all the available bandwidth. Therefore, 
managed switches are required for this architecture [34]. 
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Managed switches take into consideration the potential for loops and implement a 
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol algorithm.  
 
The Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is a network protocol that ensures a loop-free 
topology for any bridged Ethernet local area network. The basic function of STP is to 
prevent bridge loops and the broadcast radiation that results from them. Spanning tree 
also allows a network design to include spare (redundant) links to provide automatic 
backup paths if an active link fails, without the danger of bridge loops, or the need for 
manual enabling/disabling of these backup links. 
 
In 2001, the IEEE introduced Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) as IEEE 802.1w. 
RSTP provides significantly faster spanning tree convergence after a topology change, 
introducing new convergence behaviours and bridge port roles to do this. RSTP was 
designed to be backwards-compatible with standard STP [34]. 
 
While STP can take 30 to 50 seconds to respond to a topology change, RSTP is 
typically able to respond to changes within 3 × Hello times or within a few 
milliseconds of a physical link failure. The so-called Hello time is an important and 
configurable time interval that is used by RSTP for several purposes; its default value 
is 2 seconds [35].  
Standard IEEE 802.1D-2004 incorporates RSTP and obsoletes the original STP 
standard [36]. This protocol allows switches to detect loops and internally block 
messages from circulating in the loop. It also allows reconfiguration of the network 
following a communication network fault. 
 
The advantage of the ring topology is that it has the potential to provide better 
availability because IEDs can still communicate even if any one of the ring 
connections and/or Ethernet switches fail. However, this architecture is more costly 
and complex when compared to the cascaded or star topology.  
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Figure 4-3 Ring topology 
 
4.1.4 Time Synchronization of Merging Units 
The merging units described in IEC61850 9-1 are used to digitize multiple analogue 
CT/VT output and multicast the sampled values to bay the level IEDs through the 
process bus. This stream of sampled values must be synchronized so that the 
protection function can use several streams from independent MUs. IEC61850 
proposes the implementation of time synchronization on LAN using a Simple 
Network Time Protocol, SNTP [16].  
 
SNTP is a less complicated version of Network Time Protocol (NTP) which is a 
networking protocol for clock synchronization between computer systems over 
packet-switched, variable-latency data networks. NTP can usually maintain time to 
within tens of milliseconds over the public Internet [37], and can achieve 1 ms 
accuracy in local area networks under ideal conditions [38]. 
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When a better time synchronization is requied, the timing accuracy of 1 µs can be 
achieved using IRIG-B synchronization signal in compliance with IEEE 1588. 
 
The Precision Time Protocol (PTP) described in IEEE 1588 is a protocol used to 
synchronize clocks throughout a computer network. On a local area network it 
achieves clock accuracy in the sub-microsecond range, making it suitable for 
measurement and control systems [37]. 
 
Therefore, an external time synchronization source is assumed to be connected to the 
MUs for the reliability calculations in all the process bus  topologies. 
 
4.2 Reliability and Availability Analysis of Process 
Bus Topologies 
4.2.1 Device Reliability and Availability 
The failure rate “λ” of electronic components is assumed to remain constant during 
normal operating period, therefore exponential distribution is valid for the reliability 
and availability analysis of IEC61850 based SAS devices [38] [39] [40] [41]. The 
equations that estimate device reliability and availability are shown below. 
 
 tetR )(    (4-1) 
 
 
 

1)(
0


 dttRMTTF     (4-2) 
 
 
 
MTTRMTTF
MTTFA

    (4-3) 
 
where: 
 
R is the reliability function 
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t is the period under consideration (years) 
 
A is the device availability  
 
MTTF is mean time to failure (years), the mean value of exponential distribution. It 
will be used to represent device reliability in this paper 
 
MTTR is mean time to repair. It is the time taken to detect and repair each failure.  
 
4.2.2 System MTTF and Availability using Reliability Block 
Diagram 
The Reliability Block Diagram, RBD, for each configuration shows the logical 
connection of functioning components needed to fulfil a specific system function [42] 
[43] [44] [45].   
 
From the reliability point of view, components are connected in series if they all must 
work for the successful functioning of the system and only one component needs to 
fail for the system failure as shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
 
Figure 4-4Series system with two components 
 
The reliability function of the series system is 
 
 ts etRtRR
)(
21
21)()(      (4-4) 
 
Therefore the MTTF of the series system is 
 
 
21
21
210
1)(
MTTFMTTF
MTTFMTTFdttRMTTF ss 



 


  (4-5) 
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The availability of the series system is  
 
 21 AAAs     (4-6) 
 
 
In contrast, if only one needs to be working for successful functioning of the system 
or all must fail for system failure, components are connected in parallel from the 
reliability assessment as shown in Figure 4-5. 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Parallel system with two components 
 
The reliability function of the parallel system is 
 
 
)()()()()( 2121 tRtRtRtRtRp   
                 
ttt eee )( 2121                   
(4-7) 
 
Therefore the MTTF of the parallel system is 
 
 2120 1
111)(
 
 

dttRMTTP pp  
          
21
21
21 MTTFMTTF
MTTFMTTFMTTFMTTF


    
(4-8) 
 
The availability of the parallel system is  
 
 2121 AAAAAs        (4-9) 
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4.2.3 Feeder Bay Study 
The particular interest in this project has been the reliability and availability of a 
typical transmission substation feeder bay. The mean time to failure and the 
availability for a test system were calculated using above methodology. 
 
The feeder bay is considered to use a dual main scheme with MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 
protection IEDs. Each protection IED has separate MUs and circuit breaker control 
IEDs. 
 
The MTTF and availability values for the reliability calculations are tabulated in 
Table 4-1 [47] [48] [49]. These MTTF and availability values for the components 
have been derived from industry norms and provide a basis for the subsequent 
calculations. They are not based on the analysis of any specific equipment. 
 
Table 4-1 MTTF and availability considered for each component 
SAS component MTTF 
(years) 
Availability 
Protection IED 16 0.999660016 
Control IED 16 0.999660016 
MU 16 0.999660016 
Ethernet Switch 62.5 0.999912337 
TS 16 0.999660016 
 
 
The basic assumption is that failure modes are independent from each other. 
Generally, the MTTF value of the communication links is considered to be high 
enough to be ignored in the calculation [50] [51] [52]. A MTTR of 48 hours is used in 
the availablity calculation [53] [54] [55]. The MTTF and availability values of the 
principal components used in the reliability calculation of different process bus 
topologies are shown in Table 4-1. 
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4.2.4 MTTF and Availability for Cascaded Topology 
In this architecture, each IED has a single Ethernet switch, and a time synchronization 
unit is connected to the MU directly. The communication architecture of feeder bay is 
shown in Figure 4-6. 
 
Figure 4-6 Cascaded topology for feeder bay 
 
In the protection scheme, there are MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protections which are 
independent. Both schemes provide a trip instruction to the breaker. Take MAIN 1 
protection for example; the dedicated Protection IED-1, control IED-1, MU-1 and 
three Ethernet switches are connected in series in reliability block diagram. Either 
MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 are required to be healthy to maintain the feeder protection 
function, therefore MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 are connected in parallel in the RBD for 
MTTF and availability calculation as shown in Figure 4-7. 
 
 
Figure 4-7 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for cascaded topology 
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Using the data in Table 3-1, the results of MTTF and availability calculation for the 
cascade configuration are MTTFcascade is 5.034 years and the Acascade is 0.999997369. 
 
4.2.5 MTTF and Availability for Star Topology 
In the star topology, all the IEDs are connected to a central Ethernet switch. The two 
schemes, Main 1 and Main 2 monitor the power system and provide trip instructions 
to the circuit breaker. The communication architecture of feeder bay is shown in 
Figure 4-8. 
 
 
Figure 4-8 Star topology for feeder bay 
 
For the analysis of cascaded topology, the reliability block diagram of star topology is 
shown in Figure 4-9. 
 
 
Figure 4-9 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for star topology 
 
The results of MTTF and availability calculation for the star configuration are 
MTTFstar is 5.639 years and the Astar is 0.999997907. 
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4.2.6 MTTF and Availability for Ring Topology 
In the ring topology, each set of IEDs is connected to a single managed Ethernet 
switch, and all the Ethernet switches in the scheme are connected in a loop, as shown 
in Figure 4-10. Main 1 and Main 2 have separate loops, and both provide a tripping 
instruction to the circuit breaker.   
 
 
Figure 4-10 Ring topology for feeder bay 
 
The reliability block diagram for ring communication network is similar to that for the 
cascaded topology. The RBD for the ring scheme are shown in Figure 4-11. 
 
  
Figure 4-11 RBD of MTTF and availability calculation for ring topology 
 
The additional feature of the ring topology is that with the help of the RSTP within 
the managed Ethernet switch, the communication network can be reconfigured in case 
any communication cable which is used to connect the Ethernet switches in the 
scheme fails. This means the faulted scheme will still be functional after the failure. 
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Therefore, single failure of the communication cable will not influence the MTTF of 
the protection system.  
 
The results of MTTF and availability calculation for the first failure of the ring 
configuration are MTTFring is 5.034 years and the Aring is 0.999997369. 
 
For the protection application, it is questionable whether the scheme should remain 
operational after a first failure event and therefore whether it should be taken out of 
service whenever a failure occurs. Using a dual main configuration, should either 
Main 1 or Main 2 suffer a failure, the other scheme will provide viable protection. 
 
The MTTF and availability of different process bus topologies are summarized in 
Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2 MTTF and availability of different process bus topologies  
Process bus topology MTTF 
(years) 
Availability 
Cascaded 5.034 0.999997369 
Star 5.639 0.999997907 
Ring ( first failure) 5.034 0.999997369 
 
It can be observed from Table 4-2 star topology provides the highest MTTF of 5.639 
years and the highest availability of 0.999997907. This architecture has the weakness 
that the failure of the central Ethernet switch will lead the entire communication 
system collapse. Cascaded topology provides the MTTF of 5.034 years and the 
availability of 0.999997369. If the MTTF of the communication links is ignored in the 
calculation, ring topology provides the same MTTF and availability as cascaded 
topology. However, ring topology requires managed Ethernet switches with RSTP, 
which makes this architecture more expensive and complicated comparatively. 
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HIS chapter evaluates the performance of SV messages over 
three Ethernet switch based process bus topologies by using 
OPNET communication network simulation tool. T 
Modelling and Simulation for 
Performance Evaluation of 
Process Bus Topologies 
 
Chapter 5  
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5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the latency of the SV messages transmission over the three Ethernet 
switch based process bus topologies, cascaded, star and ring topology, is evaluated in 
terms of the communication volume, by using the OPNET Modeller which is a 
network modelling and simulation tool [56]. 
 
OPNET Modeller is capable of accelerating the R&D process for analyzing and 
designing communication networks, devices, protocols, and applications. It allows 
users to analyze simulated networks to compare the impact of different technology 
designs on end-to-end behaviour. The Modeller incorporates a broad suite of 
protocols and technologies, and includes a development environment to enable 
modelling of all network types and technologies including [57] [58]: 
 
 VoIP 
 TCP 
 OSPFv3 
 IPv6 
 Others 
 
Key features of OPNET Modeller: 
 
 Fastest discrete event simulation engine among leading industry solutions  
 
 Hundreds of protocol and vendor device models with source code are 
contained in the complete OPNET Model Library 
 
  Object-oriented modelling 
 
  Hierarchical modelling environment 
 
 Discrete Event, Hybrid, and optional Analytical simulation 
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 32-bit and 64-bit fully parallel simulation kernel  
 
 Grid computing support for distributed simulation 
 
 Optional System-in-the-Loop to interface simulations with live systems 
 
 Realistic Application Modelling and Analysis 
 
 Open interface for integrating external object files, libraries, and other 
simulators 
 
 Integrated, GUI-based debugging and analysis 
 
5.2 Building of IED Models 
Three types of generic IEDs are modelled for this performance study, which are 
circuit breaker Controller (CBC), merging unit (MU), and combined protection & 
control (P&C) IED [59] [60] [61]. In the SAS, those IEDs provide the following 
general functions. The MU processes and combines the signal from field CT and VT. 
Then it transmits the digital voltage and current output to the process bus. The CBC, 
which not only controls the breaker’s open/close but also monitors the state and 
condition of the circuit breaker, receives the trip/close command from the P&C IEDs 
and sends state change event to corresponding protection IEDs also through the 
process bus. The P&C IED, a universal device, integrates the protection and control 
functionalities for the bay unit in the substation [62] [63] [64]. The above unit models 
are constructed on OPNET Modeller, and the modelling work are shown below. 
 
5.2.1 Modelling of MU 
The modelling of merging unit is based on IEC61850 9-1. The Ethernet broadcast 
address is used as a default destination address although this model also supports 
unicast and multicast. The user could configure the sample rate, start time, stop time, 
packet size, address, and multicast group address if multicast is used as the 
Page 
Chapter 5                       Modelling and Simulation for Performance Evaluation of  
Process Bus  Topologies 
 99
transmission type. The communication stack for merging unit IED is very simple. It 
contains an application layer, Ethernet layer, and physical layer. Figure 5-1 shows the 
node model configuration of MU. The small squares in the model represent the 
process models. OPNET Modeller has the Node Model Editor and Process Model 
Editor which facilitate the model design. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 MU model configuration [56] 
 
The bursty_gen module represents higher layer users who submit data for 
transmission. It uses an ON-OFF pattern for traffic generation.  
 
The sink processor represents higher layers and simply accepts incoming packets that 
have been processed through the mac (medium access control) process. 
 
The hub_rx0 and hub_tx0 modules serve as the process bus link interface. These 
modules are set to transmit and receive at a data rate of 100 Mbits/second. 
 
The mac process handles both incoming and outgoing packets. Incoming packets are 
decapsulated from their Ethernet frames and delivered to a higher level process. 
Outgoing packets are encapsulated within Ethernet frames and when the deference 
flag goes low, a frame is sent to the transmitter. This process also monitors for 
collisions, and if one occurs, the transmission is appropriately terminated and 
rescheduled for a later attempt. 
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There is only one way of connecting this MU IED to P&C IEDs, which is through the 
process bus[65] [66] [67]. In the simulation, MU is connected with P&C IEDs directly 
using Ethernet switch, which will only use one communication port of the MU.  
 
The application layer includes the bursty_gen which generates Ether-type protocol 
data unit (PDU) as shown in Figure 5-2 at a configurable sampling rate. This PDU 
contains an application protocol data unit (APDU) which may contain number of 
ASDUs [66] [68] [69]. Each ASDU again contain four current values and four voltage 
values as specified in the standard.  
 
 
Figure 5-2 Raw data sample Ethernet frame 
 
The Ethernet layer consists of the eth_mac_intf and mac modules. The Ethernet 
protocols and algorithms are implemented in those modules. The Ether-type APDU 
passed from the application layer are addressed, priority tagged according to IEEE 
802.1Q [70] [71]. The priority tagging allows to separate time critical messages from 
low time requirement busload. The raw data messages should be tagged with high 
priority. 
 
The physical layer allows connecting this IED to a process bus using 10 Mb/s, 
100Mb/s, 1 Gb/s or 10 Gb/s link depending on the type of transmitters and receivers 
this module uses. 
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5.2.2 Modelling of CBC and P&C IED 
The functionalities of P&C IED is to receive the SV messages from the MU, send 
GOOSE trip messages to CBC, and calculate the end-to-end (ETE) delay. ETE delay 
is the time between the creation of the message at the application layer of the sending 
unit and the arrival of the message at the receiving unit’s application layer. The CBC 
is to receive the GOOSE trip message, send multicast GOOSE state event to other 
P&C IEDs. The size of the GOOSE is smaller than the SV message, and the number 
of messages per second is lower. At 100 Mbps, GOOSE messages do not normally 
play a crucial role in the overall network load. In the simulation, only the performance 
of the transmission of SV messages is evaluated, therefore it has been assumed that 
there are no GOOSE messages in the process bus.  
 
5.3 Feeder Bay Study 
The process bus performance of the MAIN protection for the three process bus 
topologies as described in chapter 4 of a typical transmission substation feeder bay is 
evaluated. The sampled value packet ETE delay is simulated by applying the cascaded, 
star and ring process bus topology respectively. 
 
In the cascaded topology model as shown in Figure 5-3, each component, MU, P&C 
IED and CBC, is connected to its own Ethernet switch and these are connected in a 
chain. The model is built on a 10m×10m zone as the numbers indicate in the diagram. 
In this model, the P&C IED subscribes the SVs published by the MU, the CBC can be 
configured to send GOOSE messages to the P&C IED, and generic Ethernet switch 
models which support RSTP are used to represent the switches in this network. 
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Figure 5-3 Cascaded topology model for feeder bay 
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Figure 5-4 Star topology model for feeder bay 
 
In the star topology model as shown in Figure 5-4, all the components, MU, P&C IED 
and CBC, are connected to a central Ethernet switch. 
 
In the ring topology model as shown in Figure 5-5, as with the cascade topology 
model, each component, MU, P&C IED and CBC, is connected to a single Ethernet 
switch, but the chain is then connected to form a ring. 
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Figure 5-5 Ring topology model for feeder bay 
 
The SV packet version used in this project is the IEC61850 9-2 LE [16]. An 
IEC61850 9-2LE SV packet has only one ASDU in the APDU, which contain one set 
of current values (phase A, phase B, phase C and neutral) and one set of voltage 
values. Considering the 2 bytes gap each frame in APDU, the size of an IEC61850 9-
2LE SV packet is 138 bytes - 162 bytes in terms of Figure 5-2. 
  
Assuming the svID frame is 10 bytes, the size of an IEC61850 9-2LE SV packet can 
be calculated as 138 bytes per sampled value. The inter-frame gap is 96 bits, hence the 
SV Ethernet frame width is therefore 1200 bits, which is 150 bytes. For a 50 Hz 
power system, applying 80 samples per cycle, the sampling frequency is 4000 Hz. 
The parameters for OPNET simulation are tabulated in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1 Parameters for OPNET simulation 
Parameters Default Values 
Communication link Data rate 100 Mbps 
Sampling frequency 4000 Hz 
Message size 150 bytes 
ESW packet service rate 0.5 Mega packets per second 
Each Ethernet cable length 15 meters 
Simulation Duration 10 minutes 
 
After the simulation, the SV packet ETE delay of different process bus topologies are 
summarized in Table 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2 SV ETE delay of different process bus topologies 
Feeder process bus topology Sampled value packet delay (ms) 
Cascaded 0.048348 
Star 0.031576 
Ring 0.048375 
 
It can be observed from Table 5-2 the star topology provides the shortest SV ETE 
delay of 0.031576 ms. The cascaded topology provides the ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, 
and the ring topology provides almost the same ETE delay of 0.048375 ms as 
cascaded topology. 
 
According to IEC61850, the acceptable maximum communication delay for the time-
critical messages, SVs and GOOSE, is 3 ms [16]. Therefore, the SV ETE delay of the 
MAIN protection for a feeder bay using the three different process bus topologies is 
tolerable. 
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5.4 Process Bus Overload Simulation 
In all of the above tests, the process bus was operated well within its specified 
capabilities. The data traffic consisted of the samples values derived from one MU. In 
a practical application, the process bus traffic would be expected to be greater as more 
units, both merging units and P&C IEDs would be connected to it.  
 
The SV Ethernet frame width is therefore 1200 bits. Using a 100 Mb/s process bus, 
with a 50 Hz power system and a sampling rate of 4000 samples/s, theoretically the 
max number of merging units that it can support is approximately 20. With any more 
than this, the bus would be overloaded and data would be lost. 
 
For the overload test, multiple MUs are connected to the process bus. These MUs are 
programmed to generate data streams from an increasing number of sources thus 
increasing the traffic on the process bus. 
 
5.4.1 Star Topology Overload Test 
The SV ETE delay is measured as the key indicator of its response to the increasing 
traffic on the process bus. The configuration of the test system model is shown in 
Figure 5-6. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Configuration of the star topology system model 
 
In this model, P&C IED 1 is assigned to MU 1 and P&C IED 2 is assigned to MU 2. 
Increasing the number of MU 2, thus the traffic on the process bus is increased.  The 
SV ETE delay of P&C IED 1 is measured, the results are tabulated in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3 SV ETE delay of star topology 
Number of MU IED Sampled value packet delay (ms) 
1 0.031576 
2 0.047165 
3 0.047165 
4 0.047165 
5 0.047165 
6 0.047165 
7 0.062765 
8 0.062765 
9 0.078365 
10 0.078365 
11 0.078365 
12 0.078365 
13 0.078365 
14 0.078365 
15 0.093965 
16 0.093965 
17 0.093965 
 
The results shows that, before the number of MUs reaches 18, the SV ETE delay 
increases from 0.031576 ms to 0.093965 ms. When it reaches 18 (86.4 Mbps), which 
is 86.4 % of the process bus data rate (100 Mbps), the SV ETE delay starts to increase 
with time rapidly. As shown in Figure 5-7, the Ethernet delay increased over 0.5 
seconds, after 8 seconds of the simulation. If more than 18 MUs are connected to the 
network, the Ethernet delay may even longer. Therefore, according to the simulation, 
the max number of MUs that the star process bus topology can tolerate is 17. 
Page 
Chapter 5                       Modelling and Simulation for Performance Evaluation of  
Process Bus  Topologies 
 108
 
Figure 5-7 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs on the star process bus 
 
5.4.2 Cascaded Topology Overload Test 
Similar as the star topology test, the configuration of the cascaded topology test 
system model is shown in Figure 5-8. 
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Figure 5-8 Configuration of the cascaded topology system model 
 
The results of SV ETE delay of P&C IED 1 are tabulated in Table 5-4.  
 
Table 5-4 SV ETE delay of cascaded topology 
Number of MU IED Sampled value packet delay (ms) 
1 0.048348 
2 0.048348 
3 0.048348 
4 0.048348 
5 0.048348 
6 0.048348 
7 0.048348 
8 0.048348 
9 0.048348 
10 0.048348 
11 0.048348 
12 0.048348 
13 0.048348 
14 0.048348 
15 0.048348 
16 0.048348 
17 0.048348 
 
Before the number of MUs reaches 18, the SV ETE delay remains at 0.048348 ms. 
When it reaches 18, the SV ETE delay starts to increase with time. As shown in 
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Figure 5-9, the Ethernet delay increased over 0.4 seconds, after 8 seconds of the 
simulation. Therefore, the max number of MUs that the cascaded process bus 
topology can tolerate is 17. 
 
 
Figure 5-9 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs on the cascaded process bus 
 
5.4.3 Ring Topology Overload Test 
The configuration of the test system model is shown in Figure 5-10. The results of SV 
ETE delay are tabulated in Table 5-5. 
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Figure 5-10 Configuration of the ring topology system model 
 
Table 5-5 SV ETE delay of ring topology 
Number of MU IED Sampled value packet delay (ms) 
1 0.048375 
2 0.048375 
3 0.048375 
4 0.048375 
5 0.048375 
6 0.048375 
7 0.048375 
8 0.048375 
9 0.048375 
10 0.048375 
11 0.048375 
12 0.048375 
13 0.048375 
14 0.048375 
15 0.048375 
16 0.048375 
17 0.048375 
 
Similar as the cascaded topology test, before the number of MUs reaches 18, the SV 
ETE delay remains at 0.048375 ms. When it reaches 17, the SV ETE delay starts to 
increase with time. As shown in Figure 5-11, the Ethernet delay increased over 0.25 
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seconds, after 8 seconds of the simulation. Therefore, the max number of MUs that 
the ring process bus topology can tolerate is 17. 
 
 
Figure 5-11 SV ETE delay of 18 MUs in the ring process bus 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The OPNET Modeller simulation based feed bay study shows that star topology 
provides the shortest SV ETE delay of 0.031576 ms. Cascaded topology provides the 
ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, and the ring topology provides almost the same ETE 
delay of 0.048375 ms as cascaded topology. As the acceptable maximum 
communication delay for the time-critical messages, SVs and GOOSE, is 3 ms, the 
SV ETE delay of the MAIN protection for a feeder bay using the three different 
process bus topologies is tolerable. 
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The process bus overload test shows that before the traffic on the process bus 
topologies, cascaded, star, and ring, reaches 85% of the communication link data rate 
(100 Mbps), the star topology provides the SV ETE delay between 0.031576 ms and 
0.093965 ms. The cascaded topology provides the ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, and the 
ring topology provides almost the same ETE delay of 0.048375 ms as cascaded 
topology. Therefore, before the process bus is saturated, the SV ETE delay of the 
three different process bus topologies is also tolerable. 
 
When the traffic on the process bus topologies reaches 85% of the communication 
link data rate, the SV ETE delay starts to increase with time rapidly. That is because 
the bandwidth utilization efficiency [69] of the OPNET Ethernet switch model is 85%, 
the results may be different in the reality by using the real Ethernet switch, which will 
be discussed in chapter 6.  
 
Based on the OPNET studies, as the process bus overload simulation results show, the 
max number of MUs that the three process bus topologies can tolerate is 17.  
 
In conclusion, the SV ETE delay of cascaded, star, and ring process bus topology 
within the number limit of the MUs will not influence the operation of the protection 
communication system. 
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HIS chapter evaluates the performance of different protection 
schemes with cascaded, star and ring process bus topology using 
RTDS Simulator. T 
Protection Performance Study 
with RTDS Simulator 
 
Chapter 6  
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6.1 Introduction of RTDS Simulator 
The Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [72] is designed specifically to simulate 
electrical power systems and to test physical equipment such as control and protection 
devices. Numerous analogue and digital input and output channels, with optical 
isolation and high accuracy, provide for flexible interconnections with the simulator. 
The modular design enables simulation hardware to be customized for specific study 
needs and yet give the flexibility for future expansion.  
 
6.1.1 Conventional RTDS Testing System 
Figure 6-1 demonstrates the application of RTDS in the conventional analogue signal 
based system. The RTDS simulates the power system and generates the required 
voltages and current signals to the amplifiers through a D/A converter [73] [74] [75]. 
The RTDS also exchanges the circuit breaker status, relay trip and re-closure signals 
with the conventional protective relay under test via a binary I/O interface. 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Analogue signal based RTDS test system 
 
The amplifier receives low level signals from the RTDS and amplifies them to a level 
compatible with the input module of the relays. The amplifier is composed of some 
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analogue components which have the ability to carry high currents and voltages, Vnom, 
Vpeak, Inom, Ipeak [76] [77] [78]. As a result, only a limited number of relays can be 
connected to a RTDS system at one time through the amplifiers, this constrains the 
capability of a RTDS system for relay testing. 
 
6.1.2 Design of a New RTDS Testing System 
A significant advantage of the IEC61850 system compared with the conventional 
system is the replacement of analogue and binary signals with Ethernet messages. 
Merging Units work as an access from the instrument transformers to the digital ports 
of relays through Ethernet utilising a specific data format in accordance with 
IEC61850 protocols. The simulation data generated by the RTDS can be injected to 
the IEC61850 compatible relays by a data format conversion. This is achieved by 
introducing a “Conversion Interface Module”. There is no need for the D/A interface 
unit and the current and voltage amplifiers. Figure 6-2 is a schematic diagram of 
RTDS close-loop testing design [79] [80]. 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Schematic diagram of RTDS close-loop testing design 
 
This conversion interface module (CIM) has the ability to access the digital 
simulation signals generated by the RTDS directly and converts these data to an 
IEC61850 compatible format. These data can now be injected to the Protective IED 
for testing purpose.  
 
The connection between the RTDS system and the CIM can be configured as 
analogue to accommodate the existing testing system as an integration phase. 
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Otherwise, this connection can be configured as digitised which means there is a 
direct connection between the RTDS system and the CIM. This is shown in Figure 6-3. 
 
 
Figure 6-3 Connection diagram between RTDS system and CIM 
 
6.1.3 Implementation of this new RTDS testing system 
Equipped with the Giga-Transceiver Network Communication Card (GTNET) [81] 
which is shown in Figure 6-4, RTDS can fully support the IEC61850 based system 
testing. The GTNET can provide real time communication to and from the simulator 
via Ethernet. Different firmware versions are used to accommodate IEC61850 GSE 
binary messaging, IEC61850 9-2 sampled values, playback of large data files stored 
on a PC hard disk and DNP communication, a SCADA protocol commonly used in 
substations.  
 
As shown in Figure 6-5, the simulated data (digital signals) generated by the RTDS 
system are transferred to the GTNET_SV card, where the data is sampled, time-
stamped and converted to a IEC61850 compatible format and broadcasted to the 
Ethernet. The subscribed device is able to access its required data from the Ethernet. 
This effectively eliminates the D/A interface and the current and voltage amplifiers. It 
is worth noting that, for protective relays that need more than one current or voltage 
sampled values, every node involved requires a GTNET_SV card. 
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Figure 6-4 The GTNET card 
 
 
Figure 6-5 RTDS test system using GTNET cards 
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The GTNET_GSE card is utilised to exchange breaker status and substation control 
signals. It supports both GOOSE and GSSE messages but cannot support them 
simultaneously. In the GOOSE mode, an IED configuration file (*.scd) is generated to 
configure the GTNET card using the substation configuration language. The 
configuration information can be inputted to the GTNET card directly in the GSSE 
application [82] [83]. 
 
With the process bus, the relay has no physical current, voltage or contact inputs, so 
there is no corresponding hardware to check. The hardware performing a somewhat 
analogous function, the optical transceivers, PHY chip (it takes a frame of data and 
turn it into a string of bits for transmission over the connecting medium – a process 
called serialization.), etc., are continuously self-tested with signal level margin 
detectors and with data security codes (i.e. CRC, Cyclic-Redundancy-Code), so there 
is little if any value in further testing the relay’s process bus input/output hardware. 
The firmware that implements the measuring elements and scheme logic is 
continuously checked again by CRC, and the processors by watchdog timers. 
 
This chapter will focus on the testing of feeder protection schemes and the 
transformer protection scheme with different process bus topologies. The Feeder 
Local Panel (LB) and the Remote Local Panel (RB) are shown in Figure 6-6 As with 
the other commercial test equipment, the RTDS simulator provides analogue signals 
to the remote hardwired relays and IEC61850 SVs signals to the local IEC61850 
relays. It also provides SVs signals to the HV transformer relays. The upper Local 
(LT) and upper Remote (RT) relays of the panels are configured as the Feeder Main-1 
current differential scheme whilst lower Local (LB) and lower Remote (RB) relays 
are configured as Feeder Main-2 distance scheme. The RTDS test system is shown in 
Figure 6-7. 
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Figure 6-6 Feeder Local Panel (IEC61850) and Feeder Remote Panel (hardwired) 
 
Figure 6-7 RTDS test bed for the protection schemes 
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6.2 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test  
The performance of an EHV current differential protection scheme with different 
process bus topologies is demonstrated using the RTDS simulator fitted with both 
conventional, current and voltage amplifier, and IEC61850, Ethernet, SV outputs. The 
modelled transmission system, shown in Figure 6-8, consisted of the protected 100km 
line, with similar lines connected to both the local and remote ends and 1 GVA 
sources connected to them. The local end is configured as the digital substation with 
the LT IEC61850 protection and the remote end uses a RT conventional relay.  
 
 
Figure 6-8 Modelled power transmission line for the current differential scheme test 
 
The RTDS is configured to generate an IEC61850 9-2LE SV data stream using 
“PhsMeas1” with 8 elements, 4 currents and 4 voltages. The digitised current and 
voltage data streams are provided by the RTDS, separate merging units are not 
required.  
 
Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connectors are used to connect the 
IEC61850 relay to the Ethernet communication networks. A fibre optic link is used 
for the communication between the two relays. Both relays are synchronized by the 
GPS synchronization units. There are only GTNET_SV cards equipped on the RTDS, 
so both relays are configured to send digital trip signal to the RTDS digital input 
interface. The RTDS measured and reported the relays’ tripping times. 
 
If the manual adjustment of the delay compensation in the LT relay is disable and 
both relays are injected the voltage and current values of the local end, then under the 
healthy system conditions, the observed results from the front LCD of the relays 
indicate that SV data stream is about 17.5° (0.97ms) lagging the hardwired analogue 
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signal. This can result in a different current of 539.9A~588.5A. The same conclusion 
as with the other commercial test set can be drawn that the time offset introduced by 
the IEC61850-9-2 digitization process is approximately 1ms. The angle difference and 
differential current can be reduced significantly (3°, 47A) by applying manual 
compensation to the LT relay. 
 
The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1 Parameters of relay and transmission line for current different scheme test 
Item  Value 
f nom 50.00 Hz 
No. of phases 3 
V primary 400.0 kV 
V secondary 110.0 V 
I primary 1.000 kA 
I secondary 1.000 A 
Is1 500A 
K1 30% 
Is 2 5000A 
K2 150% 
Line length 100.0 km 
Line impedance 26.75Ω 
Line angle  86° 
kZN residual comp 0.67 
kZN residual angle  -5.000° 
 
Details of the faults used are shown in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2 Outline of current differential scheme test 
Fault Type Phase A to ground 
Prefault Time 2s 
Fault Point 15 km, 50 km, 85 km 
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º 
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6.2.1 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Cascaded 
Topology 
In this architecture, each component, the IEC61850 based relay, the RTDS IEC61850 
9-2LE interface card and a supervisory PC is connected to its own Ethernet switch 
and these are connected in a chain. The communication architecture of the protection 
scheme is shown in Figure 6-9. 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Configuration of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology 
 
In the tests, faults are applied at each fault point with different points on wave, POW. 
Each test is repeated ten times and the mean trip time, MTT, is calculated. The trip 
times for both the IEC61850 based relay, IEC, and the conventional relay, CON, are 
recorded as shown in the Table 6-3 below. 
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Table 6-3a Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology 
(15km) 
Fault 
Point: 15 
km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
23.6 25.35 21.6 24.55 23.65 25.5 23.05 25.95 
23.6 25.2 24.25 24.5 24 25.05 25.1 24.1 
24.55 24.45 22.3 24.5 25.35 26.25 25.4 23.8 
25.35 25.35 22.4 24.85 24.2 25.95 26.1 23.2 
25.6 25.15 22.9 26.7 24.1 25.15 25.1 24 
25.95 25.7 22.4 24.3 24.35 27.55 26.75 24.15 
27.7 25.35 22.6 26.15 25.1 27.3 26.6 25.85 
27.25 27.05 25.3 24.55 25.95 27.05 24.85 25.85 
22.45 24.25 24.5 25.25 26.55 24.3 22.2 23.75 
22.2 24.2 24.9 24.3 25.5 25 23.1 25.1 
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Table 6-3b Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology 
(50km) 
Fault 
Point: 50 
km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
25.45 25.3 25.05 27.1 24.05 25.45 27.75 26.4 
25.4 24.95 26.9 26.15 25.3 25.85 28.35 27.5 
26.5 26.6 23.6 23.3 24.2 26.6 29.2 26.2 
26.75 27.1 26.05 24.6 25.65 26.4 26.45 28.4 
25.5 26.9 24.85 25.3 24.8 24.9 26.3 27.75 
25.75 26.3 24 25.55 25.2 26.55 26.35 27.55 
25.85 28.2 26.1 25.65 25.3 27.15 26.45 27 
26.6 28.45 25.8 23.9 25.45 26.6 29.8 27.4 
23.7 25.35 26.05 26.55 24.15 23.35 28.75 28.05 
23.85 26.35 26.2 26 24.7 24.35 28.5 28.65 
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Table 6-3c Trip times of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology 
(85km) 
Fault 
Point: 85 
km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
24.65 22.95 24.5 25.85 25.1 22.9 25.2 25.15 
25.55 24.6 25.65 26.55 25.4 24.25 27.6 26.1 
24.45 25 26.4 24.2 25.4 24.8 26.95 26.05 
24.4 25.25 24.4 22.5 22.9 25.05 27.35 27.25 
24.6 25.1 24.7 23.5 23.65 24.45 23.4 26.55 
26.05 25.55 24.95 23.3 23.6 25.45 25.75 24.1 
25 26.8 27.05 25.25 24.1 25.7 24.5 24.75 
26.8 26.8 26.2 23.3 22.6 27 25.35 23.65 
26.2 27 23.6 24.8 23.3 25.7 26.15 24.4 
22.65 26.55 23.45 25.55 24.85 24.85 25 24.3 
24.65 22.95 24.5 25.85 25.1 22.9 25.2 25.15 
 
The MTT for the cascaded topology is shown in Table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-4a MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 24.825 25.205 23.315 24.965 24.875 25.91 24.825 24.575 
 
Table 6-4b MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 25.535 26.55 25.46 25.41 24.88 25.72 27.79 27.49 
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Table 6-4c MTT of current differential scheme test using cascaded topology (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 25.035 25.56 25.09 24.48 24.09 25.015 25.725 25.23 
 
6.2.2 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Star 
Topology 
 In the star topology, all the components are connected to a central Ethernet switch 
giving the communication architecture shown in Figure 6-10. 
 
 
Figure 6-10 Configuration of current differential scheme test using star topology 
 
The trip times of both relays are shown in Table 6-5. 
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Table 6-5a Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (15km) 
Fault 
Point: 15 
km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
23.6 25.45 24.9 27.85 26.25 24.35 23 25.25 
23.3 24.7 25.05 27.1 21.6 24.55 23.2 26.9 
23.5 25.95 26.85 27.3 22.25 23.8 24 27.3 
25.6 26 24.9 23.1 22.5 24.5 23.15 25.75 
25.7 26.45 24.45 25.4 22.8 24.05 23.05 26.4 
25.15 25.55 22.85 23.35 23.05 26.55 24.35 26.5 
25.8 25.55 21.8 25.55 24.65 24.9 25 24.1 
27.4 27.9 22.15 25.25 24.25 26.3 26.1 25.1 
27.55 28.15 22.9 26.7 24.9 23 24.3 24.95 
25.55 23.8 27.05 25.45 23.85 23.25 24.6 25.3 
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Table 6-5b Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (50km) 
Fault 
Point: 50 
km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
25.95 27.5 24.15 24.9 24.7 22.55 29.4 29 
25.6 27.2 25 25.05 23.9 22.8 25.5 29.7 
26.8 28.05 26.55 26.15 25.75 24.8 26.65 29.75 
25.9 26.95 25.35 25.55 26.8 24.5 27 29.05 
23 27.1 24.4 25.2 23.2 24.85 26.1 26.15 
26.25 25.4 26.35 26.1 21.8 25.9 25.95 27.25 
22.8 24.75 25.25 23.85 21.95 26 26.4 28.4 
25 27.95 25.35 24.55 24.15 25.9 27.8 27.75 
25.2 26.55 25.8 23.05 24.75 26.3 29.55 26.15 
25.9 27.2 23.5 24.9 23.8 26.3 29.45 27.95 
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Table 6-5c Trip times of current differential scheme test using star topology (85km) 
Fault 
Point: 85 
km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
24 24.25 25.25 23.25 25.75 25.2 24.2 26.35 
25.95 24.5 26.05 27.05 23.35 25.9 24.9 26.95 
26.15 24.6 21.8 22.95 23.25 24.45 25.2 24.75 
25.95 26 21.65 23.9 23.7 25.45 24.2 27.05 
25.6 26.6 22.3 25.55 23.95 25.6 24.45 24.05 
26.05 26.5 23.05 23.8 25.2 25.35 25.6 23.45 
27.65 25.35 22.75 25.5 25.45 27.25 24.85 24.5 
26.65 25.25 23.05 26.3 25.2 27.55 26.45 23.15 
27.3 26.9 23.85 24.35 25.35 26.75 27.5 25.8 
26.1 23.65 23.4 24.45 25.55 28.2 26.05 25.25 
24 24.25 25.25 23.25 25.75 25.2 24.2 26.35 
 
The MTT for the tests are shown in Table 6-6. 
 
Table 6-6a MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 25.315 25.95 24.29 25.705 23.61 24.525 24.075 25.755 
 
Table 6-6b MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 25.24 26.865 25.17 24.93 24.08 24.99 27.38 28.115 
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Table 6-6c MTT of current differential scheme test using star topology (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 26.14 25.36 23.315 24.71 24.675 26.17 25.34 25.13 
 
6.2.3 Current Differential Protection Scheme Test Using Ring 
Topology 
In the ring topology, as with the cascade architecture, each component is connected to 
a single Ethernet switch, but the chain is then connected to form a ring using a 
managed switch, as shown in Figure 6-11. 
 
 
Figure 6-11 Configuration of current differential scheme test using ring topology 
 
The test results for the ring topology are shown in Table 6-7 below. 
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Table 6-7a Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (15km) 
Fault 
Point: 15 
km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
26.6 26.1 23.6 23.8 24.4 24.8 21.7 26.3 
22.65 25.6 24.45 23.5 25.1 25.3 26.6 26.2 
22.85 26.15 25.1 24.55 27.15 27.05 25.55 24.2 
23.35 25.8 23.9 25.15 26.95 24.85 22.45 24.3 
23.95 27.55 24.85 25.8 25.85 21.8 23.05 24.8 
24.65 27.8 25.5 25.75 21.5 24.1 22.2 24.65 
25.15 27.35 26.25 26.3 21.8 23.1 22.45 26.3 
24.8 25.35 24.05 26.45 22.9 23.15 22.5 25.65 
25.6 25.15 24.2 25.65 22.8 23.6 23.8 25.15 
26.1 25.25 25.6 27.2 23.9 24.05 24.5 25.95 
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Table 6-7b Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (50km) 
Fault 
Point: 50 
km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
25.65 25.1 22.95 23.35 25.8 25.95 25.6 22.9 
24.95 25.65 25.05 24.5 26.1 26.5 26.35 23.15 
26.3 26.4 25.25 24.05 24.4 26.15 27.25 24.1 
23.25 27.25 26.3 25.45 24.7 27.7 26.5 24.05 
23.15 25.65 25 25.45 23.4 22.6 27.05 24.2 
24.35 22.8 23.5 25.25 23.85 21.95 23.1 23.75 
25.15 23.9 25.15 24.3 23.1 22.9 24.55 26.75 
25.05 24.55 25.3 27.25 23.1 24.65 25.7 27.45 
24.75 24.1 25.45 25.95 22.45 23.9 24.6 26.2 
25.25 25.2 22.35 23.1 23.7 23.5 25.35 25.45 
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Table 6-7c Trip times of current differential scheme test using ring topology (85km) 
Fault 
Point: 85 
km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
27.4 26 26.25 27.05 23.4 23.8 24.15 26.6 
25.85 26.25 21.85 24.95 23.85 24.05 25.05 23.95 
25.15 23.55 23.6 21.5 24.35 23.65 26.45 23.55 
25.2 24.45 24.1 23.2 23 23.7 26.9 24.95 
25.65 25.85 24.1 23.9 23.6 25.4 26.4 25.5 
24.5 25.55 24.2 24.2 23.45 26.7 26.1 24.7 
26.2 25.6 24.55 22.95 23.25 26.45 26.1 26.85 
26.55 27.55 24.2 24.9 25.4 26.95 26.15 26.3 
23.8 27.25 23.05 24.9 26.95 26 26.65 27.6 
22.75 23.9 22.45 25.05 27.4 25.5 23.75 25.45 
27.4 26 26.25 27.05 23.4 23.8 24.15 26.6 
 
The MTT for the ring topology tests is shown in Table 6-8 below. 
 
Table 6-8a MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 24.57 26.21 24.75 25.415 24.235 24.18 23.48 25.35 
 
Table 6-8b MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 24.785 25.06 24.63 24.865 24.06 24.58 25.605 24.8 
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Table 6-3c MTT of current differential scheme test using ring topology (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 25.305 25.595 23.835 24.26 24.465 25.22 25.77 25.545 
 
Using a managed switch with its RSTP system enables the ring to be closed. This 
enables the communications to be maintained in the event of a unit failure.  
 
Although this self-healing ability of the ring topology provides additional 
functionality, it can be argued that it is contrary to the philosophy of the Main A – 
Main B protection described in the golden rules [2]. In this, should any part of either 
the Main A or Main B protection scheme fail, that scheme should be taken out of 
service leaving the other to provide the required level of protection. A ‘process bus 
failure alarm’ would alert operators of the need for repair and any risk of spurious 
operation would be avoided. 
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6.3 Distance Protection Relay Test 
The performance of the protection of RB conventional and LB IEC61850 based 
distance protection relay was demonstrated using the RTDS simulator. The modelled 
transmission system, shown in Figure 6-12, consisted of the protected 100km line, 
with one similar line connected to the local end and two lines connected to the remote 
end. 5 GVA sources connect to both ends.  The local end is configured as the 
substation with the both IEC61850 and conventional protection in order to compare 
their performance. The relays used were ALSTOM Grid P545, the remote with the 
conventional design and the local with the IEC61850 design. 
 
 
Figure 6-12 Modelled power transmission line of P545 distance relay test  
 
The test connection diagram is shown in Figure 6-13. The switch is the focus for the 
9-2 SV channel from the RTDS, the SV connection to the relay and the connection to 
the PC.  
 
 
Figure 6-13 Connection diagram of distance relay test 
 
The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-9. 
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Table 6-9 Parameters of the relay and transmission line 
Item Value 
f nom 50.00 Hz 
No. of phases 3 
V primary 400.0 kV 
V secondary 110.0 V 
I primary 1.000 kA 
I secondary 1.000 A 
Z1 Ph. Reach 80 km 
tZ1 Delay 0s 
Z2 Ph. Reach 120 km 
tZ2 Delay 200ms 
Z3 Ph. Reach 250 km 
tZ3 Delay 600ms 
Z4 Ph. Reach 
(reverse) 
-30km 
tZ4 Delay 100ms 
Line length 100.0 km 
Line impedance 26.75Ω 
Line angle 86° 
kZN residual comp 0.67 
kZN residual angle -5.000° 
 
Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 6-10. 9 fault points are 
chosen, which are next to the boundaries of the 4 protection zones. 
 
Table 6-10 Outline of distance relay test 
Fault Type Phase A to ground 
Prefault Time 2s 
Fault Point (measured 
from substation) 
-45 km, -15 km, 15 km, 50 km, 85 km, 110 km, 130 
km, 230 km, 270 km 
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º, 135º 
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In the test, each fault point with different POW is tested 10 times. The trip time of 
both the IEC61850 based relay and conventional relay is recorded as shown in the 
Table 6-11 and Table 6-12 below. 
 
Table 6-11a Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (-45km) 
Fault Point: -45 km -45 km -45 km -45 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
 
 
Table 6-11b Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (-15km) 
Fault Point: -15 km -15 km -15 km -15 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
116.6 121.1 125.2 118.1 
117.8 123.1 124.6 123.1 
115.8 120.6 125.3 123.3 
116.3 123.5 122.2 124.1 
116.1 122.6 123.9 120.9 
116.5 122.2 123.6 122.4 
116.6 121.3 120.7 122.6 
117.9 115.5 124.1 122.8 
116 121.1 124.5 124.6 
115.1 115.4 122.8 122.4 
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Table 6-11c Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (15km) 
Fault Point: 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
17.2 15.45 17.75 18.2 
16.8 15.75 24.6 18.85 
17.05 15.45 23.1 22.85 
16.15 16.5 21.05 21.6 
17.25 17.2 17.8 17.85 
16.9 18 16.85 18.15 
17.65 21.95 17.4 18.75 
16.9 20.55 22 17.55 
17.65 19.1 21.9 16.4 
18.15 18.95 18.2 17.95 
 
Table 6-11d Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (50km) 
Fault Point: 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
16.55 16.75 18.35 17.3 
16.9 15.95 17.25 18.25 
17.9 16.5 17.75 17.75 
18.25 15.75 18.25 17.6 
18.2 15.75 18.5 17.95 
17.55 16 19.2 16.8 
19.05 16.35 17.1 17.85 
21 14.9 18.5 18.2 
21.45 15.35 18.2 17.9 
17.4 19.75 17.8 17.6 
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Table 6-11e Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (85km) 
Fault Point: 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
216.2 215 217 216.8 
216.1 215 217.7 216.8 
217.6 214.5 216.4 215.3 
215 213.7 216.9 216.1 
216 215.3 216.9 216.2 
215 216.2 216.9 216 
215.2 215.4 215.7 216.5 
216.7 214.7 217 217.2 
215.3 215.7 217 216.6 
216 221.9 218.5 216.6 
  
Table 6-11f Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (110km) 
Fault Point: 110 km 110 km 110 km 110 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
227.3 227.7 246.5 229.2 
229.7 221.7 252.2 235.2 
226.3 226.7 252.5 233.4 
227.7 226.9 245.2 227.8 
226.9 228 242.5 233.3 
226.1 227.8 235.9 233.9 
228.6 228.3 242.9 228.2 
229.1 226.7 239.8 229.5 
225.7 227.7 235.7 233.9 
228.8 228.1 239.6 234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 
Chapter 6                                Protection Performance Study with RTDS Simulator 
 141
Table 6-11g Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (130km) 
Fault Point: 130 km 130 km 130 km 130 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
616.3 616.8 616.8 617 
616.7 618 617.3 616.8 
616.6 617.3 616.8 618.3 
616.1 615.5 617.7 616.6 
615.7 615.2 615.3 615.1 
616 614.9 616.5 616.2 
616.3 614.9 617.3 615.4 
615.9 613.5 615.4 618.1 
616.5 613.9 617.8 618 
615.4 614.6 619.2 617.1 
 
Table 6-11h Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (230km) 
Fault Point: 230 km 230 km 230 km 230 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
629.4 627.6 641.4 636.1 
627.8 626.9 637.9 633.5 
626.8 626.5 648.4 633.6 
626.9 628.8 650.3 634.3 
629.9 628.5 650.1 629.3 
627.6 626.1 638.4 629.4 
628.6 628.1 642 628.2 
628.8 628.7 642.5 629.1 
627.7 627.3 649.2 636.2 
628 628.6 655.5 633.9 
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Table 6-11i Trip times of IEC61850 based distance relay (270km) 
Fault Point: 270 km 270 km 270 km 270 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
 
Table 6-12a Trip times of conventional distance relay (-45km) 
Fault Point: -45 km -45 km -45 km -45 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
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Table 6-12b Trip times of conventional distance relay (-15km) 
Fault Point: -15 km -15 km -15 km -15 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
114 117.9 118.1 116.1 
114.8 116.6 117.8 118.3 
114.1 115.8 118.9 116.2 
115 116 116.7 115.7 
115.4 115.5 117.7 117 
114.3 116.1 117 117.1 
115.4 116.1 118.1 116.1 
115.8 115.6 119 116.8 
114.7 117 118.1 118.3 
114.5 117.8 117.1 116 
 
Table 6-12c Trip times of conventional distance relay (15km) 
Fault Point: 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
15.35 14 16 17 
15.3 14.35 17.5 16.55 
16.05 13.75 17.65 16.55 
17.09 15.75 16.9 17.2 
15.3 15.9 15.75 17.1 
16.55 16.05 16.85 17.55 
15.6 15.6 17.5 17.55 
17.25 16.35 18.3 16.6 
14.95 17.15 16.75 16.9 
17.05 16.05 17.25 17.6 
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Table 6-12d Trip times of conventional distance relay (50km) 
Fault Point: 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
17.15 15.5 16.9 17.7 
15.7 15.3 18.3 16.8 
16.15 14.75 17.6 17.15 
16.4 15.75 16.25 16.25 
15.65 15.7 17.35 17.2 
17.35 15.4 16.8 18.55 
17.5 15.6 17.75 16.65 
17.1 15.8 16.45 17.2 
14.85 17.75 17.95 16.5 
15.75 18.1 17 17.15 
 
Table 6-12e Trip times of conventional distance relay (85km) 
Fault Point: 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
215.1 213.5 217.2 215.9 
214.6 215.1 215.9 215.6 
214.8 213.6 215.7 214.4 
216 214 215.3 215 
215.3 214.9 215 216.4 
213.9 214.5 214.9 214.4 
214.8 215 214.5 214.6 
214.7 214.1 215.4 216.5 
214.6 215.6 215.7 215.2 
215.4 220.4 215.4 216.3 
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Table 6-12f Trip times of conventional distance relay (110km) 
Fault Point: 110 km 110 km 110 km 110 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
226.5 223 237.7 226.3 
226.8 224.8 238.2 232.7 
228.1 228.7 236.1 233.3 
228.5 230.6 238.6 227.5 
227.4 226.8 236 226.6 
228.6 231.6 235.3 225.8 
227.7 231.3 238 226.3 
228.2 229.9 237 227.1 
226.8 228.4 237 227.4 
227.1 227.7 236.6 227.3 
 
Table 6-12g Trip times of conventional distance relay (130km) 
Fault Point: 130 km 130 km 130 km 130 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
615.7 612.8 616.1 615.9 
614 616.1 613.2 617.6 
613.9 619.5 614.5 615.9 
614 615 614 617.6 
614.5 614.2 615.1 615.7 
614.9 613 614.9 615.5 
615.8 613.3 615.3 615.8 
615.4 613.9 617.3 617.2 
614.2 612.6 615.1 616.5 
614.3 613.7 616 617.4 
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Table 6-12h Trip times of conventional distance relay (230km) 
Fault Point: 230 km 230 km 230 km 230 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
628.4 630.9 645.8 637.5 
627.2 624.5 646.2 637 
627.3 622.6 646.5 636 
628.7 623.4 656.1 637 
628.1 627.8 655.7 636.1 
628 626.2 655 637.8 
629.8 631.6 655.5 636.7 
627.9 630.7 653.5 636.7 
629.8 627.8 656.5 636 
626.8 628.3 655.1 637.2 
 
Table 6-12i Trip times of IEC61850 conventional relay (270km) 
Fault Point: 270 km 270 km 270 km 270 km 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
no no no no 
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The MTT of the IEC61850 based and conventional relay is show in Table 6-13. 
 
 Table 6-13a MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (-45km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT no no no no no no no no 
 
Table 6-13b MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (-15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 116.47 114.8 120.64 116.44 123.65 117.85 122.43 116.76 
 
Table 6-13c MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 17.17 16.049 17.89 15.495 20.065 17.045 18.815 17.06 
 
Table 6-13d MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 18.425 16.36 16.305 15.965 18.09 17.235 17.72 17.115 
 
Table 6-13e MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 215.91 214.92 215.74 215.07 217 215.5 216.41 215.43 
 
Table 6-13f MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (110km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 227.62 227.57 226.96 228.28 243.28 237.05 231.84 228.03 
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Table 6-13g MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (130km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 616.15 614.67 615.46 614.41 617.01 615.15 616.86 616.51 
 
Table 6-13h MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (230km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT 628.15 628.2 627.71 627.38 645.57 652.59 632.36 636.8 
 
Table 6-13i MTT of IEC61850 based distance relay and conventional relay (270km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON 
MTT no no no no no no no no 
 
The results indicate that the two relays have a very similar performance and respond 
with similar tripping times.  
 
As the MTT of 110km and 230km shown, the trip may become slower when the fault 
happens next to the boundary of the protection zone.  
 
Because of the 17.5° (0.97ms) lagging of the SV signal to the hardwired analogue 
signal, the response of the conventional relay is faster than the IEC61850 based relay. 
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6.4 Distance Protection Scheme Test  
The performance of an EHV distance protection scheme with different process bus 
topologies was demonstrated using the RTDS simulator. The modelled transmission 
system, shown in Figure 6-14, consisted of the protected 100km line, with similar 
lines connected to both the local and remote end and 5 GVA sources connected to 
them. The local end was configured as the digital substation with the IEC61850 
protection. The conventional relay was located at the remote end.   
 
 
Figure 6-14 Modelled power transmission line of distance protection scheme test 
 
The relays were configured as a permissive under-reach protection scheme (PUR) 
which is shown in Figure 6-15. The communication channel for a PUR scheme was 
keyed by operation of the under-reaching zone 1 elements of the relay. If the remote 
relay has detected a forward fault upon receipt of this signal, the relay will operate 
with no additional delay using the PUR scheme. Faults in the lines end zone, 20% of 
the protected line, are therefore cleared with no intentional time delay. 
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Figure 6-15 Permissive under-reach protection scheme characteristic 
 
Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connector are used to connect the 
local IEC61850 based relay to the Ethernet communication network. Fibre optic 
communication was used to achieve the communication between the two relays. Both 
relays were configured to send their digital trip signals to the RTDS digital input 
interface. The RTDS measures and reports the relays’ tripping times.  
 
The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-14. 
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Table 6-14 Parameters of relay and transmission line for distance scheme test 
Item Value 
f nom 50.00 Hz 
No. of phases 3 
V primary 400.0 kV 
V secondary 110.0 V 
I primary 1.000 kA 
I secondary 1.000 A 
Z1 Ph. Reach 80 km 
tZ1 Delay 0s 
Z2 Ph. Reach 150 km 
tZ2 Delay 200ms 
Z3 Ph. Reach 250 km 
tZ3 Delay 600ms 
Z4 Ph. Reach (reverse) -50 km 
tZ4 Delay 100ms 
Line length 100.0 km 
Line impedance 26.75Ω 
Line angle 86° 
kZN residual comp 0.67 
kZN residual angle -5.000° 
 
 
Details of the faults used for the testing are shown in Table 6-15. 
 
Table 6-15 Outline of distance protection scheme test 
Fault Type Phase A to ground 
Pre-fault Time 2s 
Fault Point 
(measured from digital substation) 
-25 km, 15 km, 50 km, 85 km, 115 km 
 
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º 
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6.4.1 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Cascaded Topology 
The communication architecture of the protection scheme is shown in Figure 6-16. 
 
 
Figure 6-16 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology 
 
In the tests, faults are applied at each fault point with different points on wave, POW. 
Each test is repeated ten times and the MTT is calculated. The trip times for both the 
IEC61850 based relay, IEC, and the conventional relay, CON, are recorded as shown 
in the Table 6-16 below. 
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Table 6-16a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture  
(-25 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
-25 km -25km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
225.7 116.8 222.1 118.2 238.6 122.4 227.9 123.9 
225.7 115.8 223.5 119.8 226.4 124.1 226.5 118 
227.9 116.5 225.2 121.6 235.1 124.1 227.4 121.7 
226.6 116 223.4 121.7 235.8 124.7 227.4 121.8 
225.5 115.9 224.2 120.4 235.3 124.2 227.1 122.6 
226.1 116.7 221.7 116.6 235.3 122.3 228.8 122 
225 117.8 221.7 116 237 122.1 231.7 122.8 
226.4 115 222.6 118.8 236.8 124 228.6 121.2 
226.6 115.5 222.5 118.9 235.1 120.6 229.1 121.4 
227 116.7 222.7 115.7 236.4 124.4 227.8 122.9 
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for 
the conventional relay. 
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Table 6-16b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture  
(15 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
24 16.2 23.25 16.5 23.4 16.6 21.2 15.75 
21.55 15.3 22.05 16.5 23.05 16.4 24.1 16.5 
22.75 16 22.5 15.65 23.55 17.2 20.9 15.7 
23.1 15.8 22.15 15.4 22.25 16.65 24.25 17.1 
23.45 16.85 22.15 16.05 22.85 17 24.15 17.15 
23.35 17.2 22.9 15.6 22.4 18.25 24.7 17.85 
22.65 16.25 22.75 16.4 22.45 16.9 24.45 17.15 
24.65 16.45 23.3 15.8 23.1 17.35 25.05 17.95 
21.1 15.5 23.3 15.2 22.6 16.45 23.15 16.9 
21.6 15.1 23.3 16.65 23.5 16.6 23.8 17.15 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier 
assisted times for the conventional relay. 
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Table 6-16c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture  
(50 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
16 14.95 17.7 17.2 17.15 17.95 17.85 17.35 
16.45 15.75 17.4 16.45 19.15 18.1 16.05 17.65 
17 15.85 17.25 17.65 16 17.2 15.95 16.75 
15.95 16.6 17.45 18 17 17.75 16.65 17.15 
15.55 19.15 17 17.8 16.5 17.05 18 18.15 
16.25 17.05 15.65 17.1 17.7 17.35 17.1 17.45 
15.55 15.3 17.2 16.7 17.4 17.9 16.65 18.05 
15.6 17.45 16.65 16.95 18.45 17.9 16.15 16.15 
17.1 16.05 16.2 17.35 17.7 17.55 16.55 16.35 
15.1 15.15 15.85 17.65 17.15 18.35 17.05 16.55 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the 
conventional relay. 
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Table 6-16d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture  
(85 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
15.9 23.7 15.95 25.1 16.2 24.2 16.55 23.6 
15.8 24.05 15.25 22.45 15.3 23.5 15.85 22.8 
16 21.15 15.9 23.4 15.2 21.9 16.65 24.6 
16 21.8 16.1 25.55 15.45 22.9 16.2 22.9 
15.1 22.95 16.25 25.8 15.95 22.75 15.7 23.5 
15.1 21.7 16.4 22.85 15.85 22.6 16.8 24.4 
16.05 23.2 16.75 24.3 16.3 23.95 16.15 24.7 
16.5 23.85 16.5 23.85 15.95 23.75 17 25.05 
14.95 20.8 16.7 24.15 16.05 22.85 16.2 23.1 
15.4 24.15 15.15 23.45 16.65 23.6 18.55 25.8 
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the IEC61850 relay. 
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Table 6-16e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using cascade architecture  
(115 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
115 km 115km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115km 115 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
116.9 222.7 115.2 215.8 118.9 217.6 117.8 222.3 
116 223.4 121 217.3 119.7 216.6 119.6 223.1 
115.5 221.9 119.6 218 119.1 216.3 115.6 216.4 
115.8 222.2 118 216.5 122.7 217 121.1 216.8 
115.5 224.4 117.9 217.2 122.9 216.3 123 216.2 
116.1 220.5 119.1 217 121.1 216.3 116.1 223 
116.4 220.9 115.1 215.6 121.9 214.8 123.1 217.8 
115.8 221.3 116 216.4 125 215.7 117.2 217.2 
116.9 221.5 118.5 217.5 122.5 216.5 116.4 223.2 
116.8 221.6 118.4 218.2 125.2 217.3 123.8 220.9 
The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for 
the conventional relay 
 
The MTT of both relays using cascaded topology is shown in Table 6-17. 
 
Table 6-17a MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (-25km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 226.25 116.27 222.96 118.77 235.18 123.29 228.23 121.83 
 
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for the 
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the 
conventional relay, which made the trips slower.  
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Table 6-17b MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 22.82 16.065 22.765 15.975 22.915 16.94 23.575 16.92 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the conventional relay. Because of the communication delay between the 
two relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the conventional relay were 
about 7 ms slower than the IEC61850 relay. 
 
Table 6-17c MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 16.055 16.33 16.835 17.285 17.42 17.71 16.8 17.16 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the 
conventional relay, therefore the trip times of the two relays were similar. 
 
Table 6-17d MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 15.68 22.735 16.095 24.09 15.89 23.2 16.565 24.045 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the IEC61850 relay. Because of the communication delay between the two 
relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the IEC61850 relay were about 7 
ms slower than the conventional relay. 
 
Table 6-17e MTT distance protection scheme test using cascaded topology (115km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
MTT 116.17 222.04 117.88 216.95 121.9 216.44 119.37 219.69 
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The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for the 
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the IEC61850 
relay, which made the trips slower at 0º POW. 
 
6.4.2 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Star Topology 
The communication architecture is shown in Figure 6-17. 
 
Figure 6-17 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using star topology 
 
The trip times of both relays using star topology are shown in Table 6-18. 
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Table 6-18a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture 
(-25 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
-25 km -25km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
225.2 118.1 222.7 117.4 238.4 120.6 231.7 122.1 
225.7 116.2 221.9 118.7 236.2 121.2 228.8 122.6 
225.9 116.4 223.5 117.2 226.5 122.5 229 123.2 
227.9 117.1 224 118 237 121.2 227.1 122.5 
227.6 118.7 223.8 116.4 235.7 122.6 227.2 120.2 
226.8 116.7 224.1 117.7 236.1 123.2 227.1 122 
226.5 116.1 226 117.3 237.8 119.8 229 122.9 
226.6 117.9 222 114.5 236.8 122.2 226 121.5 
225.7 115.8 223.5 118 235.5 123.6 228.5 124.1 
226.9 116.4 222.7 118.2 239.6 122 229.3 120.1 
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for 
the conventional relay. 
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Table 6-18b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture  
(15 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
23 16.75 21.1 15.65 22.85 16.4 25.35 17.85 
23.25 17.85 21.55 16.2 22.35 15.25 23.15 16.85 
23.6 15.8 21.5 16.5 22.45 16.45 22.35 16.15 
22.4 15.7 21.3 15.15 22.2 16.1 23.55 16.7 
22.2 15.25 21.75 15.8 23.1 16.2 22.75 17.55 
21.95 15.05 22 16.65 23.3 16.1 23.4 17.7 
22.75 15.7 21.85 16.45 24.15 15.55 25.75 18.1 
20.6 15.45 22.4 16.3 23.75 16.4 25.25 15.95 
23.4 16.45 21.95 16.15 22.55 16.2 24.35 16.45 
23.4 16.25 22.1 15.85 23.5 16.45 24.4 16.25 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier 
assisted times for the conventional relay. 
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Table 6-18c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture  
(50 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
17 15.9 17 17.15 17.65 16.1 16.6 17.75 
16.45 15.7 16.7 18.05 17.2 16.95 16.9 16.45 
16.5 15.95 17.2 16.9 16.3 19.65 18.3 17.25 
15 16.4 17.05 18.15 16.85 18.1 17.45 17.7 
15.85 16.55 16.7 16.85 16.7 17.05 17.15 17.9 
16.5 16 16.5 17.75 16.5 16.7 16.45 17.15 
16.55 16 16.75 18.15 18.2 20.5 16.55 18 
14.9 17.6 16.95 16.05 17.85 18.1 17.2 17 
16 16.8 17.05 17.6 18 17.4 17.45 18.35 
16.85 14.95 17.05 16.3 16.65 16.6 16.5 16.6 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the 
conventional relay. 
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Table 6-18d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture  
(85 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
15 24.4 16.1 26.8 16.6 24.05 15.3 23.25 
16.05 23.85 16.85 25.65 15.95 23.15 15.2 21.95 
14.6 21.95 17.4 24.6 17.25 23.7 17.6 24.35 
15.45 22.75 15.35 22.3 17.25 22.95 15.8 24.8 
15.4 24.65 16 22.65 17.1 23.7 16.5 25 
15.1 20.65 16.85 22.5 17.5 25.05 15.5 22.4 
17.2 23.9 15.75 23.1 17.55 23.3 16.6 24.8 
16 21.85 16.5 22.65 16.55 23.45 16.8 25.25 
16.45 25.15 15.75 23.25 16.5 24.4 17.3 26.15 
15.5 23.05 16 23.75 18.75 26.55 15.8 22.9 
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the IEC61850 relay. 
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Table 6-18e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using star architecture  
(115 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
115 km 115km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115km 115 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
118.5 222.2 115.9 217.3 122.8 217.4 118.9 217.1 
117.2 224.2 116 215.5 119.6 216.6 117.4 217.3 
116.3 223.2 116.1 218.5 117.3 216.2 124.1 223.7 
115.8 224.1 115.2 215.8 120.8 215.9 123.7 216.74 
115.3 224.9 116.4 214.9 125.4 217.5 121 222.9 
116.1 224.1 115.3 216.9 123.5 215.7 119.5 216.4 
115.1 226.1 115.6 219.9 125.9 216.3 116.9 214.6 
116.1 223.8 116 216.7 119.1 216 118.3 216.2 
117.2 224.2 115.7 216.4 118.6 215.4 119.3 215.4 
116.7 223.4 1118.3 216.3 125.3 216.3 117.6 215.8 
The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for 
the conventional relay 
 
Summary of the results using MTT of both relays with star topology is shown in 
Table 6-19. 
 
Table 6-19a MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (-25km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 226.48 116.94 223.42 117.34 235.96 121.89 228.37 122.12 
 
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for the 
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the 
conventional relay, which made the trips slower.  
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Table 6-19b MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 22.655 16.025 21.75 16.07 23.02 16.11 24.03 16.955 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the conventional relay. Because of the communication delay between the 
two relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the conventional relay were 
about 7 ms slower than the IEC61850 relay. 
 
Table 6-19c MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 16.16 16.185 16.895 17.295 17.19 17.715 17.055 17.415 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the 
conventional relay, therefore the trip times of the two relays were similar. 
 
Table 6-19d MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 15.675 23.22 16.255 23.725 17.1 24.03 16.24 24.085 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the IEC61850 relay. Because of the communication delay between the two 
relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the IEC61850 relay were about 7 
ms slower than the conventional relay. 
 
Table 6-19e MTT distance protection scheme test using star topology (115km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 116.43 224.02 216.05 216.82 121.83 216.33 119.67 217.61 
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The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for the 
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the IEC61850 
relay, which made the trips slower at 0º POW. 
 
6.4.3 Distance Protection Scheme Test Using Ring Topology 
The communication architecture is shown in Figure 6-18. 
 
 
Figure 6-18 Configuration of distance protection scheme test using ring topology 
 
The trip times of both relays using star topology are shown in Table 6-20. 
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Table 6-20a Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture 
(-25 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
-25 km -25km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km -25 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
226 116.5 225 117.4 237.4 120.5 227.8 121.5 
226.9 115.7 222.5 119.4 238 124.7 228.7 122.7 
226.3 116.1 222.9 117.7 238.9 122.8 226.9 122.6 
227.5 117.4 225.3 114.7 237.2 123.2 227.1 120.7 
225.9 115.1 227.7 122.7 228.5 121.1 228 121.1 
227.1 115.9 223.2 117.8 235.2 122.1 227 121 
226.5 117.3 221.4 118.5 234.5 121.3 228.9 123.4 
226 118.5 220.9 117.3 236.5 122.5 228.1 123.3 
226.7 116.5 223.8 116.9 238.8 120.7 228.1 122.3 
227.2 117 224.6 121 235.7 123.2 231.1 117 
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for 
the conventional relay. 
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Table 6-20b Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture  
(15 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 15 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
22.25 16.4 22.55 15.9 24.25 16.8 24.8 17.95 
21.9 15.8 19.85 15.6 24.25 16.95 26.15 17.25 
21.55 14.9 23.25 16.2 24.45 17.55 22.75 16 
21.25 16.75 23.45 15.3 24.2 17.25 22.55 16.15 
21.55 15.25 24.55 16.2 23.1 16.45 21.7 16.45 
22.5 16.5 20.2 15.75 24.8 18.45 23.75 16.3 
22.25 16.3 24.85 16.65 23.9 16.4 23.7 17.9 
22.15 16.7 24.65 16.25 24.7 17.25 23.4 16.85 
22.8 15.85 24.05 16.95 24.25 17.15 22.8 17.9 
23.2 16.45 23.35 14.6 22.75 15.85 22.85 16.75 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier 
assisted times for the conventional relay. 
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Table 6-20c Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture  
(50 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
17.8 16.45 16.8 17.4 17.85 17.1 17.3 18.65 
15.75 17.25 15.95 16.6 18 17.3 16.9 17.55 
15.75 15.4 17.7 17.15 17.1 17.35 17.65 16.75 
15.95 15.3 17.3 15.65 17.25 17.85 16.65 19.1 
15.6 16.15 16.65 16.25 17.6 18.2 16.05 17.95 
16.05 16.4 16.6 16.9 17.95 18 16.65 17.55 
15.65 16.85 17.1 17.2 16.7 18 16.85 17.15 
15.6 16.2 17.25 18.3 17 16.6 16.3 16.7 
17.35 16.75 17.15 16 16.1 16.75 16.95 17.05 
16.4 16.1 16.5 17 16.95 17 18 17.6 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the 
conventional relay. 
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Table 6-20d Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture  
(85 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 85 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
15.55 22.35 17 24.65 16.4 25.8 17.05 21.4 
16.25 25.45 16.5 25.85 15.8 21.7 15.1 22.35 
16.4 24.85 16.25 24.05 17.2 25.25 15.25 22.85 
15.8 25.2 16.05 24.25 17.15 24.9 16.4 22.55 
15.75 21.7 15.95 23.65 16.9 24.9 16 22.15 
15.1 22.3 16.55 24.6 17 25.8 15.7 22.75 
15.25 21.6 16.2 23.25 17.4 25.35 15.25 23.4 
16 22.25 16.45 23.05 17.35 23.5 16.55 24.1 
15.95 21.25 15.6 22.2 18.3 25.15 16.4 23.4 
15.6 23.45 16.05 24.55 15.85 24.4 15.95 23.75 
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the IEC61850 relay. 
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Table 6-20e Trip times of distance protection scheme test using ring architecture  
(115 km) 
Fault 
Point: 
115 km 115km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115 km 115km 115 km 
POW: 
0º 0º 45º 45º 
 
90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay 
Type: 
CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC CON IEC 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
Trip 
time 
(ms) 
116 223.6 117.6 221.7 120.3 216.1 117.1 216.3 
116.1 221.6 122.8 218.1 121.7 217 118.1 221.9 
116.5 221.8 117.9 223.2 122.7 215 118.3 223.8 
115.7 222.9 125.7 216.2 117.6 215.5 118.6 214.6 
117.1 222.6 123.8 216 118.7 216.3 125.2 217.7 
115.3 223.1 116.5 214.9 122.6 215.5 117.7 218.1 
115.2 221.1 118.9 215.3 121.2 216 122.6 222.2 
116.5 222.6 120.7 215.9 120.9 215.6 117.8 221.7 
116.2 221.9 121.5 216.9 119.5 217.5 121.6 222.9 
118.8 222.9 118.4 217.9 119.8 215.8 118.8 216 
The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for 
the conventional relay 
 
The MTT of both relays using star topology is shown in Table 6-21. 
 
Table 6-21a MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (-25km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 226.61 116.6 223.73 118.34 236.07 122.21 228.17 121.56 
 
The tripping times were zone 4 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 2 times for the 
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the 
conventional relay, which made the trips slower.  
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Table 6-21b MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (15km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 22.14 16.09 23.075 15.94 24.065 17.01 23.445 16.95 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for the IEC61850 relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the conventional relay. Because of the communication delay between the 
two relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the conventional relay were 
about 7 ms slower than the IEC61850 relay. 
 
Table 6-21c MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (50km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 16.19 16.285 16.9 16.845 17.25 17.415 16.93 17.605 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 times for both the IEC61850 relay and the 
conventional relay, therefore the trip times of the two relays were similar. 
 
Table 6-21d MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (85km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 15.765 23.04 16.26 24.01 16.935 24.675 15.965 22.87 
 
The tripping times were zone 1 for the conventional relay and PUR carrier assisted 
times for the IEC61850 relay. Because of the communication delay between the two 
relays and processing of the PUR scheme, trips of the IEC61850 relay were about 7 
ms slower than the conventional relay. 
 
Table 6-21e MTT distance protection scheme test using ring topology (115km) 
POW 0º 0º 45º 45º 90º 90º 135º 135º 
Relay CON IEC CON IEC CON IET CON IEC 
MTT 116.34 222.41 120.38 217.61 120.5 216.03 119.58 219.52 
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The tripping times were zone 2 times for the IEC61850 relay and zone 4 times for the 
conventional relay. The fault point was next to the zone 2 boundary of the IEC61850 
relay, which made the trips slower at 0º POW. 
  
6.5 Transformer Current Differential Protection 
Relay Test  
The performance of an EHV transformer current differential protection relay with 
different process bus topologies was demonstrated using the RTDS simulator. The 
modelled transmission system, shown in Figure 6-19, consisted of the protected 
transformer, with a 100 km line connected to the local end and a 1 GVA source 
connected to it. The low voltage end was configured as the digital substation with the 
HV IEC61850 based transformer protection. Both the low voltage and high voltage 
sides of the transformer used IEC61850 9-2 connection. Each side is for a different 
GTNET card. 
 
 
Figure 6-19 Modelled power transmission line for the transformer current differential 
protection relay test 
 
The tripping characteristics of the current differential protection relay are shown in 
Figure 6-20. 
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Figure 6-20 Current differential bias characteristic 
 
Standard 100/1000TX electrical cables with RJ45 connectors were used to connect the 
IEC61850 relay to the Ethernet communication networks. The relay is configured to 
send digital trip signal to the RTDS digital input interface. The RTDS measures and 
reports the relays’ tripping times.  
 
The main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-22. 
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Table 6-22 Parameters of relay and transmission line for transformer relay test 
Item  Value 
f nom 50.00 Hz 
No. of phases 3 
HV nominal 400 kV 
HV connection Y-Wye 
LV nominal 132 kV 
LV connection Y-Wye 
Leakage inductance 0.2 PU 
Transformer rating 100 MVA 
Is1 2.000 PU 
K1 30% 
Is 2 10.00 PU 
K2 80% 
Line length 100.0 km 
Line impedance 26.75Ω 
Line angle  86° 
kZN residual comp 0.67 
kZN residual angle  -5.000° 
 
Details of the faults used are shown in Table 6-23. 
 
Table 6-23 Outline of transformer current differential relay test 
Fault Type Phase A to ground 
Prefault Time 2s 
Fault Point HV primary side  
Point On Wave 0º, 45º, 90º, 135º 
6.5.1 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test 
Using Cascaded Topology 
The communication architecture of the transformer protection is shown in Figure 6-21. 
The transformer relay subscribes both the HV and LV SVs with one IEC61850-9-2 
LE network card. 
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Figure 6-21 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using cascaded topology 
 
In the tests, faults were applied at primary side of the transformer with different points 
on wave, POW. Two SV data streams (high voltage side and low voltage side) were 
provided by the RTDS. Each test was repeated ten times and the mean trip time, 
MTT, was calculated.  The trip times are recorded as shown in the Table 6-24 below. 
 
Table 6-24 Trip times of transformer relay test using cascaded topology 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
13.1 13.45 12.95 16.6 
14.35 13.25 12.25 16 
12.5 13.1 12.05 15.85 
12.5 13.1 11.85 15.8 
14.25 12.7 11.9 16.5 
14.4 13.4 11.6 15.9 
14 12.5 13.2 16.4 
14.65 13.1 13.7 15.35 
14.9 12.45 11.25 15.3 
14.1 12.65 13.5 15.45 
 
The MTT for the cascaded topology is shown in Table 6-25. 
 
Table 6-25 MTT of transformer relay test using cascaded topology 
POW 0º 45º 90º 135º 
MTT 13.875 12.97 12.425 15.915 
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6.5.2 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test 
Using Star Topology 
The communication architecture of the transformer protection is shown in Figure 6-22. 
 
Figure 6-22 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using star topology 
 
The trip times are recorded as shown in the Table 6-26 below. 
 
Table 6-26 Trip times of transformer relay test using star topology 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
12.95 11.45 12.7 16.8 
12.85 11.4 12.3 16.05 
13.05 11.85 12.4 15.8 
13 11.1 12.75 16.1 
12.8 11.8 12.9 16.6 
12.75 11.65 12.45 14.75 
15.45 11.2 13.85 15.9 
13.75 11.5 12.3 15.65 
15.15 11 11.75 15.6 
14.25 10.7 11.85 15.45 
 
The MTT for the star topology is shown in Table 6-27. 
 
Table 6-27 MTT of transformer relay test using star topology 
POW 0º 45º 90º 135º 
MTT 13.6 11.365 12.525 15.87 
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6.5.3 Transformer Current Differential Protection Relay Test 
Using Ring Topology 
The communication architecture of the transformer protection is shown in Figure 6-23. 
 
 
Figure 6-23 Configuration of transformer protection relay test using ring topology 
 
The trip times are recorded as shown in the Table 6-28 below. 
 
Table 6-28 Trip times of transformer relay test using ring topology 
POW: 0º 45º 90º 135º 
Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) Trip time (ms) 
14 12.65 12.9 14.95 
14.55 12.85 12.8 15.35 
13.3 12.85 12.75 15.15 
13 13.1 13.15 18.1 
13.15 12.55 12.95 16.05 
14.85 12.8 12.85 15.55 
14.7 12.65 12.55 15.8 
14.65 11.85 12.5 15.4 
14.6 11.55 12.1 15.6 
14.95 11.35 12.3 15.2 
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The MTT for the ring topology is shown in Table 6-29. 
 
Table 6-29 MTT of transformer relay test using star topology 
POW 0º 45º 90º 135º 
MTT 14.175 12.42 12.685 15.715 
 
6.6 Process Bus Overload Test  
6.6.1 Introduction 
Following the process bus overload simulation in chapter 5, for the process bus 
overload test, multiple Ethernet sources were connected to the process bus. These data 
sources provide data streams which were similar to those generated by IEC61850 
merging units.  
 
Based on the OPNET studies, as the process bus overload simulation results show, 
when the traffic on the process bus topologies reaches 85% of the communication link 
data rate, the SV ETE delay starts to increase with time rapidly, and the max number 
of MUs that the three process bus topologies can tolerate is 17.  
 
The performance of LB distance protection relay is demonstrated using an “A” phase 
to ground fault at the mid-point of the protected transmission line with a point-on-
wave of 0 degrees. The modelled transmission system is shown in Figure 6-24. The 
main parameters of the relay and transmission line are shown in Table 6-1.  
 
 
Figure 6-24 Modelled power transmission line for process bus overload test 
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6.6.2 VLAN Priority of SV Ethernet packet 
IEEE 802.1Q is the networking standard that supports Virtual LANs (VLANs) on an 
Ethernet network. The standard defines a system of VLAN tagging for Ethernet 
frames and the accompanying procedures to be used by bridges and switches in 
handling such frames. The standard also contains provisions for a quality of service 
prioritization scheme commonly known as IEEE 802.1p and defines the Generic 
Attribute Registration Protocol.  
 
In the Ethernet frame, there is a 3-bit field which is Priority Code Point (PCP). It 
refers to the IEEE 802.1p priority and indicates the frame priority level. Values are 
from 0 (best effort) to 7 (highest); 1 represents the lowest priority. These values can 
be used to prioritize different classes of traffic (voice, video, data, etc). 
 
The default VLAN priority of a SV Ethernet packet is 4. In this case, changing the 
priority level of the SV packet generated by the RTDS to a higher level, the Ethernet 
switch will differentiate it from other SV packets and guarantee it not to be influenced 
by the process bus overload. Therefore, the VLAN priority level of SV streams were 
all set to 4 in the test. 
 
6.6.3 Process Bus Overload Test Using Star Topology 
For this test, multiple Ethernet sources are connected to the star switch. The test 
system configuration is as shown in Figure 6-25. These simulators are programmed to 
generate data streams from an increasing number of sources thus increasing the traffic 
on the process bus. 
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Figure 6-25 Configuration of process bus overload test using star topology 
 
Using Wireshark Network Analyzer, the sample value packets published by the 
Ethernet Simulator are captured as shown in Figure 6-26. As the size of the Ether-type 
PDU is 113 bytes, according to Figure 5-2, the size of this sample value packet is 143 
bytes. The inter-frame gap is 96 bits, the SV Ethernet frame width is therefore 1240 
bits.  
 
The svID is the logical node name of the IED assigned to the MU. The range of this 
frame is 10 to 34 bytes. As the length of the svID may be different, the size of the 
PDU could change in different applications. In this case, the size of svID 
“Areva_MUEthDRS1” is 15 bytes, which makes the size of the PDU 5 bytes bigger 
than the one used in OPNET simulation. 
 
Using a 100 Mb/s process bus, with a 50 Hz power system and a sampling rate of 
4000 samples/s, the max number of merging units that it can support has been shown 
to be 20, which means the process bus load will reach its full capacity (actually 99.2 
Mb/s) when 20 SV data steams transmitted through the process bus. This is an ideal 
estimation. 
Page 
Chapter 6                                Protection Performance Study with RTDS Simulator 
 182
 
Figure 6-26 Sampled value packet frames captured by Wireshark Network Simulator 
 
The traffic on the process bus is increased and the effect on the IEC61850 relay’s 
tripping times are monitored and recorded as shown in Table Appendix-3. The MTT 
is shown in Table 6-30. 
 
Table 6-30a MTT of process bus overload test using star topology (1 to 20 SVs) 
1 SV 
MTT 
5 SV 
MTT 
10 SV 
MTT  
15 SV 
MTT 
19 SV 
MTT 
 20 SV 
MTT 
16.221 16.007 16.986 16.175 16.119 16.02 
 
Table 6-30b MTT of process bus overload test using star topology (21 to 40 SVs) 
21 SV 
MTT 
25 SV 
MTT 
30 SV 
MTT  
35 SV 
MTT 
40 SV 
MTT 
23.183 35.493 45.565 50.606 53.6 
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The results show that the MTT of the IEC61850 based relay starts to increase when 21 
SVs are injected into the process bus, which makes the traffic load reaches over its 
full capacity and lead to the congestive collapse. 
 
Congestion collapse is a condition which a packet switched computer network can 
reach, when little or no useful communication is happening due to congestion. 
Congestion collapse generally occurs at choke points in the network, where the total 
incoming traffic to a node exceeds the outgoing bandwidth [84].  
  
When a network is congestion collapse, it has settled (under overload) into a stable 
state where traffic demand is high but little useful throughput is available. Throughput 
is the average rate of successful message delivery over a communication channel [84]. 
 
Therefore, there are high levels of packet delay and loss, caused by routers discarding 
packets due to the output queues are full, and general quality of service is extremely 
poor under such condition. It can be observed from the Table 6-30 and Table 6-31 that 
some of the trips are longer than the normal value (16 ms) due to congestion collapse 
of the process bus LAN, and under such condition the trip times increase as the data 
traffic load is increased. 
 
The results for different traffic levels are shown in Figure 6-27. 
 
 
Figure 6-27 MTT with respect to the loading of the star process bus traffic 
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The results show that the MTT of the IEC61850 based relay starts to increase after the 
process bus load reaches its full capacity, which is different from the results of OPNET 
Modeler based process bus overload simulation. It means that the bandwidth utilization 
efficiency of the real Ethernet switch is 100% rather than 85%. For these tests, there is 
no evidence of any failure to trip. 
 
6.6.4 Process Bus Overload Test Using Cascaded Topology 
The test system configuration is as shown in Figure 6-28. 
 
 
Figure 6-28 Configuration of process bus overload test using cascaded topology 
 
The tripping times are monitored and recorded as shown in Table Appendix-4. The 
MTT is shown in Table 6-31. 
 
Table 6-31a MTT of process bus overload test using cascaded topology (1 to 20 SVs) 
1 SV 
MTT 
5 SV 
MTT 
10 SV 
MTT  
15 SV 
MTT 
19 SV 
MTT 
 20 SV 
MTT 
16.705 16.135 16.176 16.443 16.399 16.191 
 
Table 6-31b MTT of process bus overload test using cascaded topology (21 to 40 SVs) 
21 SV 
MTT 
25 SV 
MTT 
30 SV 
MTT  
35 SV 
MTT 
40 SV 
MTT 
24.215 34.253 50.577 55.52 51.053 
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The results for different traffic levels are shown in Figure 6-29. 
 
 
Figure 6-29 MTT with respect to the loading of the cascaded process bus traffic 
 
6.6.5 Process Bus Overload Test Using Cascaded Topology 
The test system configuration is as shown in Figure 6-30. 
 
 
Figure 6-30 Configuration of process bus overload test using ring topology 
 
The tripping times are monitored and recorded as shown in Table Appendix-5. The 
MTT is shown in Table 6-32. 
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Table 6-32a MTT of process bus overload test using ring topology (1 to 20 SVs) 
1 SV 
MTT 
5 SV 
MTT 
10 SV 
MTT  
15 SV 
MTT 
19 SV 
MTT 
 20 SV 
MTT 
15.975 16.489 16.254 16.654 16.937 16.549 
 
Table 6-32b MTT of process bus overload test using ring topology (21 to 40 SVs) 
21 SV 
MTT 
25 SV 
MTT 
30 SV 
MTT  
35 SV 
MTT 
40 SV 
MTT 
23.049 32.361 47.157 48.902 49.86 
 
 
The results for different traffic levels are shown in Figure 6-31. 
 
 
Figure 6-31 MTT with respect to the loading of the ring process bus traffic 
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6.7 Conclusions 
The performance of IEC61850 protection schemes using the three different process 
bus topologies is investigated with an RTDS real time simulator modelling EHV 
transmission systems. The protection schemes include feeder distance protection 
scheme, feeder current differential protection scheme and transformer current 
differential protection scheme. 
 
The tests demonstrate that the IEC61850 based relays and the conventional relays had 
a very similar performance and responded with similar tripping times. The time offset 
introduced by the IEC61850-9-2 digitization process is approximately 1ms. 
Differences of the tripping times for the three different process bus topologies are 
small. 
 
Tests to investigate the IEC61850 relay’s performance when the process bus traffic is 
overloaded demonstrate a consistent performance until the process bus is congestion 
collapse. The bandwidth utilization efficiency of the real Ethernet switch is 100% of 
the communication link data rate (100Mb/s). Under the congestion collapse condition, 
the protection becomes slower and the tripping times are increased. 
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HIS chapter summarizes the thesis by outlining the major 
contributions and findings from the research, and also presents 
future works that can be done to improve the technology. T 
Conclusion and Future Work 
Chapter 7  
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7.1 Conclusion 
The aims of IEC61850 are to reduce costs, respond to the increasing demands for 
communications and to provide for standard protocols available from different 
manufacturers. There are also aims to provide for future proofed equipment, 
interoperability of equipment from different manufacturers and easing the 
management of future power system substation equipment. 
 
These aims can be met and if the road-maps provided by the computer and 
communications systems are followed. There will also be a host of other opportunities 
and advantages that can be realised. These include easier repair, refurbishment and 
replacement of sub-station protection, control and metering equipment. They also 
provide for greater use of general purpose IEDs, self-healing systems, and plug and 
play type facilities. 
 
IEC61850, the communications standard for the digital substation, has provided the 
basis for future protection and control systems. The communications buses, which are 
fundamental to the operation of these schemes have presented challenges to protection 
scheme designers as to the type of system architecture which can be used.  
 
In order to reducing the outages for replacement of the secondary equipments which 
are typically eight weeks in duration to one – two weeks, National Grid Electricity 
Transmission launched the Architecture of Substation Secondary System (AS3). This 
aim will be achieved by implementation of a process bus. 
 
Therefore, four primary aims and seven golden rules are proposed for the design of 
the process bus architecture by the National Grid. 
 
Primary aims of AS3 process bus architecture are: 
 
A. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements. 
 
B. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement. 
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C. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems. 
 
D. Reduce risks of mal-operation. 
 
Seven golden rules for the design of the process bus Architecture are:  
 
1. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types – 
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC 
Transformer, MC Feeder. 
 
2. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary 
equipment 
 
3. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system. 
 
4. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay. 
 
5. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection & 
Control). 
 
6. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally 
identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid 
suppliers. 
 
7. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding 
intertrip send).  
 
Cooperating with WG4, Architecture & Reliability, a process bus architecture is 
proposed, which has already been agreed by National Grid. This process bus 
architecture as shown in Figure 7-1 contains two bay process buses (PB1 and PB2) 
which are connected to the MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protection respectively, which 
makes them totally separated and independent. 
Page 
Chapter 7   Conclusion and Future Work 
 191
 
Figure 7-1 Substation communication system using the proposed standard process 
bus architecture 
 
The main advantages of this process bus architecture are described below in terms of 
the four primary aims and seven golden rules of AS3 project. 
 
12. Allow replacement of faulty IED with minimum outage requirements. 
 
With the application of switching box, two independent bay process buses and 
gateway switches, the, any single faulty IED can be replaced without an outage or 
impacting any other IEDs. 
 
13. Allow secondary refurbishment of a bay with minimum outage requirement. 
 
The secondary system of a bay can be refurbished without an outage. 
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14. Simplify isolation procedures between primary and secondary systems. 
 
The primary system of a bay can be refurbished in an isolated way. 
 
15. Reduce risks of mal-operation. 
 
By using the independent MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 protection systems, each 
protection IED is capable of tripping the circuit breaker. Therefore, the risk of 
mal-operation is reduced. 
 
16. The design principles of the AS3 scheme must be standard for all bay types – 
DBB feeder, DBB Bus Section, DBB Bus Coupler, MC Mesh Corner, MC 
Transformer, MC Feeder. 
 
The process bus architecture is proposed as a standard for all bay types. 
 
17. The switching box should be located as close as possible to the Primary 
equipment. 
 
The switching box is capable of being located next to the Primary equipment 
 
18. No single activity on the MAIN 1 system shall affect the MAIN 2 system. 
 
The MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 systems are totally separated and independent. 
19. No single failure shall result in the loss of control of more than one bay. 
 
All the BCUs are connected to the inter-bay measurement process bus and station 
bus through gateway switches. Any single failure would influence one BCU at 
most. 
 
20. Physical facilities shall be available to isolate a bay for testing (Protection & 
Control). 
 
The application of switching box and gateway switches can fulfil this requirement. 
Page 
Chapter 7   Conclusion and Future Work 
 193
21. The Protection and Control application/philosophy shall be functionally 
identical to the existing bay solution currently provided by National Grid 
suppliers. 
 
The new substation communication system will not influence the protection and 
control schemes that the substations are using at the moment. 
 
22. All trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms (excluding 
intertrip send).  
 
As described above, this proposed process bus architecture is capable of achieving the 
four primary aims and obeying the seven golden rules, but leaves two questions still 
unanswered.  
 
 What Ethernet LAN topology will be used in the bay process buses? 
 
 Whether all trip signals shall be received by the breakers within 10ms 
(excluding intertrip send) or not? 
 
This work describes and evaluates three different process bus topologies which are 
cascaded, star, and ring topology. The performance of IEC61850 protection scheme 
using these topologies is investigated with different simulation tools. Conclusions are 
drawn below. 
 
I. Reliablity and availability analysis of process bus topologies 
 
The three process bus architecures are evaluated from the reliability point of view 
and the MTTF and availability of the feeder bay process bus topologies are 
calculated. It is found that star topology provides the highest MTTF of 5.639 years 
and the highest availability of 0.999997907. This architecture has the weakness 
that the failure of the central Ethernet switch will lead the entire communication 
system collapse. The cascaded topology provides the MTTF of 5.034 years and 
the availability of 0.999997369. Considering the first failure, the ring topology 
provides the same MTTF and availability as cascaded topology. However, ring 
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topology requires managed Ethernet switches with RSTP, which makes this 
architecture more expensive and complicated comparatively. 
 
II. Modelling and simulation for performance evaluation of process bus  topologies 
 
The OPNET Modeller simulation based feeder bay study shows that the star 
topology provides the shortest SV ETE delay of 0.031576 ms. The cascaded 
topology provides the SV ETE delay of 0.048348 ms, and the ring topology 
provides almost the same SV ETE delay of 0.048375 ms as cascaded topology.  
 
According to IEC61850, the acceptable maximum communication delay for the 
time-critical messages, SVs and GOOSE, is 3 ms. The size of the GOOSE 
message is smaller than the SV message, and the frequency is lower, hence the SV 
and GOOSE ETE delay of the MAIN protection for a feeder bay using the three 
different process bus topologies are small and tolerable. 
 
III. Protection performance study with commercial test set and RTDS simulator 
 
The tests with both commercial test set and RTDS Simulator demonstrate that the 
IEC61850 based relay and the conventional relay have a similar performance and 
respond with similar tripping times. It can be concluded that the latency of the 
process bus is small. 
 
The time offset introduced by the IEC61850-9-2 digitization process of the 
protection IED is approximately 1ms. It results that the analogue input is faster 
than the SV input on average. As the operating time  of a distance relay should be 
≤20ms, considering the worst case which is scenario 2 in section 3.3, the SV 
input delay is tolerable. The GOOSE trip signal is about 2.6 ms faster than the 
digital trip signal on average, which indicates that the GOOSE message 
digitization process of the protection IED is faster than the digital trip signal 
processing. 
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IV. Process bus overload test 
 
The OPNET process bus simulation results shows that because the bandwidth 
utilization efficiency of the OPNET Ethernet switch model is 85%, when the traffic 
on the process bus topologies reaches 85% of the communication link data rate, the 
SV ETE delay starts to increase with time rapidly. The max number of MUs that the 
three process bus topologies can tolerate is 17.  
 
The process bus overload tests to investigate the IEC61850 relay’s performance when 
the process bus traffic is overloaded demonstrate a consistent performance until the 
process bus is congestion collapse. The bandwidth utilization efficiency of the real 
Ethernet switch is 100% of the communication link data rate (100Mb/s). Under the 
congestion collapse condition, the protection becomes slower and the tripping times 
are increased. The max number of MUs that the three process bus topologies can 
tolerate is 20.  
 
7.2 Future Work 
The Ethernet standards comprise several wiring and signalling variants of the OSI 
physical layer in use with Ethernet. The original 10BASE5 Ethernet used coaxial 
cable as a shared medium. Later the coaxial cables were replaced by twisted pair and 
fibre optic links in conjunction with hubs and switches. Data rates were periodically 
increased from the original 10 megabits per second to 100 gigabits per second. 
 
The new Gigabit Ethernet provides a great opportunity for the design of process bus 
topologies. More complicated topologies can be evaluated, for example, the mesh 
topologies. 
 
Mesh topology is a type of computer network setup, where each of the computers and 
devices in the network are interconnected to one another. This allows most of the 
transmissions to be distributed, even if any one of the connection goes down. The 
connection between the devices and different nodes (computers) is made through hops. 
Some of the devices and nodes are connected through single hop and some are 
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connected with more than one hop. In a full mesh topology, every node is connected 
to every other node in the network. When data is traveling in a mesh network, the 
network is automatically configured to take the shortest route to reach the destination. 
In other words, the data is transferred through least number of hops.  
 
Mesh topologies involve the concept of routes. Unlike the cascaded, star and ring 
topology, messages sent on a mesh network can take any of several possible paths 
from source to destination. (Recall that even in a ring, although two cable paths exist, 
message can only travel in one direction.) The advantages of mesh topologies are: 
 
 There are dedicated links used in the topology, which guarantees, that each 
connection is able to carry its data load, thereby eliminating traffic problems, 
which are common, when links are shared by multiple devices. 
 
 It is a robust topology. When one link in the topology becomes unstable, it 
does not cause the entire system to halt. 
 
 If the network is to be expanded, it can be done without causing any 
disruption to current users of the network. 
 
 It is possible to transmit data, from one node to a number of other nodes 
simultaneously. 
 
 Troubleshooting, in case of a problem, is easy as compared to other network 
topologies. 
 
 This topology ensures data privacy and security, as every message travels 
along a dedicated link. 
 
With the upgrade of protection IED which can support the Gigabit Ethernet, the mesh 
process bus topologies are worth being investigated in the future. 
 
As concluded in the previous section, The time offset introduced by the IEC61850-9-
2 digitization process of the protection IED is approximately 1ms. The GOOSE trip 
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signal is about 2.6 ms faster than the digital trip signal on average. The results may be 
different if using protection IEDs from different manufacturers. Therefore, various 
protection IEDs should be involved in the protection performance study in order to 
improve the IEC61850-9-2 processing power and interoperability of the IEDs. 
 
IEEE 1588 has already been considered to be the next step in the development of the 
substation communication system synchronization. IEEE 1588 provides fault tolerant 
synchronization for different clocks along the same network. There is very little 
bandwidth consumption, processing power, and setup. IEEE 1588 accomplishes all of 
this by using the PTP (precision time protocol). The time protocol synchronizes all 
clocks within a network by adjusting clocks to the highest quality clock. IEEE 1588 
defines value ranges for the standard set of clock characteristics. The Best Master 
Clock (BMC) algorithm determines which clock is the highest quality clock within 
the network. The BMC (grandmaster clock) then synchronizes all other clocks (slave 
clocks) in the network. If the BMC is removed from the network or is determined by 
the BMC algorithm to no longer be the highest quality clock, the algorithm then 
redefines what the new BMC is and adjusts all other clocks accordingly. No 
administrator input is needed for this readjustment because the algorithm provides a 
fault tolerant. It is designed for applications that cannot bear the cost of a GPS 
receiver at each node, or for which GPS signals are inaccessible. The new standard 
needs to be investigated by applying on the synchronization of multiple MUs with 
only one GPS receiver. 
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Appendix 1 
The trip times of the four scenarios for the distance relay test using the commercial 
test set are shown in Table Appendix-1. The four scenarios are: 
 
 Scenario 1: Analogue input and Digital output – conventional hardwired; 
 Scenario 2: SV input and Digital output - hybrid implementation of IEC61850; 
 Scenario 3: Analogue input and GOOSE output – partial implementation of 
IEC61850; 
 Scenario 4: SV input and GOOSE output – complete implementation of 
IEC61850. 
 
Table Appendix-1 Trip time of the four scenarios for distance relay test 
Fault Point Angle Scenario 1 
trip time 
(ms) 
Scenario 2 
trip time 
(ms) 
Scenario 3 
trip time 
(ms) 
Scenario 4 
trip time 
(ms) 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.4 16.7 13.7 17.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.9 20.1 17.6 19.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.6 20.1 15.9 20 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.4 20 15.7 20.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 17.9 15.4 14.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.6 20.2 14.8 17 
40 km 70.00 ° 20.3 19.5 17.5 16.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 20 19.3 17.3 17.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 19.5 17.4 16.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.4 17.1 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 20 19.2 19.4 17.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 19.5 15.7 18 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 19.6 15.6 15.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 20.3 13.8 17.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19 18 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 20 19.6 16.2 20.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.8 20.2 13 15.7 
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40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 20.3 13.1 18.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.3 19.8 18.8 20.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19.1 15.8 19 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 16.4 16.3 16.1 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.8 20.2 19.6 20.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.7 19 15.1 18.7 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 18.2 14.9 15.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 19.3 15 14.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.4 19.3 15.2 20.4 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 18.5 15.5 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 16.3 15 18 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.3 19.9 18.4 14 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 16.8 13.9 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19.9 18.6 16 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 20.5 17 19.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.7 19.1 15 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 18.7 17 15.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 18.7 14.3 16.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.4 19.1 15.8 19.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 17.6 17.5 19.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.5 17.2 17.8 17.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 20.5 16.2 13.5 16 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.3 20.5 20 18.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 18.1 15.5 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 17.7 18.3 17.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.4 19 14.6 15.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.6 15.6 15.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 20.7 18.8 15.8 17 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.5 18.6 15 15.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 20.1 19 15.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 22.5 19.9 14.7 20.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 18.7 17.1 19.1 
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40 km 70.00 ° 16.9 19.1 16.6 16.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 19 19.2 14.8 17 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.3 19.3 14.9 15.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19.3 15.4 17.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.4 17 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.8 18.2 15.1 17.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.8 19.4 17.7 15.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.8 19.8 15.4 17.1 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.3 20.4 14.6 14.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.7 19 15.9 15.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.6 17.8 15.4 13.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 19.7 15.7 16.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.7 17.9 15.5 20.1 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.3 19.6 18.8 19.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.3 19.3 15.2 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 20.9 18.8 15.6 17.1 
40 km 70.00 ° 20.3 18.8 17.3 15.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.8 16.2 15.8 17.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 19 19.7 17.7 20.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.8 18.8 15.6 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19 17.2 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 20.4 20.3 16 18.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19.5 16.2 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.5 19.1 15.9 15.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.1 20.3 18.2 16.7 
40 km 70.00 ° 17 19.6 15.8 20.1 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 20.1 15.3 17.1 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 19 14.8 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.4 19.1 18.8 15.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 19.6 15.3 14.4 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.2 19.6 16.4 15.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 21.2 18 15.3 17.5 
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40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 18 19.3 20.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 21.3 19.7 14.6 17.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.1 18.1 14.8 19.7 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.6 19 17 19.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 19.2 18.5 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.2 19.7 14.3 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.3 19.8 16.4 17.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.6 20.3 18.3 16.3 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.2 18.9 15.7 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.7 20.1 13 18.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 17.4 18.9 16.3 18.6 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.6 19.5 15.2 16.8 
40 km 70.00 ° 16.6 19 17 17.7 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.5 19.5 15.2 16.2 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.8 19.2 17.5 18.4 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.9 17.6 15.6 15.9 
40 km 70.00 ° 18 19.6 15.3 18 
40 km 70.00 ° 19.7 19.9 16.1 17.5 
40 km 70.00 ° 18.9 19.9 15.1 17.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 218.4 214.1 215.3 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 218.4 211.6 214.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.2 218.3 216.4 218.8 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 217.4 213.5 218.3 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.6 218.9 216.3 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 217.6 214.4 214.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.9 218.3 215.5 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.9 218.8 213.8 213.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 218.4 215.7 213.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 218 214.8 214.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.1 216.6 215.3 214.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 217.5 213 214.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.8 217.4 218.4 215.8 
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115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 216.8 215.5 216.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 217.6 212.9 216.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 218.6 212.4 214.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.5 219.9 213.9 213.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 219.2 214.8 214.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.1 218.5 214 216 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.5 217.9 211.8 217.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 216 218.5 212.5 214.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 216.6 214 214 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 216.6 216.6 215.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 218.5 213.3 213.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 216.9 216 215.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.5 219.4 215.6 216.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.6 214 216.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 219.4 213 215.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 218.3 214.2 212.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.2 218.3 213.8 214.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 214.6 215.4 215.7 214.8 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.9 217.1 214.2 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.1 216.9 215.7 216.8 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 219.6 213.8 213.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.4 218.9 216.6 216.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.3 218.7 215.1 214.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 217 213.5 219 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.6 220 213.1 213.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.9 217.3 211.9 215.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.4 213.1 215.3 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.1 216.7 213.1 214.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 218 218 214 214.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 219.9 216.2 216.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 220.2 215 217.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 217.1 215.5 213.1 
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115 km 70.00 ° 218.1 219.5 212.6 214.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.7 219.9 212.2 216 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.6 217.6 216.9 215.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.8 217.3 214.7 213.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 217 218.8 213.4 216.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 217.8 214.8 215.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.8 217.5 212.4 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.9 217.5 213.8 216.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.8 218.2 213.2 216.1 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 216.7 214.1 215.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 217.9 213.5 216.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 216.9 215.4 215.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 218.3 214.2 214.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.2 216.9 216.3 213.8 
115 km 70.00 ° 221.7 216.3 212.6 215.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 216.7 213.8 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 215.9 214.7 214.3 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 219.3 214 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 219.3 214 214.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 214.8 219.2 212.7 216.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 216 219.4 214.1 217 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.9 216.9 218.6 215 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.8 219.9 213.3 215.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.1 217.2 216.2 216.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 214.9 218.9 215.2 214.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.3 218.4 217.9 215.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 220.2 214.3 215.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.5 218.9 213.2 214.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.8 215.5 212.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.3 217 213.6 213.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 218.5 215.1 213.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.4 218.4 213.8 214.7 
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115 km 70.00 ° 214.9 218.5 214.4 213.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 216 219 213.6 213.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.4 216.8 214 214.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.3 218.4 214.7 213.5 
115 km 70.00 ° 215 218.6 213.3 215.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 218 218.4 215.4 214.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 217 218.2 212.3 215.8 
115 km 70.00 ° 215.7 216 217.8 214.3 
115 km 70.00 ° 216 219 213 216.9 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 217.3 215.2 212.3 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.7 217.4 212.8 215.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.7 218.1 214.9 216.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.5 217.9 211.3 213 
115 km 70.00 ° 219.5 218.2 214 214.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 216.9 219.7 217.5 213.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 219.7 219.1 212.5 214.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.8 219.7 216.3 215.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 217.1 218.1 214.6 213.4 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.5 217.2 213.2 214.6 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.3 216.9 212.6 216.7 
115 km 70.00 ° 220.7 219.1 212.3 215.2 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.1 217.6 214 218 
115 km 70.00 ° 218.2 216.6 214.3 214.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 615.6 617 614.4 617.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.4 617.4 615.2 617.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 618 618.2 615.5 615.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.4 617.1 616.2 615.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 615.9 618.6 612.9 614.6 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 617 613.4 615.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.1 616.9 614.5 615.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 618.5 612.4 614.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 617 613.6 614.4 
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200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 616.6 612.6 612.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 617.3 614.5 615 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 618.8 615.8 612 
200 km 70.00 ° 616 615.6 611.5 614 
200 km 70.00 ° 616 617.7 615.2 614.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 616 617.7 613.8 613.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.6 613.3 615.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 617 616.2 612.4 615.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 618.6 614.3 618.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 617.1 614.2 616.6 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 615.1 614.6 614 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 616.6 614.5 614.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617 615.2 618.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.4 613.8 616.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 616.9 613 614.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 617 619.7 615.1 614 
200 km 70.00 ° 618 619.4 611.9 613.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.5 617 616.4 614.6 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617.6 613.5 615.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 619.5 612.5 614.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 617.5 613.8 614.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 616.7 613.7 615 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.6 617.5 612.6 614.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 620.4 613 615.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.2 618.6 615.9 616.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 617.4 614.1 619.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 617 616 615 617.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 619 614.6 616.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.9 617 613.1 614.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 617.7 614 614.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 616.9 612.7 615 
200 km 70.00 ° 618 617 614.5 615.3 
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200 km 70.00 ° 615.1 618.7 614.3 615.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 617.3 614.6 615.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 619.7 617.1 615.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.5 615.5 615 614.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617.6 614.1 613.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 619.1 617.7 614 
200 km 70.00 ° 617 617.2 614.7 614.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.6 614.1 619.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 615.2 618.4 614.3 614.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 614.6 617.7 616.1 617.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 618.4 613.5 614.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 619.6 615.8 617.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.6 616.3 613.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.5 613.7 613 
200 km 70.00 ° 616 618.4 613.5 614.6 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 616.8 613.6 613.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 618 613.2 613.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.8 614 615 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.4 618.4 615.4 614.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 618.8 614.4 613.4 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.9 616.1 615.3 614.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 615.5 618.2 617.8 615.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 617.4 613.1 615.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 617.8 615 614.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 617.4 613.7 616.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 615.8 618.4 613.9 615.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 618.5 614 613.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 616 616.5 612.8 616.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 618.5 615.5 615 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.8 617.1 612.9 613.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.7 618.2 612.8 614.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 617.6 615.2 614.4 
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200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 617.7 613.5 615.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 617 613 614.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 617.4 612.7 613.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.7 616.9 614.6 615.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 615.9 619.2 613.3 614.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.3 617.4 614.5 617 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.8 618.2 613.6 614.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 620 611.4 617.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.1 617.3 613.1 615.1 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.5 616.1 613.7 614.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.1 619.2 615.2 614.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 618 619 614.2 614.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.2 617.8 613.7 614.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 617.9 615.7 614.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.2 619.1 612.5 613.8 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.8 617.4 613.9 615.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 617.8 614.5 614 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.2 618.4 614.7 612.9 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.5 614.1 614.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 617.1 616.5 613.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.6 616.9 613.3 614.5 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.5 618.5 617.2 614.6 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.2 618.7 613.3 614.3 
200 km 70.00 ° 616.3 618 616.4 618.2 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.6 619.2 616.1 613.7 
200 km 70.00 ° 618.7 620 615.6 614 
200 km 70.00 ° 617.4 618.8 614.3 616.9 
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Appendix 2 
The trip times of the four scenarios for the current differential relay test using the 
commercial test set are shown in Table Appendix-2. 
 
Table Appendix-2 Trip time of the four scenarios for current differential relay test 
Test No. Scenario 1 
trip time (ms) 
Scenario 2 
trip time (ms) 
Scenario 3 
trip time (ms) 
Scenario 4 
trip time (ms) 
1 27.4 26.7 23.9 23.8 
2 29.2 25.7 25.5 23.3 
3 27 27.2 24.2 28.4 
4 25.7 26.7 22.5 23.2 
5 23.4 25.9 19.8 26.6 
6 25.2 25 22 21.9 
7 25.5 26.3 22.4 22.8 
8 24.4 23.7 21.2 21 
9 28 24 25.4 21.5 
10 27.4 25.3 24.3 22.3 
11 25 25.8 21.9 26.6 
12 28.1 25.7 24.1 23.4 
13 27.5 27.4 27.7 24.6 
14 27.8 25.8 26.8 27.5 
15 26 23.3 22.6 21.3 
16 26 26.8 23.5 23.4 
17 28.4 27.7 25 24.6 
18 24.7 24.7 21.7 21.7 
19 25.8 29.4 22.6 27.4 
20 25.6 26.5 22.2 23.4 
21 24.6 27.3 21.4 26.4 
22 26.8 27 24 24.1 
23 25.1 27.6 22 29.3 
24 27.3 31.3 24.8 30.5 
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25 28 24.1 25.8 21.6 
26 25.5 23 22.4 22.5 
27 26.6 26.1 23.5 23.1 
28 28.4 26.4 27.6 27.8 
29 27.3 24.9 23.7 22.7 
30 27.7 26.7 25 23.7 
31 25.3 22.9 22.4 23 
32 28.5 28.9 28.7 29 
33 26.4 23.5 23.1 21.2 
34 24.1 27.6 23.5 24.4 
35 26.9 26.7 23.7 23.6 
36 25.6 24 23 23 
37 26.4 25.9 23.1 22.9 
38 24.2 24.7 21.2 21.2 
39 27.9 27.3 24.4 24.2 
40 24.8 24.7 21.6 21.7 
41 24.8 24.1 23.7 23.4 
42 25.7 24.8 22.9 21.3 
43 26.6 25.2 23.2 22.4 
44 25.6 25.9 22.6 22.6 
45 28 24.5 25.1 21.1 
46 23.9 25.1 20.7 22.4 
47 29.8 28.1 26.1 24.5 
48 26 28.9 22.9 28.8 
49 26.2 27.6 25.8 28.2 
50 26.4 24.4 23.2 21.8 
51 25.8 26.4 24.4 25.9 
52 25.6 24 22.4 21.1 
53 25.5 27.3 22.2 24.6 
54 26.4 23.8 24.3 22 
55 27.8 25.2 25.4 22.4 
56 23.9 25.2 20.7 23.3 
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57 27.3 25.9 23.8 22.4 
58 25.3 27.9 22.1 24.2 
59 25.9 25.5 25.1 21.9 
60 26.4 25.5 23.4 22.8 
61 23.2 26.4 20.1 23.5 
62 25.4 27.5 23.1 23.9 
63 26.9 23.4 23.8 20.3 
64 24.4 27.4 21.1 24.6 
65 27.8 25.9 26.7 22.9 
66 24.9 27.9 21.7 24.7 
67 27.3 25.7 23.6 22.3 
68 27 24.6 23.7 21.7 
69 25.7 27.8 22.5 24.2 
70 27.4 25.3 26.3 22.4 
71 27.3 24.8 23.9 22.7 
72 27.5 26 26.5 23 
73 24.3 26.3 21.3 23.4 
74 25.4 24 23.9 20.8 
75 26.7 26.1 23.4 22.9 
76 26.8 26.4 23.9 23 
77 24.1 26.9 20.7 24.4 
78 28.8 24.6 25.3 24.8 
79 24.6 27.4 21.1 24.4 
80 26.8 26.5 23.7 22.8 
81 26.4 27 23.4 25.9 
82 25.9 26.9 22.6 23.6 
83 23.8 23.3 20.5 20.2 
84 28.1 26.2 26.8 22.6 
85 24.3 25.1 21.3 21.8 
86 27.8 22.5 24.5 19.5 
87 28.1 26.5 25.1 27.6 
88 28.6 26.9 25.4 23.6 
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89 24.4 25.1 22.1 24.4 
90 25.1 26.6 21.8 23 
91 27.8 27.1 24.1 23.6 
92 27.1 23.6 24.5 22.9 
93 25.8 27.7 22.4 25.6 
94 23.5 24.3 19.9 21.4 
95 25.6 28 22.2 24.6 
96 26.6 28.4 23.6 26.1 
97 26.5 25.7 23.4 22.5 
98 26.4 24.2 22.9 21.2 
99 26.6 24.6 23.5 21.1 
100 25 26 22.1 23.1 
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Appendix 3 
Increasing the traffic on the star topology process bus by injecting SVs into the 
process bus, the tripping times of the IEC61850 distance relay are shown in Table 
Appendix-3. 
 
Table Appendix-3a Trip times of process bus overload test using star topology  
(1 to 20 SVs) 
1 SV 
Trip Time 
5 SV 
Trip Time 
10 SV 
Trip Time  
15 SV 
Trip Time 
19 SV 
Trip Time 
 20 SV 
Trip Time 
15.75 16.55 16.65 14.5 16.7 16.05 
16.85 16.2 16.15 15 16.25 16 
16.25 16.4 15.4 15.5 16 15.4 
16.45 18.25 15.5 16.15 16.15 16.25 
15.35 16.4 16.35 15.6 16.5 17.35 
15.2 15.6 17.1 15.35 15.4 16.55 
16.35 15.5 16.95 16.9 16.25 17.05 
16.35 14.7 17.05 16.4 16.85 14.7 
16.4 15.75 16.15 16.05 14.55 15.65 
15.45 15.55 15.5 15.2 16.35 16.2 
16.75 15.5 17.35 15.25 15.55 16.25 
15.4 16.05 14.95 15.4 15.65 16.4 
15.3 15.95 15.35 15.65 16.1 15.65 
15.05 15.9 16.3 15.3 16.45 14.8 
15.8 15.05 16.1 16.7 16.05 15.85 
15.45 17.9 15.55 16.25 15.1 16.6 
15.9 15.9 16.4 16.8 17.6 17.1 
16.45 16.6 30.95 16.25 16.4 16.5 
16.5 16.85 16.75 15.7 17.95 15.15 
16.15 16.7 15.55 15.85 17.1 16.7 
15.35 14.45 16.9 16.85 17 16.05 
16.35 15.3 15.5 16.3 14.55 16.65 
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16.35 16.25 16.8 15.7 15.95 16.25 
16.3 16.3 15.7 15.75 17.1 15.6 
16.55 16.65 29.95 15 15.75 15.05 
14.9 16.05 15.95 15.35 16.05 15 
15.3 15.2 14.75 16.2 15.6 16.35 
15.1 15.7 15.6 29.45 16.05 16.4 
15.6 15.45 16.4 15.25 15.45 16.6 
16.2 15.5 17.4 15.95 17.55 15.45 
15.95 16.8 17 15.55 16.85 16.4 
16.45 16.15 15.35 15.35 16.25 15.45 
15.6 16.3 16.45 15.85 14.85 15.4 
15.55 15.7 15.7 16.35 15.8 16.3 
16.3 16.75 15.95 16.55 15.65 16.4 
16.65 15.3 29.75 15.1 17.7 18 
16.65 14.8 16.95 15.3 14.6 17.05 
16.1 15.35 15.35 15.65 15.5 14.6 
15.65 14.8 15.1 16.15 16.25 17.1 
17.1 15.5 15.05 17.6 16.15 15.75 
16.1 16.15 15.95 17.1 14.85 16.35 
15.65 16.1 16.65 15.95 15.55 15.5 
30.15 16.2 16.9 15.8 15.7 15.7 
14.65 15.95 16.65 15.5 16.25 15.75 
16 17.3 15.95 16.3 15.85 14.55 
15.9 15.8 15.4 17 17.4 15.95 
15.8 16.7 16 16.25 16.15 16.1 
16.3 16.2 17 16.55 16.4 16.1 
16.05 16.2 16.15 16 16.05 15.9 
15.3 16.15 17 15.25 16.15 15.05 
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Table Appendix-3b Trip times of process bus overload test using star topology 
(21 to 40 SVs) 
21 SV 
Trip Time 
25 SV 
Trip Time 
30 SV 
Trip Time  
35 SV 
Trip Time 
40 SV 
Trip Time 
49.3 61.75 28.9 46.7 159.6 
46.85 51.25 46.75 47.4 49.75 
51.2 31.85 45.95 32.45 45.6 
15.85 32.35 46.8 64.45 49.5 
15.1 29.9 50.05 47.6 50 
17.3 16.45 51.4 72 17.15 
16 15.6 15.85 18.2 59.2 
15.35 46.45 71.4 47 57.85 
16.2 51.05 47.25 50.2 46.6 
16.05 52.15 20 256.2 23.85 
51.95 50.25 51 19.1 19.4 
16.5 50.5 33.85 22.2 47.55 
15.65 17.35 43.95 47.15 51.7 
16.95 23.25 48.8 46.35 46.05 
16.45 47.4 36.9 48.55 50.05 
31.3 50 50.89 48.9 50.3 
17.95 16.95 44.65 51.7 50.1 
21.65 49.9 50.35 51.65 55.7 
16.6 52.5 67.4 46 65.85 
16.35 49.6 29.2 16.8 47.2 
29.85 34.2 47.9 56.3 28.3 
16.1 60.5 50.35 42.35 46.2 
15.65 14.8 47.3 29.8 50.1 
15.85 49.15 49.65 34.85 77.45 
16.1 45.5 48.95 52.75 45.45 
44.15 45 49.35 50.55 52.5 
14.9 16.2 47.05 49.05 50.3 
15.65 31.7 29.5 45.75 49.25 
15.9 31.3 45.9 47.2 50.4 
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15.7 46.4 66.55 51.25 46.75 
15.7 14.7 26.8 48.15 188 
15.95 22.85 45.3 69.7 54.8 
16.2 49.45 65.8 51.25 135 
16.35 16.1 45.35 51.1 45.85 
15.95 47.85 49.6 19.15 51.55 
16.3 16.35 45.7 48.6 39.95 
29.55 15.15 50.75 49.15 56.55 
15.65 16.55 52.25 51.8 46.25 
18.7 28.2 49.45 16 36.25 
47.1 15.6 16.85 50.3 46.05 
37.05 39.95 48.5 63.45 17.15 
48.5 48.95 66.4 49.25 45.6 
16 29.6 33.8 49.25 49.7 
17.1 28.15 44.85 71.4 46.35 
16.5 16.6 51.4 51.15 29 
16.9 46.1 48.3 65.55 48.6 
17.25 29.6 23.4 48.65 49.9 
16.8 23.1 51.3 51.15 55.1 
45.6 48.85 51 34.55 49.1 
39.6 49.7 47.6 50.25 49.55 
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Appendix 4 
Increasing the traffic on the cascaded topology process bus by injecting SVs into the 
process bus, the tripping times of the IEC61850 distance relay are shown in Table 
Appendix-4. 
 
Table Appendix-4a Trip times of process bus overload test using cascaded topology  
(1 to 20 SVs) 
1 SV 
Trip Time 
5 SV 
Trip Time 
10 SV 
Trip Time  
15 SV 
Trip Time 
19 SV 
Trip Time 
 20 SV 
Trip Time 
16.25 17.2 15.8 17.8 17.25 16.6 
16.35 16 15.3 16.45 16.2 15.3 
16.75 15.85 15.25 16.9 16.3 16.15 
15.35 15.75 16.1 16.35 16.15 16.05 
16.15 16.9 16.45 16.15 16.6 16.4 
15.45 16.55 15.75 15.85 16.7 17.2 
15.1 16.8 15.45 15.85 15.35 15.6 
17.05 15.4 17.75 15.6 14.95 16.4 
16.4 14.95 15.7 15.45 15.75 16 
16.25 14.75 16.4 15.6 15.75 15.25 
16.2 16.2 17.15 17 16.2 16.7 
15.1 16.15 16.45 16.55 16.2 16.25 
15.75 15.55 16.25 16.1 16.65 16.35 
15.7 17 15.85 16.55 17.1 16.95 
16.8 15.05 15.75 15.5 16.9 16.35 
15.9 16.1 16.4 16.6 15.7 18.2 
16.05 16.6 16.65 16.3 16 16.5 
15.75 17.4 15.85 17.35 16.85 16.5 
17.4 17.15 15.7 16.3 16.5 16.6 
15.45 16.95 16.5 17.1 16.85 16.45 
16 15.8 16 16 14.75 15.75 
16.3 15.4 17.2 15.35 14.95 14.95 
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15 15.95 15.9 16.05 16.35 15.65 
18.95 16.15 16.2 27.6 16.25 15.55 
17.25 15.35 16 16.55 16.1 15.75 
16.15 15.8 15.55 15.95 15.9 15.5 
17.2 16.2 17.15 14.85 15.3 15.2 
16 16.65 16.85 16.45 15.8 15.5 
15.95 16 16.6 16.35 16.05 15.65 
16.4 16.3 16.15 15.9 15.65 15.8 
16.7 15.75 16.6 15.95 24.2 15.7 
16.3 16.1 15.8 17.2 16.4 16.15 
16.2 16.8 15.1 16.6 16.5 16.55 
15.95 16.9 16.1 16.1 17 16.85 
15.75 15.2 15.95 15.25 15.8 16.65 
16.55 16.25 16.1 15.85 16.3 14.65 
16.3 15.15 16.6 15.55 16.55 15.4 
16.15 16.2 16.4 16.9 15.6 16.5 
15.9 16 17.3 14.85 15.9 16.25 
16.9 16.9 16.1 15.9 15.65 15.6 
16.6 16.35 15.7 16.55 15.7 15.9 
16.05 15.65 16.9 16.9 16.65 19.05 
15.85 15.25 16.35 16.25 17.2 16.2 
28.95 16.65 16.55 16.05 16.3 17.3 
15.55 16.2 15.75 15.3 19.65 17.05 
16.15 17 16.7 18.45 15.15 16.4 
27.55 15.9 16.55 16.25 16.4 15.65 
16.75 16.45 15.25 17.35 17 15.55 
16.1 16.35 15.55 15.1 16.25 16.5 
16.6 15.8 15.35 15.4 16.7 16.55 
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Table Appendix-4b Trip times of process bus overload test using cascaded topology 
(21 to 40 SVs) 
21 SV 
Trip Time 
25 SV 
Trip Time 
30 SV 
Trip Time  
35 SV 
Trip Time 
40 SV 
Trip Time 
46.4 59.6 77.05 49.5 49.7 
31.1 16.3 22.6 109.4 46.25 
16.3 30.25 49.35 62.15 45.8 
17.15 19.65 49.95 91.4 49.4 
16.85 51.75 51.05 50.3 56.1 
15.4 16.05 47.95 46.35 51.2 
38.3 32.35 47.25 49.8 49.65 
31.2 18.95 50.55 49.4 51.6 
16.8 26.8 46.35 49.05 49.9 
30.2 19.75 50.95 50.05 73.15 
16.55 45.5 16.8 56.75 17.45 
16.45 30.55 50.65 47.35 47.25 
16.8 48.55 47.5 59.1 39.9 
45.3 21.1 215.9 129.4 49.9 
15.8 49.7 31.95 17.1 61.75 
49.85 18.5 49 220.1 129.5 
18.75 15.65 50 49.75 49.75 
18.7 48.45 61.6 46.6 50.35 
16.85 15.9 174.6 51.7 51.3 
48.35 43.55 52.35 48.8 49.3 
16.85 16.1 52.35 18.1 51.6 
17.75 30.15 50.55 86.6 50.05 
15.3 23.65 64.25 49.3 58.25 
17.05 48.25 22.1 51.35 49.05 
19.05 21.65 50.7 88.2 50.05 
17.5 46.3 30.7 25.4 50.55 
30.45 18.55 45.65 49.95 51.3 
31.9 50.9 50.55 49.8 27.05 
16.9 16.55 51.35 52.2 51.3 
Page 
   Appendix 
 
 219
31.15 47.3 26.45 45.9 50.35 
48.4 49.35 31.65 27.3 50 
38.7 46.55 45.3 48.65 48.4 
16.25 47.45 49.95 47.05 52.1 
17.5 47.5 52 18.9 48.3 
17.1 20.65 60.5 49.4 46.65 
18.5 39.2 50.9 52 51.25 
15.35 50.2 50.75 136.3 51.6 
16.6 18.3 49.8 31.8 78.4 
30.5 49.3 47.1 51.2 52.6 
32.95 59.5 50.6 21.4 50.2 
30.4 17.05 50.15 50.15 35.3 
16.65 49.4 50.8 46.8 48.6 
30.1 51.1 29.55 49.8 51.95 
31.95 18.05 32.65 18.25 49.6 
16.55 49.65 16.95 53.1 49.45 
15.95 16.25 46.65 29.85 52.1 
17.05 51.25 47 48.55 50.25 
17.45 18.3 19.05 46.75 48.9 
30.55 16.25 42.85 46.75 30.95 
15.25 49.05 16.6 51.15 47.3 
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Appendix 5 
Increasing the traffic on the ring topology process bus by injecting SVs into the 
process bus, the tripping times of the IEC61850 distance relay are shown in Table 
Appendix-5. 
 
Table Appendix-5a Trip times of process bus overload test using ring topology  
(1 to 20 SVs) 
1 SV 
Trip Time 
5 SV 
Trip Time 
10 SV 
Trip Time  
15 SV 
Trip Time 
19 SV 
Trip Time 
 20 SV 
Trip Time 
16 15.4 16.65 15.85 16.1 15.9 
14.9 15.5 14.85 18.3 15.65 16.7 
16.8 16.8 16.4 18.35 15.65 16.65 
16.2 16.1 15.6 15.45 17.2 15.15 
16.95 16.55 16.35 16.4 16.25 14.95 
17.3 17 17.15 16.35 15.8 15.35 
16.5 16.3 18.5 17.4 16.45 16.65 
16 14.55 16.45 24 16.65 16.6 
15.45 15.4 15.4 17.05 16.1 17.7 
15.35 16.05 16.75 15.75 16.5 15.9 
15.15 15.6 15.35 16.05 19.45 15.55 
14.9 15.85 15.2 16.25 15.45 16.55 
15.4 16.6 14.6 16.55 30.45 16.05 
16.4 17.15 15.5 16.65 15.75 16.3 
15.8 16.4 16.4 17.1 16.6 16.8 
16 16.15 15.75 14.5 16.5 14.9 
15.9 15.9 16.2 15.75 17.45 15 
15.4 16.2 15.9 16.25 15.75 15.05 
15.9 16.45 15.8 15.3 16.2 15.3 
15.75 16.95 16.2 15.4 16.3 16.7 
15.55 28 16.2 15.5 17.15 16.05 
16 16.8 16.3 15.6 16.65 30.95 
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16.05 15.7 16.9 15.6 31.75 16.75 
16.65 16.65 16.3 15.95 18.95 15.1 
16.05 17.05 16.25 16.4 16.15 16.5 
16.5 15.65 18.4 15.75 16.15 16.65 
15.5 15.4 15.8 15.7 16.25 16.4 
15.75 15.5 16.4 16.7 16 17.8 
15.3 15.3 15.65 16.15 17.6 15.55 
15.3 16.4 15.65 15.9 15.4 15.4 
16 16.6 15.65 32.35 15.85 15 
16.45 16.45 16.2 15.85 16.8 15.55 
15.3 16.2 15.45 15.1 16.4 16 
16.55 16.25 16 17.65 15.65 16.75 
15.65 15.95 15.85 15.75 15.4 15.9 
15.95 17.05 15.7 16.35 15.7 15.8 
17.1 16.25 18.95 18 16.5 14.95 
17.1 16.45 17.65 15.9 16.55 16.5 
17.25 16.4 16.2 16.3 14.95 16.05 
16.15 15.65 15.95 16.05 14.6 24.75 
15.85 16.15 15.95 16.25 15.6 16.6 
15.95 15.5 15.4 16.6 16.15 16.9 
15.4 16.05 16.05 17 16.75 16.75 
14.95 18.55 16.65 17.15 16.1 15.5 
15 16.05 16.7 14.65 17.5 16.85 
16.25 15.8 16.3 15.9 17.6 16 
16.7 17.7 15.95 15.9 15.45 16.4 
16.4 17.3 15.95 15.8 16.5 15.2 
15.55 16.75 15.65 15.3 16.35 17.45 
16.5 16 19.65 14.9 16.15 15.65 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 
   Appendix 
 
 222
Table Appendix-5b Trip times of process bus overload test using ring topology  
(21 to 40 SVs) 
21 SV 
Trip Time 
25 SV 
Trip Time 
30 SV 
Trip Time  
35 SV 
Trip Time 
40 SV 
Trip Time 
15.1 53.05 30.25 48.8 47.5 
50.25 46.8 51.75 51.2 48.55 
16 16.2 51.35 44.85 29.4 
16.6 16.55 44.85 50.95 70.95 
16.5 47.25 50.15 34.35 50.35 
14.8 50.05 50 46.45 52.5 
17.1 51.5 46 51.55 83 
15.25 18.8 49.7 49.9 75.45 
17.65 45.6 45.9 19.2 47.4 
32.15 38 47.25 29.6 50.5 
16.7 51.6 19.85 57.4 50.7 
17 46.55 38.65 49.75 54.4 
16.85 16 32.5 49.65 20.9 
47.6 15.4 49.8 49.55 23.7 
15.5 50.05 50.15 51.25 49.7 
16.1 18.4 61.2 37.65 51.7 
23.6 33.05 49.9 49 46.5 
17.5 50.25 47.9 26.35 51 
15.5 17.15 50.9 48.8 58.35 
48.25 50.4 55.25 49.15 63.95 
16.35 17.05 47.3 52.7 46.3 
16.8 49.9 15 50.35 49.95 
15.85 27.05 19.05 49.75 48.55 
46 16.75 44.9 30.8 58.4 
17.2 39.8 27.1 30.2 47.85 
15.5 16.9 77.95 48.9 48.3 
19 30.4 51.35 44.9 68.6 
16.5 30.6 46.7 50.4 47.2 
15.7 49.65 30.75 40.15 50.65 
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19.1 49.7 18.3 36.95 47.55 
16.8 18.8 49.1 53.65 49.85 
36.9 31.9 45.8 50.6 49.8 
16.15 47.35 52.45 46.85 36.8 
31.45 16.45 46.45 45.1 16.8 
17.55 50.4 51.4 105.8 50.55 
16.1 15.85 38.6 49.05 50.85 
17.75 15.15 31.3 49.7 53.15 
19.15 17.65 49.9 63 48.55 
18.95 29.4 49.4 53.75 49.85 
16.25 15.95 17.1 42.9 78.1 
30.4 47.4 27.9 51.45 28.2 
16.55 16.85 35.8 48.9 47.1 
46.4 49.5 31.3 50.05 48.2 
17.8 48.1 49.05 45.85 49.65 
46.25 17.7 30.65 46.95 51 
31.05 16.4 30.05 48.8 47.3 
16.75 15.5 279 131.3 50.05 
16.95 18.45 36.3 46.4 50.55 
48.3 18.45 54.2 34.55 49.6 
30.95 50.35 50.4 49.95 47.2 
Page 
   Publications 
 224
Publications 
Xin Sun and Miles A Redfern, “An Investigation into the Design of an IEC61850 
Based Protection Relay”, 44th International Universities’ Power Engineering 
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M A Redfern, X Sun, Wen An, P A Crossley, Li Yang and H Grasset, “IEC61850 
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Xin Sun, Miles Redfern, Peter Crossley, Li Yang, HaiYu Li, U B Anombem, Wen An, 
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